Watson v. StateWatson v. State
Appellant, Phillip Dale Watson, was convicted, after a jury trial, of possession of marijuana and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), in violation of
The record reflects that around 9:30 p.m., on April 25, 1986, Patrolman Jeff Hughes of the Red Bay Police Department was on routine рatrol in a police car within the corporate limits of that city. While patrol-ing, he met a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction, and the driver of the oncoming vehicle failed to dim its headlights. Hughes turned around, turned on his blue light, and stopped the vehicle. Hughes approached the vehicle on the driver’s side and asked the driver for his driver’s license, telling him that he was stopping him for failing to dim his vehicle’s headlights. There were three people in the automobile, all sitting in the front seat. Appellant was a passenger and was sitting in the middle. The driver, Randall Scott, gave the officer his driver’s license and stepped out of the vehicle. The officer smelled alcohol on Scott’s breath and asked him how much he had had to drink. The officer shined his flashlight into the vehicle on the driver’s side to check for weapons and saw none. He placed Scott under arrest for failing to dim his headlights, put him in the police car, and told him that he was going to take him to the police station and give him a chemical test for intoxication. It was a policy of the city to give a citation or warning to a driver failing to dim his vehicle’s headlights when required.
.Appellant did not take the stand or adduce evidence or testimony in his behalf.
In the instant case, the officer detained the driver of the automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence. The failure of the driver to lower the beam оf his vehicle’s headlights when approaching the police vehicle constituted a misdemeanor violation. Ala.Code (1975), § 32-5-242(c)(1); § 32-5A-8. The detention of the driver under these circumstances wаs authorized. Ala.Code (1975), § 15-10-3. Alabama law authorizes a police officer to arrest, without a warrant, any person seen committing a violation of the traffic regulations or rules of the road. It is undisputed here that at the time the officer decided to stop appellant, appellant had violated the rule requiring the lowering of the headlight beam when apprоaching another vehicle at night.
While performing his duties in this regard, the officer smelled alcohol on the breath of the driver and suspected that he had been driving under the influence of alсohol. Acting on this suspicion, he went to the passenger’s side of the vehicle and shined his flashlight in to look for more evidence of appellant’s use of alcohol. Arrest for a traffiс offense does not, without more, permit a probing, exploratory police search of an automobile for evidence of unrelated offenses and does not permit рersonal search of the occupants. United States v. Humphrey,
“There are circumstances, of course, in which the plain view is obtained without any prior entry or opening of the vehicle. One situation ... is when the car itself is in plain view and it is subject to seizure as evidence of a crime or as an object subject to forfeiture. Another is when incriminating objects may be seen inside the vehicle by merely standing near it.*739 In the latter situation, Coolidge instructs, the question is whether the officer had a ‘legitimate reason for being present’ in the precise location where he made the observation. If the officer first stopped the car, this of course requires a determination as to the lawfulness of the stopping, but if the vehicle is parked on a public street or parking lot, then there is no doubt but that the officer may stand by and look into thе vehicle just as any member of the public might.” (Footnotes omitted.)
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(a) (2d ed. 1987). See also Smith v. Slayton,
It is clear from the facts of the instant case that the arrest for the traffic violation was not a mere excuse to sеarch the vehicle. The surrounding circumstances justified the arresting officer in suspecting that he was dealing with a situation more serious than a routine traffic infraction. Due to the odor of аlcohol emanating from appellant, the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle contained evidence of alcohol. The circumstances justified further investigation. Having stopped the vehicle properly, he may act upon the basis of what he observes during the confrontation. If the encounter takes place at night, the defendant cannot object because the officer shines a flashlight into the car’s interior and, in the process, sees contraband. Williams v. United States,
Sinсe the two passengers were still in the vehicle, the officer was justified in, not only checking for any alcoholic beverages in plain view, but also checking for weapons for his prоtection. It was at this time that he observed in plain view the plastic bag containing what he suspected, and what was later determined, to be marijuana. This observation was not the result of а search, but falls within the plain view doctrine. At that time, the officer, by his prior experience of recognizing marijuana, had probable cause to believe a crime was being cоmmitted in his presence and had the right and duty to seize the package of marijauana and to make an arrest. The seizure of such contraband from the car, under the circumstancеs presented here, is not unreasonable and, therefore, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The marijuana and lysеrgic acid diethylamide (LSD) found on appellant’s person were the product of a search, but a search incident to a lawful arrest. The search of the automobile ocсurring after the arrest was also incident to a lawful arrest.
Under the facts of this case, it was not error to deny appellant’s motion to suppress and to admit into evidence the contraband found on the floor of the automobile, as well as that found on his person.
We find no error. The judgment of conviction is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.