These appeals lie from judgments upon jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs below (appellees here) for personal injuries and property damage arising from a threе-car collision which they contend was due solely to appellant’s negligence in the operation and control of his automobile. In his answer appellant аlleged that the accident was unavoidable, but from the record and argument of counsel it is clear that he based his defense not upon an unavoidable accidеnt in the ordinary negative sense where all parties prove themselves free of negligence, but rather upon the positive intervention of an Act of God — a sudden illness which he had no reason to anticipate.
An unavoidable accident occurs while all persons concerned are exercising ordinary care. Knox v. Akowskey, D.C.Mun.Aрp.,
Appellant’s evidence indicated the following: On the date of the acсident appellant and his son were alternatively driving the former’s automobile while on various errands in downtown Washington. While appellant was at the wheel, the vehicle suddenly accelerated from 20 to 40-45 miles per hour, edged over to the left side of the street, entered an intersection in disregard of a red traffic signal, and collided with two оther motor vehicles. The son testified that, as the car speeded up, he asked his father what was wrong, but received no reply, and his father fell across his arm as the witness grаbbed the steering wheel in a last-minute effort to avoid the collisions.
Two doctors testified as to the physical condition of appellant. One medical witness, who had trеated him after the accident, stated that appellant suffered from “hypertensive cardiovascular disease”; that there was damage to his brain due to “ocсlusion of his blood vessels”; and that in his opinion appellant had sustained a seizure at the time of the accident. The other doctor testified he had treated Watts befоre the accident for an ulcerous condition of the stomach and for mild hypertension but that Watts had no reason to expect any sudden attack due to these ailments. Appellant, his wife and his son all testified that appellant was in good health and drove his car every day.
To counter appellant’s Act of God defense, appellees introduced over objection, testimony of the investigating officer that while he was at the scene of the accident, some 20 minutes after the collisions, a man, who identified himself as Joseph Briggs and as appellant’s son-in-law, stated that appellant had “high blood pressure” and dizzy spells for which he took pills and “[didn’t] drive becausе he might pass out.” 1 The trial court ruled that these statements were admissible as part of the res gestae exception to the hearsay evidence rule. Appellant claims this ruling was еrror.
Res gestae
is a loose evidentiary term encompassing several hearsay exceptions : verbal acts, statements indicating the mental condition of the declarant, аnd spontaneous declarations. Jones, Evidence §§ 318-319 (1958). If the obviously hearsay statement of the witness Briggs is to be admissible, it must be characterized as a spontaneous deсlaration, not only tending to explain the act or occurrence with which it is connected but also indicating a spontaneous utterance of a thought while under the influence of that act or occurrence, with no opportunity for premeditation or deliberation. Jackson v. Goode, D.C.Mun.App.,
Briggs’ statements were made to the officer at the scene of the accident not more than 20 minutes after the collisions. Rather than the accident itsеlf, the exciting event which produced the utterance might have been the recognition of appellant’s automobile and the realization that a friend may have bеen seriously injured. The courts have cautioned that statements not relating to a description of the event must be carefully scrutinized to test their spontaneity and that a substantial foundation for their introduction must be laid, encompassing the elapsed time and the action, state of mind and general demeanor of the declarant. Murphy Auto Pаrts Co. v. Ball, supra,
Appellant also contends that the court erred in failing to direct verdicts in his favor at the conclusion of all testimony. The record is replete with conflicting statements by witnessеs as to the manner in which the accident occurred and as to appellant’s health and physical condition at the time of the accident. With such a plethora of inconsistent evidence before him, the trial judge properly denied appellant’s motion and submitted to the jury for its determination the issues of negligence, contributory nеgligence, proximate cause, and whether the accident was caused by an Act of God. Clearly the jury was not convinced that appellant had carried his burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the accident was solely produced by an Act of God, negating any responsibility on his part for the collisions. There is ample evidence to support the jury verdicts — which we, in any case, have no authority to overturn where there is no error of law.
Appellant claims errоr by the trial judge in approving certain jury instructions defining the essential elements of unavoidable accident or Act of God. Although he objected to them when they were originally presented, he did not renew his objections after the charge had been given to the jury, and it must be presumed he waived his objections and accepted them as satisfаctory. 2 Furthermore, we have reviewed these instructions and find that the law was correctly stated.
As in our opinion there is no basis for the errors claimed, and there being no сhallenge to the amounts awarded to ap-pellees as damages, the judgments on the jury verdicts are
Affirmed.
Notes
. When called upon by appellant to testify, Briggs denied lie told thе officer lie was in any way related to appellant or knew anything about the condition of his health. The trial judge properly submitted to the jury the determination of which version of the conversation was correct, if either.
. Civil Rule 51, Court of General Sessions.