57 Pa. 161 | Pa. | 1868
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
The business of a conveyancer is one of great importance and responsibility. It requires an acquaintance with the general principles of the law of real property and a large amount of practical knowledge, which can only be derived from experience. In England it has been pursued by lawyers of the greatest eminence. As our titles become more complex, with the increase of wealth, and the desires which always accompany it to continue it in our name and family as long as the law will permit, it will become more and more necessary that gentlemen prepared by a course of liberal education and previous study should devote themselves to it. There have been and still are such among us. The rule of liability for errors of judgment as applied to them ought to be the same as in the case of gentlemen in the practice of law or medicine. It is not a mere art, but a science. “ That part of the profession,” said Lord Mansfield, “which is carried on by attorneys is liberal and reputable, as well as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honor and integrity; and they ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge. But‘ every man is liable to error; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake. * * * * * A counsel may mistake as well as an attorney. Yet no one will say that a counsel who has been mistaken shall be charged. * * * Not only counsel, but judges, may differ, or doubt, or take time to consider. Therefore an attorney ought not to be liable in case of a reasonable doubt:” Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060. The rule
If the defendant had undertaken to act upon his own opinion that the judgment, which appeared on the searches, was not a final one, and therefore not a lien upon the ground-rent, the title of which it was his duty to examine, could we say that, before the decision of this court in Sellers v. Burk, 11 Wright 344, the mistake was one which could only result from the want of ordinary knowledge and skill or the failure to exercise due caution ? But when in addition it appears that having been previously employed to investigate the same title, he had submitted it to eminent counsel, who had given a written opinion in its favor without even expressing a doubt as to the judgment in question, to hold him responsible would be to establish a rule, the direct effect of which would he to deter all prudent and responsible men from pursuing a vocation environed with such perils. We think the court below was right in refusing to charge as requested in the plaintiff’s points; all of which assume as matter of law that to pass 'the title with such an encumbrance upon it was evidence of want of ordinary knowledge and skill and of due caution. We see therefore no error for which we ought to reverse.
Judgment affirmed.
