Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of felony murder, the underlying felony being criminal damage to property in the first degree. In Case No. S93A1629, appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction and life sentence entered on the jury’s guilty verdict and, in Case No. S93A1630, he appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial. 1
1. The notice of appeal in Case No. S93A1629 was timely filed. Accordingly, that case “is pending before this court. Case [No. S93A1630] is dismissed as redundant.”
Elwell v. Nesmith,
2. Appellant enumerates the general grounds.
Construing the evidence most strongly in support of the verdict shows the following: Appellant’s 19-year-old half-brother, Eric Prince, dropped a rock weighing more than 40 pounds from a bridge which crossed a metropolitan interstate highway. The rock crashed through the windshield of a car and killed a passenger therein. Only 15 minutes earlier, appellant himself had thrown a garbage can from the same bridge and struck another vehicle. After this incident, appellant *693 instructed Prince to select the largest rock that he could find, so that he could throw it from the bridge. Appellant then assisted Prince in moving the rock to the bridge and watched Prince as he dropped the rock.
“A person commits the offense of criminal damage to property in the first degree when he . . . [k]nowingly and without authority interferes with any property in a manner so as to endanger human life. . . .” OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1). Appellant aided and abetted Prince in throwing a large rock from a bridge into the path of oncoming traffic, thereby interfering with the on-coming vehicles in a manner so as to endanger human life. The
testimony of the State’s witnesses, [including] evidence of appellant’s flight, was sufficient to authorize a rational trior of fact to have found proof of appellant’s guilt. . . as a party to [criminal damage to property in the first degree] beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cit.]
Garrett v. State,
As a 15-year-old, appellant was not incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent to violate OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1). OCGA § 16-3-1. As defined in OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1), criminal damage to property in the first degree is a felonious act which is inherently dangerous or life-threatening and that felony can, therefore, support a felony murder conviction. Compare
Ford v. State,
“As a party to [criminal damage to property in the first degree, OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1)], [appellant] was liable for the consequences of his crime, including the death of the victim. [Cit.] Furthermore, the jury was properly charged on the relevant principles of law. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found [appellant] guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]”
Bedford v. State,
3. On direct examination, a State’s witness testified that appellant “had a real bad attitude. He really didn’t care about anything. He was always in trouble for just mischievous little things.” Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial, urging that his character had been placed into issue. The trial court’s failure to sustain the objection and grant a mistrial is enumerated as error.
“[A] reference to a defendant’s having been in trouble does not
*694
place his character in issue, since it is unclear what is meant by such a remark. [Cits.]”
Richardson v. State,
4. The trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the legal principles discussed in
Ford v. State,
supra at 602 (1) is enumerated as error. However, there is no indication in the record that any request to charge on those principles was ever made. See
Wilson v. State, 262
Ga. 588, 590 (3) (
5. The trial court’s refusal to give appellant’s requests to charge on reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses is enumerated as error. See
Reinhardt v. State,
“[T]he crime of reckless conduct is, in essence, an instance of
criminal negligence,
rather than an intentional act, which causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another.” (Emphasis in original.)
Bowers v. State,
[T]he uncontradicted evidence in this case showed the completion of the greater offense of [criminal damage to property] in the first degree, rendering it unnecessary that the trial court charge on the lesser offenses. [Cit.]
McCoy v. State,
6. The trial court’s refusal to give appellant’s requested charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense is also enumerated as error.
OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) provides, in relevant part, that the crime of criminal trespass is committed when one “knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without his consent.” The crime of criminal damage to property in the first degree, however, requires more than a mere knowing and malicious interference with the property of another without his consent. OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1) provides, in relevant part, that the crime of criminal damage to property in the first degree is committed when one “[k]nowingly and without authority interferes with any property in a manner so as to endanger human life.” (Emphasis supplied.) The only evidence of “interference” in the instant case is the life-endangering act of intentionally dropping the rock into the path of on-coming traffic. There is no evidence of a mere knowing and malicious interference with the property of another without his consent. Accordingly, even assuming without deciding that OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) can ever be considered, as a matter of law, to be a lesser included offense of OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1), it is clear that, in the instant case, OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) cannot be considered, as a matter of fact, a lesser included offense of OCGA § 16-7-22 (a) (1). It follows that there was no error in refusing to give the charge.
7. For the reasons previously discussed, appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in charging on conspiracy and parties to a crime is without merit.
8. “Nor did the trial court err in refusing to charge on accident [or misfortune].”
Brooks v. State,
9. Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to give an unrequested charge on criminal damage to property in the first degree as a separate lesser included offense is without merit.
Peterson v. State,
10. There was no reversible error in the charge on reasonable
*696
doubt.
Vance v. State,
11. The State’s pre-trial notice regarding appellant’s prior commission of similar transactions was sufficiently specific. “The transactions were continuing in nature over a period of [weeks] and the State’s [pre-trial notice] described them with as much specificity as was possible.”
Loyd v. State,
12. We need not address [appellant’s contention] that the State improperly failed to show a legitimate purpose for admitting the evidence of similar independent crimes because Williams [v. State,261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649 ) (1991)] provides a ground for reversal only as to objections raised at trial. [Cit.]
Slater v. State,
13. Appellant alleges error in that the trial court admitted testimony of the investigating officer relating to [a statement] made by [appellant] during [a juvenile] investigation. The objection is predicated on the proposition that [OCGA § 15-11-38] (b) was violated. . . . While the record reflects there was a juvenile proceeding relating to [appellant], we hold that the officer’s testimony regarding the facts learned in the investigation does not disclose the “disposition of a child” nor is it “evidence adduced in a hearing in juvenile court.”
Hayward v. Ramick,
14. Evidence was adduced which showed that appellant had two years earlier thrown an object into the windshield of a moving car and that he had a few weeks earlier thrown a watermelon off the bridge. This evidence was properly admitted as relevant and probative similar transactions evidence. See
Williams v. State,
supra;
Childs v. State,
15. Appellant has no standing to complain that the trial court accepted Prince’s guilty plea. See
Jackson v. State,
16. Appellant filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. Another judge heard the motion and denied it. The denial of the recusal motion is enumerated as error.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, all grounds of his motion to recuse were ruled upon, by written order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law. None of those grounds was meritorious and his motion was, therefore, properly denied. “In this case, there has been no showing of personal bias or prejudice, and consequently [we find no error].”
Mitchell v. State,
17. The denial of appellant’s demurrer challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s felony murder statute is enumerated as error.
“It is beyond constitutional question that the [S]tate has authority to enact felony murder statutes. [Cit.]”
Collier v. State,
18. Appellant’s remaining enumerations of error have been considered and are either without merit or moot.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S93A1629. Appeal dismissed in Case No. S93A1630.
Notes
The crime occurred on August 25, 1990. Appellant was indicted on December 10, 1990. The verdict was returned on March 15, 1991. Appellant’s motion for new trial was filed on March 15,1991, amended on July 30,1991 and denied on June 11,1993. Appellant’s notice of appeal in Case No. S93A1629 was filed on July 6, 1993 and his notice of appeal in Case No. S93A1630 was filed on July 8, 1993. The appeals were both docketed on July 29, 1993 and orally argued on October 5, 1993.