116 Ga. 546 | Ga. | 1902
Watson, a merchant, was convicted in the municipal court of the town of Thomson for the violation of an ordinance providing that “ it shall be illegal for any person to follow any trade, avocation, or calling, within the limits of the town of Thomson, on the 25th day of December of each year; said day being hereby set aside as a holiday, and is to be observed by all persons within the limits of the town.” By the terms of the ordinance its provisions
The town of Thomson had no express authority from the General Assembly to pass the ordinance in question; and inasmuch as we have reached the conclusion that such authority can not be fairly implied from the general grant of power contained in the general welfare clause, which is the only clause in the town’s charter which could by any possible construction be held to confer the authority, it will be unnecessary to determine whether the General Assembly could constitutionally enact itself or delegate to municipal corporations the power to pass such a law as is involved in the present case. Christmas day is declared by the law of this State to be a holiday. The General Assembly has not, however, seen proper to provide for an entire cessation of business on public holidays. On such days it is not lawful to note and protest bills and notes, but further than this the law does not prohibit the carrying-on of business vocations. Civil Code, §3692. See also Hamer v. Sears, 81 Ga. 288. It is well settled that a municipal corporation can not by ordinance provide for the punishment of an act which is made an offense under the law of the State. It does not necessarily follow, however, from this that a municipal corporation may provide for the punishment of any act which the State has not seen fit to declare a crime. The power of municipal corporations to provide for the punishment, under the general welfare clause in their charters, of acts otherwise lawful, is a limited power. As a general rule, a municipal corporation can not under this clause ex
The State itself can not interfere with the right to labor except upon reasons which demand that this right shall be restrained for the public good. Laws requiring cessation from labor at given times have been upheld for the reason that experience has demonstrated that it is for the welfare of each individual, and therefore for the society of which he is a member, that all persons should take periodic rests from their work. The policy of the law of this State is, and has been for many years, favorable to the right of a man to labor and to follow the pursuit of his ordinary vocation. The only restraints upon this right which the General Assembly has ever seen proper to exercise are those above referred to. The General Assembly has never, so far as we are informed, conferred in express terms upon any municipal corporation the right to altogether prohibit a person from carrying on one of the lawful vocations of life on a public holiday, even if it could confer such power. Municipal corporations under the general welfare clause -have been permitted to pass ordinances in aid of the policy of the law of the State, by punishing acts which were not punishable under the law of the State, but which if permitted in the municipality might tend to bring about violations of State laws. It was held in Karwisch v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 204, that while the City of Atlanta could not
Of course, what is said above with reference to the power of a municipal corporation under the general welfare clause of its charter to prohibit the carrying on of lawful occupations on public
Judgment reversed.