Waugh v. . WaughWaugh v. . Waugh
A testator, owning two farms, adjoining each other, devised to his son J. W. “one of the farms, describing it as one hundred acres of land which formerly belonged to my brother J. W.” He then gave and bequeathed to his grandson, R. W., the other farm, describing it as “the old homestead whereon I lived at the time of making my will, containing one hundred acres.” Held that the latter words were not in any way descriptive, or intended to be, of the subject of the devise. That the descriptions of the two pieces were definite and capable of being exactly located by the deeds; that there was no ambiguity, and therefore no necessity for, or propriety in, resorting to parol proof of the testator‘s intentions.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Suprеme Court. The action was to recover damages for an alleged trespass by the defendant upon lands claimed by the plaintiff. The parties were owners of adjoining farms; the farm of the plaintiff lying on the west of that of the defendant, and the only controverted question was as to the true location of the division line. Both farms were originally owned by Rоbert Waugh, the grandfather of the parties. The farm of the defendant was conveyed to old Robert Waugh by William Scott, in 1769, and in 1807 he got title to that of the plaintiff by a deed, in which it is bounded east by the farm of the defendant. Robert Waugh, the grandfather, died in 1816, seised of the two farms in question, leaving a will, by which he devised to James Waugh, the father of the parties, the farm of the present plaintiff, describing it as “one hun
James Waugh, the father, made a will devising to the plaintiff the farm now owned by him, describing it as the farm “whereon my son Robert now lives,” and bounded on the east “by the farm on which I now live, and given to my son Robert after my decease.”
The deed from Scott to Robert Waugh, in 1769, of the farm of the defendant, conveyed a tract of land by courses and distances, being one half of a lot of two hundred acres, known as lot No. 2, of land formerly granted to Alexander Baird and others, “beginning at the northeast corner of said lot No. 2, being a pepperage tree, marked with a blaze and two notches on four sides,” &c. The deed of 1807, of the plaintiff‘s farm, described a farm of one hundred acres, by estimation, and bounded “on the east by the lands belonging to Robert Waugh.” The plaintiff proved that the farm described in the deed from Scott, in 1769, had always been known as the “homestead,” аnd claimed that a survey of the same, according to the description in the deed, located the division line between the two farms east of the spot on which the alleged trespass was committed; and evidence of such a survey was given on the part of the plaintiff.
On the part of the defendant it was claimed that the division line between the two fаrms had been practically located and established by Robert Waugh, the grandfather of the parties, while he was the owner and in possession of both farms; and there was no dispute but that if the line was as
Evidence was also given, on the part of the defendant, of a survey made by a surveyor, on which it appeared that the whole tract, embracing both farms, contained 202 77/100 acres, and that running the line, as claimed by the defendant, gave to the plaintiff‘s farm a frаction over one hundred acres. The plaintiff was present at this survey and said that he would agree to run the line by the monuments, the stump and tree.
After the defendant rested, the plaintiff gave evidence of the declarations of Robert Waugh and James Waugh, to the effect that the line between the farms had never been run, and that they did not know where it ran.
Thе court charged the jury as follows: “The lands have been owned in such a manner as to exclude any practical location, and if the line can be located by survey, according to the calls of the deeds, that is, of course, the true location, and can not be defeated by any of the statements or admissions of the ancestors when in рossession of both farms.” To this charge the counsel for the defendant excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment being entered thereon, the defendant appealed to the court at general term where it was affirmed. The defendant appealed to this court.
J. H. Reynolds, for the appellant.
A. J. Parker, for the respondent.
WRIGHT, J. The jury were instructed that the lands embraсing the farms of the plaintiff and defendant had been owned in such a manner as to exclude any practical location; and if the line between the farms could be located by surveys according to the calls of the deeds, that was, of course, the true location, and could not be defeated by any of the statements or admissions of the anсestors of the parties when in possession of both farms. The latter proposition was repeated in a somewhat altered form, though substantially to the same effect, viz. that if the starting point given by the deed could be found, and the lines accurately run and determined by the courses and distances of the deed, the boundaries must be settled by their calls, and сould not be altered or affected by the parol evidence.
Two propositions were contained in the charge: First. That the lands had been owned in such a way as to exclude any practical location; and, second, that if the line could be located by surveys, according to the calls of the deeds, that was the true locatiоn, and could not be defeated by parol statements or admissions of the ancestors when in possession
But it is now urged by the defendant‘s counsel, that the case was tried and went to the jury upon an erroneous theory. The question, it is said, as to the line between the farms, and whether the defendant was a trespasser, did not depend upon the courses and distances in the old deeds or any of them; but as the grandfather, Robert Waugh, by his will in 1816, devised to the defendant, his grandson, the “old homestead” whereon he then lived, the real and sole question was where the west line was, as intended by the testator, or what part of the two hundred acres he intended to give to the defendant under the name of “the homestead whereon he lived at the time he made his will.”
The difficulty is, there is nothing in the terms of the devise to the defendant, or in the proof given by him, to support such a position. The words of the devise are: “I give and bequeаth to my grandson, Robert Waugh, the old homestead, whereon I lived at the time of making my will, containing one hundred acres.” This followed a devise to the testator‘s son “of one hundred acres of land which formerly belonged to my [his] brother James Waugh,” which was the West place, as distinguished from the “old homestead.” The devise to the grandson was the farm known and designated аs the “old homestead,” on which the testator is described as living at the time of making his will. The gift was of the tract of land known as the testator‘s “homestead,” and not of a particular tract, within established boundaries, occupied by the testator at the time of making his will. In short, the words “whereon I lived at the time of making my will,” is not in any way descriptive, or intended to be, of the subjеct of the devise. The devise to the defendant was of the “old homestead,” and to the father of the plaintiff “the one hundred acres which were formerly owned by the testator‘s brother James.” These were definite descriptions, and capa
The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
ROSEKRANS, J. The sole question in the case is, whether the declarations of Robert Waugh and James Waugh were competent to control the language of the deed and wills. No monument being mentioned in the deed from William Scott, except the pepperage tree at the northeast corner of the farm conveyed by it, and the residue of the description being by courses and distances, it is clear that the true mode of ascertaining the extent and location of the premises conveyed is to follow the courses and distances as given in the deed. It is also clear that as the deed to Robert Waugh, from the heirs of James Waugh, described the premises conveyed as bounded on the east by lands belonging to said Robert Waugh, this line could only be ascertained by running the west line of the defendant‘s farm according to the Scott deed. The land devised to the plaintiff‘s father being described as the farm formerly owned by James Waugh, and the land devised to the plaintiff being described as the homestead, which the proof showed was the name by which the east farm, described in the Scott deed, required the running of the division line between the two farms according to the courses and distances given in that deed. There is no аmbiguity in the language of either of the deeds or devises. The paper title of the plaintiff to the premises where the trees were cut is thus shown to be perfect. No authority is needed to show that the parol evidence offered was inadmissible to contradict the plain language of the deeds and devises. The declarations of Robert Waugh the elder could not be proved to contradict the language of his will, as to the subjects of the devises to his son and grandson. The devise to the former was of the farm formerly belonging to the testator‘s brother, James Waugh. This, as the deed showed, was of land bounded on the east by lands belonging to the testator, and
The parol declarations of James Waugh, the father of the plaintiff, could not operate as a disclaimer of his title to all the land covered by the devise to him; nor could they operate to defeat his title, on the ground thаt they operated as a practical location of the line between the two farms. Such location can be made effectual to transfer title when the agreement for that purpose has been made between adjoining owners of land, and there has been an adverse holding in conformity with the practical location for a period of twenty years. No such adverse holding was shown, and from the nature of the occupancy of both farms down to 1841 there could be no such holding. Since that time there did not appear to have been any adverse holding in conformity with the declarations shown. If there had been, the time was too short to defeat the paper title. It follows that the proof of such declarations could not, in any aspect of the case, be admitted in evidence. The judgment should be affirmed.
All the Judges concurring,
Judgment affirmed.