121 Me. 67 | Me. | 1921
This is a bill in equity brought by fourteen taxable inhabitants against the present selectmen and treasurer of Sangerville, and the inhabitants of said town of Sangerville.
The bill alleges in substance that Elmer J. Prince, F. Wallace Cleaves and Walter R. Farnham, being selectmen of Sangerville, libeled one Arthur Stanley, that a civil action was brought against them, judgment recovered, and the judgment was satisfied by the defendants in the libel suit.
The town at its annual meeting held in March, 1920, voted to reimburse the selectmen for the year 1918 for the damages and costs paid by them, and this bill seeks to enjoin the present selectmen and treasurer from paying any sum pursuant to the vote of the town.
The sitting Justice found as a fact that the allegations set forth in the bill were true, sustained the bill, and granted a permanent injunction. The case is before the court on appeal.
The bill alleges, and the answer admits, that the municipal officers made the following statement in their annual report to the town:
over the attitude of the municipal officers from the beginning seems not to have been that of officials endeavoring in fairness and justice to perform their public duties, but rather that of partisans having some grudge to gratify either toward this plaintiff or Mr. Coburn. There is strong inferential evidence of actual malice, malice in fact. The speedy notification for settlement or arrest, the arrest and trial that followed with no delay, the claim of S50 for a metal culvert costing and worth about $20, the service of the civil writ therefor by arrest, instead of the usual course by summons, when so far as appears there was no pecuniary necessity therefor, the setting up of the truth in the pleadings by way of justification, Davis v. Starrett, 97 Maine, at 577, and the adherence to the same in argument, even after the Supreme Judicial Court had discharged the plaintiff from arrest under this same charge, all this reveals a persistent purpose on the part of the defendants to harrass and humiliate the plaintiff with respect to a matter which in itself and as among broad-minded business men would be regarded as trivial. It was a case therefore in which punitive damages might well be awarded if the jury saw fit to grant them.” There was absence of good faith shown in that case and we find nothing in the evidence in the instant case to warrant a conclusion that an injustice has been done in Stanley v. Prince, supra, or to justify the town, or its officers, in paying the damages and costs arising in the libel suit above mentioned.
It is well settled that among the implied powers of a town is that of defending and indemnifying its officers when they have incurred liability in the bona fide discharge of their duty. Cooley Const.
The phrase “in good faith,” as it is used in the law, simply means “Honestly, without fraud, collusion or deceit; really, actually, without pretense.” Words and Phrases, 3117.
In Fuller et als. v. Inhabitants of Groton et ais., 11 Gray, 340, a petition in equity to restrain the respondents from paying and indemnifying the school committee of Groton for the expenses incurred in defending a suit brought against them for an alleged libel contained in one of their official reports, it was held “that towns have power to raise money to indemnify then officers against liabilities incurred or damages sustained in the bona fide discharge of their duties, is now well settled.” In that case, however, the circumstances were in no respect like the instant case. There the report under consideration, while stating their conclusions forcibly and leaving no room for doubt as to their meaning, contained no libelous words. In the libel suit underlying this case the officers did use libelous words and this court has so held. In Fuller v. Groton, supra, the subject of the vote of the town was expenses incurred in defending a groundless suit; here the vote includes not only expenses, but damages paid in a suit for libel, where the town officers were guilty of libel. In the former the school committee were acting in good faith in the performance of a legal duty. Here it must be held that from the very nature of the case, the selectmen were not acting in good faith. It was not an act of good faith to add to the list of assets of their town libelous words concerning any person. There was no necessity in accounting for the possession or absence of a culvert to add libelous words concerning the plaintiff in the libel suit. The use of libelous words were in no manner called for by the requirements of law in making a report. There were other words available for purposes of identification of the culvert, if any were needed at all. In any event the town was not interested in the description of the culvert adopted by the defendants in that action, and it matters not that the town voted to accept the report. Neither the vote accepting the report, nor the vote to reimburse the defendants, can make the town hable for the illegal act of the town officers in placing the libelous words in their report. A town is not liable for the negligent acts of its public officers committed in the performance of their public duties, unless such liability is created by statutory provisions. 26 R. C. L., Page 807; Brown v.
We are of opinion that the findings of fact by the sitting Justice are supported by the evidence, and the decree being in accord with the facts must stand unreversed. The decision of a single Justice upon matters of fact in an equity hearing will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that such decision is erroneous; and the burden to show the error is upon the appellant. Hartley v. Richardson, 91 Maine, 424.
Appeal dismissed.
Decree of sitting Justice affirmed with additional costs.