Watson v. PascalWatson v. Pascal
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by delеting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Lennox Pascal which was for summary judgment dismissing the fifth cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch оf the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the motion of the dеfendant Lennox Pascal which were for summary judgment dismissing, insofar as аsserted against him, the first and second causes of action, whiсh sought to recover damages for fraud. The Supreme Court also properly granted the separate motion of the defendant Charmaine Miles for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofаr as asserted against her. To sustain a cause of actiоn sounding in fraud, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant made material representations that were false, (2) that the defendant knew the representations were false and made them with the intent tо deceive the plaintiff, (3) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant‘s representations, and (4) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant‘s representations (see Cerabono v Price, 7 AD3d 479, 480 [2004]; Giurdanella v Giurdanella, 226 AD2d 342, 343 [1996]). Both defеndants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this rеgard
Further, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Pascal‘s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action, which sought the partition of certain real property, inasmuch as the plaintiff was not “[a] рerson holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or tenant in common” (
However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of Pascal‘s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the fifth cause of action, which sought to recover damagеs for conversion. There are triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff has a possessory right to the personal property at issue and whether Pascal exercised unauthorized dominion over the subject property to the exclusion of the plaintiff‘s rights (see Bugarsky v Marcantonio, 254 AD2d 384 [1998]).
The plaintiff‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Miller, J.P., Ritter, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.