Watson v. StateWatson v. State
Opinion
James Watson appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents, State of California (State) and its employees,
On February 8, 1990, appellant was an inmate at the Santa Barbara County jail and injured himself playing basketball. Nurse Gregory Jackson examined him the following day. Appellant complained that his right ankle was tender and swollen. Jackson palpitated the Achilles tendon, noting that it appeared to be intact. Appellant was given an ace bandage, pain medication, and provided in-cell feeding to minimize use of the leg. Doctor Gerhard Rohringer, a board certified internist, reviewed the medical chart but did not examine appellant. On February 17, 1990, Nurse Jackson extended in-cell feeding for three days.
On March 8, 1990, appellant was transferred to the Chino state prison where he underwent an intake physical exam. Doctor Portales and Richard Grantham, a senior medical technical assistant, examined him. Appellant complained about the ankle injury but was able to walk. Doctor Portales testified that he had no reason to examine appellant’s Achilles tendon. According to Portales, a patient suffering from a torn tendon would be screaming in pain and have to use a wheelchair or crutches to move about.
On March 12, 1990, appellant walked into the prison medical clinic and was examined by Doctor Chichun Kau. Doctor Kau noted that appellant’s right ankle was mildly swollen. X-rays were taken but revealed no fractures. Doctor Kau prescribed medication for a sprained ankle. On March 30, 1990, appellant reported for sick call to get a prescription refill and told Grantham that his ankle was getting better.
On April 2, 1990, appellant was transferred to the Corcoran State Prison and saw Doctor Rene Iway. Appellant wanted medication for a 10-year-old back condition. During the visit, appellant told the doctor that he had torn his Achilles tendon. Doctor Iway examined appellant’s ankle, performed some range of motion tests, and noted that the Achilles tendon was tender. Based on appellant’s oral history, he made an entry in the medical chart that appellant had a probable torn Achilles tendon that was mending. Appellant
Doctor Lin Ho later determined that appellant had ruptured his right Achilles tendon. Appellant was told that an untreated tendon could result in permanent loss of ankle flexion. Doctor Ho believed that the tendon should have been treated during appellant’s incarceration. Because of the passage of time, the chances for a successful surgical repair were significantly reduced.
Appellant brought suit on the theory that the County of Santa Barbara (County) and State breached a duty to summon and provide reasonable medical care. The action was based on
County and State moved for summary judgment on the ground that they had breached no statutory duty of care. State presented uncontroverted evidence that appellant was provided prompt medical care while in state prison. 2 Appellant, however, contended that triable facts existed on the issue of whether “reasonable” medical care was furnished. Appellant represented that his medical expert, Doctor Ho, would testify that State’s medical care “probably fell below the standard of care.”
The trial court ruled that no triable facts were presented to support a
The purpose of summary judgment is to penetrate evasive language and adept pleading and to ascertain, by means of affidavits, the presence or
Here the action is based on a statutory duty to summon medical care. Liability under
The 1963 Law Revision Commission comment to
Appellant argues that the statutory duty to “summon” medical care encompasses a duty to provide reasonable medical care.
Here it was uncontroverted that State provided prompt medical care. Appellant, however, argues that it had a concomitant duty to assure that its employees (i.e., the prison medical staff) properly diagnosed and treated the medical condition. Not so.
Appellant’s citation of
Zeilman
v.
County of Kern
(1985)
On appeal, the summary judgment was reversed based on
The instant action is legally and factually distinguishable in two respects. First, the State had no actual or constructive notice that appellant’s Achilles
We reject the argument that the State knew or had reason to know that appellant’s medical condition required surgery. No triable facts were presented that the State knew or had reason to know that the medical care provided at Chino and Corcoran was so deficient that it was tantamount to no medical care. An orthopedic specialist diagnosed the medical problem almost a year after the injury. Notice could not be imputed to the State based on medical hindsight. There is no merit to the argument that the misdiagnosis triggered
Zeilman
v.
County of Kern, supra,
is also distinguishable because medical care was provided each time appellant sought medical attention at Chino and Corcoran. Appellant, however, argues that
Appellant also challenges the order sustaining the demurrer of the state employees. The trial court ruled that the negligence action was barred because appellant failed to comply with the claims presentation requirement. (§§ 911.2, 950.2.) We agree.
It is well settled that a government claim must be filed with the public entity before a tort action is brought against the public entity or public employee. (§ 950.2;
Fisher
v.
Pickens
(1990)
Here the government claim stated that appellant was refused medical treatment. The claim stated in pertinent part: “Claimant was playing basketball and injured his leg. Jail medical personnel refused to treat him. He was then shipped to the State Facility at Chino where his leg was X-rayed, but they refused to treat him. He was ultimately sent to Corcoran where, again, treatment was refused.”
On January 15, 1991, the State Board of Control requested that appellant’s counsel provide additional information. In a July 1, 1991, letter, counsel responded: “[I]t is claimant’s position that he was suffering from an obvious and debilitating injury to his leg and foot, which conditions would dictate that a reasonably prudent person summon appropriate medical treatment for him. Such medical treatment was not summoned and was, in fact, refused when requested by Mr. Watson.'' (Italics added.)
The government claim was based on the theory that the State refused to provide medical care and no care was provided. The first amended complaint, however, alleged that respondents “failed to provide Plaintiff with appropriate and adequate medical treatment for his injuries . . .. .” The trial court determined that the variance between the claim and first amended complaint was fatal. We agree.
(Donohue
v.
State of California
(1986)
Appellant’s case is controlled by
Nelson
v.
State of California, supra,
Nelson became diabetic and sustained injuries to his leg. A government claim was presented stating that the injuries were caused by . . the
The claim was rejected by the State. Nelson thereafter filed a complaint alleging that the State and prison medical staff breached “ \ . . a duty to plaintiff to summon immediate and competent medical attention.’” (
The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that the failure to summon medical care is not the same as the failure to provide adequate care. “[T]he two are
not
equivalent. Once a practitioner has been summoned to examine and treat a prisoner, he or she is under a duty to exercise that degree of diligence, care, and skill such as is ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession. Failure to do so is malpractice. [Citation.] Failure of a practitioner to prescribe or provide necessary medication or treatment to one he or she has been summoned to assist is a breach of such duty and as such is also medical malpractice and clearly, as a matter of the plain meaning of the statutory language, cannot be characterized as a failure to summon medical care, [fl] Based upon this analysis and particularly our legal interpretation of the statute noted [
The same result follows here. Appellant cannot save the action based on the theory that he substantially complied with the claims statute. (E.g.,
Phillips
v.
Desert Hospital Dist.
(1989)
Stone (S. J.), P. J., and Gilbert, J., concurred.
Notes
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.
Appellant was deposed and admitted that he was seen by medical personnel each time he requested medical attention. Appellant testified:
“Q. Okay. Was there any time in your incarceration in Corcoran or Chino when you asked to be seen by medical personnel and you were not seen?
“A. No.”
He later changed his answer to read: “No. But as in all cases, I received no meaningful medical attention, It was as if no one I had seen, either for the State or the County cared what my problem really was.”