16 S.E.2d 426 | Ga. | 1941
The statute penalizing solicitation for prostitution (Code, § 26-6201) is not unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law. An indictment under this statute was not subject to demurrer on the grounds here taken.
The assignments of error presented no cause for new trial.
2. Any person of common intelligence may determine without guessing whether he has "good reason to know of the immoral purpose," and thus reach in advance a responsible conclusion whether an act would be criminal. It follows that the words "good reason to know" do not render the statute void for the want of sufficient *680
certainty as a standard of conduct by which individuals may be judged and made subject to its penalties, or cause it to be repugnant to the due-process clause of either the Federal or the State constitution, as contended. Farrar v. State,
Nor was the precise question involved in Strickland v.Whatley,
3. An indictment drawn under the foregoing statute need not allege the place from which or to which the female is taken or transported, the place not being an essential element of the offense charged. Code, § 27-701; Pines v. State,
4. Under the rulings stated above, there was no merit in any of the grounds of the demurrer to the indictment, either general or special, or in the exceptions to the judge's charge to the jury.
5. A ground of a motion for new trial complaining that the court erred in permitting the solicitor to propound a question to a witness, over objection that the question was leading, is without merit where it does not appear what answer, if any, was made to such question; and the same is true as to an objection that the question sought to elicit hearsay, but so far as shown no answer was given. Brunswick Birmingham Railroad Co. v.Hoodenpyle,
6. The female testified on direct examination that she had received money for illicit intercourse on the occasion in question; and under all the facts of the case, it does not appear that the judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit counsel for the defendant to ask the witness, on cross-examination. Whether she "got money from the one [she] did have intercourse with." Even if receipt of the money would go to the credibility of the witness, as contended, needless repetition was not required. Sims v. State,
7. The general grounds of the motion are not insisted on by counsel. The court did not err in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. *682