Fоllowing a jury trial, Benjamin Jarrod Watson was found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection with the stabbing death of Nakya Seales. 1 On appeal Watson contends, among other things, that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its charge to the jury and in failing to recharge the jury; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) the trial court erred with respect to various evidentiary matters. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence reveals that, on November 29, 2000, Erica Johnson made plans to meet with Seales. Seales was running late, and he left a message on a voice mail system that Johnson shared with her boyfriend, Watson. Johnson and Seales met up and then went to Johnson’s mobile home. When they arrived, Watson emerged from one of the bedrooms holding a knife. Watson then walked up to Seales, who was in the living room area, and demanded that Seales leave. Johnson fled out of the back door to a neighbor’s house where she called her aunt, Tokyo Rutledge-Smith, and told her that she was worried because Watson was in her home with Seales. Shawn Brunson, a neighbor, was walking by Johnson’s home to go visit a fellow neighbor when he witnessed Johnson fleeing her home through the back door. Brunson also heard stomping and loud noises coming from the trailer. As Brunson was on his way back home, he saw Watson come out of the back door of the trailer. Watson *40 quеstioned Brunson as to whether he had seen anyone come out of the back door. Frightened by the blood on Watson’s shirt, Brunson said no. As Watson walked away, Brunson could see a knife in Watson’s back pocket.
Responding to Johnson’s call, Rutledge-Smith saw Watson driving away as she was turning into the trailer park. They both stopped to talk, and Watson told her that it was Seales’ blood on his shirt and that he had to cut him to get Seales off of him. Rutledge-Smith asked Watson to go back to Johnson’s trailer so they could discuss what had happened. When she and Watson arrived at the trailer, Rutledge-Smith pushed the door open, saw Seales on the floor covered in blood, and called 911. She then waited with Watson until police arrived. When the police got there, they took Watsоn into custody. Watson admitted to the police that he had killed Seales. At trial, Dr. Whitaker, an expert in forensic crime scene analysis, concluded that Seales had multiple defensive wounds and that the first stab wound had brought Seales down. Dr. Whitaker further concluded that Seales had been held by either his shoulder or head while additional wounds were inflicted and that the final stab wounds to Seales’ neck and head occurred while Seales was on the ground.
The evidence outlined above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Watson guilty of all the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Watson contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow three of his potential witnesses to testify at trial. However, the record reveals that these witnesses did not testify because Watson was unable to locate them prior to trial, not because the trial court made any ruling regarding the admissibility of their testimony. This enumeration is therefore waived on appeal
(Butts v. State,
3. Without аrguing any specifics in his brief, Watson claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement to police because his statement was involuntary and had been obtained through trickery. The record reveals, however, that Watson’s counsel conceded at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he had “no facts that [he] could point to to shоw that [Watson’s custodial statement to police was] not voluntary based on the testimony [he] heard [at the hearing from police officers indicating that Watson’s statement was freely and voluntarily made].” Accordingly, “the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress [Watson’s] . . . custodial statement ].”
Vergara v. State,
*41
4. Watson’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the warrantless search of his automobile is also without merit, as the record reveals that the search of the inside of the automobile was conducted pursuant to a warrant, and that the initial list of the contents of the vehicle was made during a proper inventory search of the vehicle during which no officers actually entered the car. See
Wright v. State,
5. Watson argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony at trial regarding prior difficulties between Watson and Seales.
2
However, Watson failed to object to this testimony at trial and has therefore waived review of this issue on appeal. See
Warbington v. State,
6. Watson urges that the trial court erred in denying his special and general demurrers to the indictment. He claims that the indictment was insufficient in that it did not specifically state that the knife involved in the crime of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony had to have a blade of at least three inches. See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b). However,
[pjretermitting the propriety of the trial court’s rulings, [Watson] cannot show how any insufficiency in the indictment prejudiced [him] so as to require reversal. The record establishes that [Watson] had notice of what [hе was] charged with, so that [he] was able to intelligently prepare his defense and be safeguarded against double jeopardy. [Nor has Watson] shown how he was misled to his prejudice by any alleged imperfection in the indictment and we can discern no prejudice in [the] record.
*42
Mitchell v. State,
7. Watson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after Johnson testified that she ran to her neighbor’s house and told her neighbor that she “believed” that Watson had a knife in his hand at the time that she ran out of the back door of her trailer. 3
“Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Childs v. State,
8. Watson claims that the trial court erred by allowing the State’s expert witness on blood spatter evidence to testify as to the location in Johnson’s trailer where he believed that the altercation between Watson and Seales began.
4
Watson asserts that such testimony was improper, as it related to the “ultimate issue” to be decided by the jury. However, Watson is incorrect. The record reveals that the expert did not testify regarding the ultimate issue of whether Watson was guilty of the crimes for which he was charged, but only regarding the location where the altercation between Watson and Seales may have taken place based on an analysis of the blood spatter evidence at the crime scene. See, e.g.,
Cammon v. State,
9. As the State correctly concedes, the trial court erred by giving the following charge to the jury:
You may infer that a person of sound mind and discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of that person’s intentional acts. And if a person of sound mind and discretion intentionally аnd without justification uses a deadly weapon or instrumentality in the *44 manner in which the weapon or instrumentality is ordinarily used, and thereby causes the death of another human being, you may infer the intent to kill. Whether or not you make any such inference is a matter solely within your discretion as juror.
In
Harris v. State,
10. Watson argues that the trial court erred in failing to recharge the jury on voluntary manslaughter in addition to recharging the jury on malice murder, despite the fact that the jury only requested to be recharged on malice murder. “Where[, as here,] the jury requests further instructions upon a particular phase of the case, the court in his discretion may recharge them in full, or only upon the point or points requested. The court is not bound to repeat all the law favorable tо the accused.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Williams v. State,
11. Watson’s argument that the trial court erred in accepting the inconsistent verdicts of guilty on felony murder and not guilty on malice murder is without merit, as this Court has abolished the rule against inconsistent verdicts (see
Milam v. State,
*45 12. Watson suggests that his trial attorneys were ineffective in that they (a) failed to adequately investigate the facts and the law, (b) failed to adequately prepare Watson with a cohesive plan of defense, (c) failed to adequately interview potential witnesses for the defense, and (d) failed to properly object to the State’s opening and closing statements.
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, Watson must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the deficient performance.
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) The record reveals that lead defense counsel and the attorneys in his office conducted research and investigations in Watson’s case; that counsel interviewed trial witnesses and used an investigator to find and interview other potential witnesses; and filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress. Watson has not pointed to anything in the record to support his claim that counsel did not adequately investigate the facts and the law relating to his case, and he therefore cannot “overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Citation omitted.)
Judkins v. State,
(b) Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he met with Watson on several occasions to discuss his case and that he discussed the case with Watson thoroughly. Watson’s counsel also discussed trial strategy with him, talked with him about the witnesses who would be good and bad for his case, and discussed using self-defense as their main defense. Evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel rendered effective assistance in this regard. See, e.g.,
Reed v. State,
(c) With respect to alleged defense witnesses that trial counsel failed to locate prior to trial, Watson did not call these witnesses to *46 testify at the motion for new trial hearing.
[B]ecause [Watson] neither called [these witnesses] to testify at the motion for new trial hearing nor presented a legally acceptable substitute for [their] direct testimony so as to substantiate [his] claim that [the witness’] testimony would have been relevant and favorable to [his] defense, it was impossible for [Watson] to show there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Dickens v. State,
(d) Watson cites to no portion of the record at trial, nor did he make any specific showing at the motion for new trial hearing, to indicate that improper evidence of his character was somehow introduced during the State’s opening or closing statements. He relies only upon his own testimony at the motion for new trial hearing in which he indicates that he was “concerned” that the State brought evidence of his character before the jury without objection from his trial counsel. Because Watson has not supported his specific contention of ineffective assistance with any evidence of record, and because “it is not our job to cull the record on behalf of a party [to find error]” ((citation and punctuation omitted)
Westmoreland v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
On December 19, 2000, Watson was indicted for felony murder, malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Following a June 25-28, 2001 jury trial, on June 28, 2001, Watson was found guilty on all charges except malice murder. On that same day, the trial court sentenced Watson to life imprisonment for felony murder and five consecutive years for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The aggravated assault count was merged into the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. On January 18, 2008, the trial court granted Watson’s motion for leave of court to file an out-of-time motion for a new trial, and Watson filed a motion for new trial on that same day. Watson amended his motion for new trial on April 20, 2009, and April 28, 2009. The trial court denied Watson’s motion for new trial on February 9, 2010. On June 17, 2010, the trial court granted Watson’s motion to file an out-of-time appeal. Watson’s appeal was docketed in this Court for the September 2010 term, and his case was submitted for decision on the briefs.
We note that Watson’s characterization of this testimony later in his brief as “similar transaction” evidence is inaccurate. The evidence here was admitted specifiсally for the purpose of showing “prior difficulties” between Watson and the victim, and not a “similar transaction.” Indeed,
[ulnlike similar transactions, prior difficulties do not implicate independent acts or occurrences, hut are connected acts or occurrences arising from the relationship between the same people involved in the prosecution аnd are related and connected by such nexus. Thus, the admissibility of evidence of prior difficulties does not depend upon a showing of similarity to the crime for which the accused is being tried. Evidence of the defendant’s prior acts toward the victim, be it a prior assault, a quarrel, or a threat, is admissible when the defendant is accused of a criminal act against the victim, as the рrior acts are evidence of the relationship between the victim and the defendant and may show the defendant’s motive, intent, and bent of mind in committing the act against the victim which results in the charges for which the defendant is being prosecuted.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Dixon v. State,
The trial court had earlier sustained defense counsel’s objection to a portion of Johnson’s testimony wherein she claimed that shе had seen “something black [in Watson’s hand, and she had] assumed it was a knife.”
We note that Watson did not object to the expert’s qualifications.
To the extent that Watson argues that the verdicts are erroneous because they are mutually exclusive, this argument is misplaced. “[T]he rule against mutually exclusive verdicts applies to multiple guilty verdicts which cannot he logically reconciled; the rule is not implicated where, as here, verdicts of guilty and not guilty are returned.” (Citation omitted.)
*45
Shepherd v. State,