Watson v. HamiltonWatson v. Hamilton
OPINION
The plaintiff, Kevin A. Watson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under
At all relevant times, Watson was housed at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP). According to his Complaint, Watson refused to participate in the prison‘s annual TB testing on religious grounds and was subsequently disciplined.
On July 11, 2022, defendant Hamilton, a nurse at the facility, requested that Watson submit to the TB skin injection test.2 Watson refused the test “upon religious grounds” and insisted that she instead conduct a chest X ray, an alternative TB testing option he received in previous years. Compl. 4, Dkt. No. 1. Watson claims he overheard Hamilton tell another nurse that she “hate[s] black Muslims for thinking they can use their religion as an excuse for everything, trying to make us believe their religious lies.” Id. at 22. Based on Watson‘s refusal to comply with the available TB screening method, Hamilton issued a disciplinary charge against him, which included a penalty of ninety days loss of good time credit. Defendant Gilbert certified the charge and defendant Grubb served the charge upon Watson.
A disciplinary hearing was held on August 19, 2022, and Watson pled not guilty. Although medical records presented at the hearing showed that Watson
Watson appealed on September 13, 2022, claiming that his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Constitution were violated by the medical staff‘s failure to provide him with an alternative to the TB skin injection test. The prison warden, defendant White, reviewed the appeal and found no error. White reasoned that the “test is not a vaccine but preventative therapy. Nurse Hamilton stated that it was explained to you that you have the right to refuse, but you will receive a charge for refusal to participate in preventative/prophylactic therapies. You admitted you refused and you received a charge according to policy.” Id. at 14.
Watson then submitted a level two appeal to the regional administrator, defendant Manis, who upheld the decision and found no procedural errors. Manis explained that
the contentions you presented with your level two appeal were only facsimiles of contentions already answered in full with your level one appeal response and/or during your original hearing. The purpose of the level two appeal is not to allow you to argue the facts of your case once more. You are not given the choice to unilaterally exempt yourself
Id. at 17.
On November 7, 2022, Watson submitted a medical request for a chest X ray “as a medical exemption for the [TB] skin injection chemical test because of his religious belief restriction.” Id. at 22. In response, defendant Holbrook stated that the “chest X ray is not a screen for TB.” Id. Watson submitted a written complaint based on Holbrook‘s response, alleging that she “is refusing to provide plaintiff a medical exemption for the [TB] skin injection chemical test.” Id. at 23. Defendant Trent responded and asked that Watson provide the name of his religion. Id. According to Watson, after advising Trent of his religion and the reason for seeking a religious exemption to the TB skin injection test, Hamilton responded that “we do not have any religious exemptions for the [TB test].” Id. Watson thereafter submitted a regular grievance, complaining of violations under RLUIPA. Per Watson, the grievance ombudsman did not log the grievance because it was repetitive to a prior grievance, but he contends that the issue with the prior grievance was regarding defendant Duncan‘s refusal to approve a different medical accommodation request.
On December 19, 2023, the then-director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), defendant Dotson, overturned the disciplinary decision and restored Watson‘s loss of good time. But according to Watson, Dotson has failed to
Finally, Watson alleges that the Commonwealth of Virginia has entered into a contract with the federal government under RLUIPA to receive federal funding for its religious programs and, as a third-party beneficiary to this contract, he has lost his religious property rights.
Based on the foregoing, Watson has set forth the following claims at issue in this proceeding:
Claim A: Defendant Hamilton retaliated against Watson by filing a disciplinary charge against him for refusing a skin injection TB test at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP), in violation of the Plaintiff‘s First Amendment rights. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.
Claim B: Defendant Ramey retaliated against Watson by finding him guilty at his disciplinary hearing for the charge of refusing the TB test at ROSP, in violation of Watson‘s First Amendment rights. Id. at 8-9.
Claim C: Defendant White violated Watson‘s RLUIPA and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to investigate and correct the fact that Watson had been charged and convicted of a disciplinary conviction for refusing the TB test. Id. at 13.
Claim D: Defendant Manis violated Watson‘s RLUIPA and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to investigate and correct the fact that Watson had been charged and convicted of a disciplinary conviction for refusing the TB test. Id. at 15-16.
Claim E: Defendant Dotson violated Watson‘s RLUIPA rights by failing to provide for an alternative type of TB test that is not a “skin injection chemical test.” Id. at 18.
Claim M: Defendant Hamilton violated Watson‘s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “manufactu[ring] false inculpatory evidence which led to [Watson‘s] unreasonable seizure and to his prison disciplinary hearing guilty decision.” Id. at 41-42.
Claim N: Defendants Hamilton, Gilbert, Grubb, Ramey, Day, White, and Manis violated Watson‘s Fourteenth Amendment and/or RLUIPA rights by charging, convicting, and/or upholding Watson‘s disciplinary conviction for refusing the TB skin injection test. Id. at 44-45.
Claim Q: The Commonwealth of Virginia breached a RLUIPA contract with the federal government, “the Defendant Healthcare Provider and [Watson as a] third-party beneficiary” when Watson was not provided an alternative to the TB skin injection test. Id. at 49-53.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Watson‘s claims against them. First, they contend that Watson has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to claims A, B, C, D, E, and F. Second, the defendants argue that Watson‘s claims under the Constitution, RLUIPA, or conspiracy laws cannot survive. Finally, the defendants assert that the Commonwealth of Virginia is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity and that Watson‘s breach of contract claim is not cognizable. Watson disagrees.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
The defendants assert that Watson has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to claims A, B, C, D, E, and F.3 Specifically, they argue that Watson did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his “allegations about being retaliated against or any VDOC employees conspiring against him in regard to the
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner cannot bring a civil action concerning prison conditions until he has first exhausted his available administrative remedies.
A prison official has the burden to prove an inmate‘s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Once a defendant presents evidence of a failure to exhaust, the burden of proof shifts to the inmate to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that exhaustion occurred or that
In support of their exhaustion defense, the defendants have submitted an affidavit of T. Still, the prison‘s grievance coordinator, along with the facility‘s grievance policy and Watson‘s grievance records. Under the prison‘s Offender Grievance Procedure, exhaustion of the regular grievance procure is mandatory prior to initiating litigation. Def.‘s Mem. Supp. Summ J. Still Aff. at ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 79-1. To initiate the grievance process, an inmate must first make a good faith effort to resolve the issue informally with a verbal complaint to a prison official. Id. at ¶ 7. If the issue remains unresolved, the inmate may then submit a completed written complaint form. Id. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the response, he may file a regular grievance. Id. A grievance must be accepted at intake or the inmate must resubmit it. Id. at ¶ 9. Then, the inmate must undertake two tiers of review: Level I, conducted by the warden or Superintendent of the facility, and Level II, conducted by the Regional Administrator, Health Services Director, or Chief of Operations, depending on the issue. Id. at ¶ 10. A matter is considered exhausted when the regular grievance has been accepted at intake and appealed through the highest level of review with no resolution. Id. at ¶ 12. Furthermore, “[a]ll inmates are oriented to the Offender Grievance Procedure when they are initially received into the VDOC.” Id. at ¶ 14. Watson‘s signed orientation acknowledgment is enclosed,
According to the defendants, Watson did not exhaust available administrative remedies for his claims related to retaliation, conspiracy, or religious exemptions to the TB testing policy. The record partly supports this contention. Specifically, Still declared that he reviewed Watson‘s grievances, and enclosed a copy of Watson‘s grievance report from June 1, 2022, through January 5, 2026, which includes all written complaints and grievances accepted at intake. According to Still,
[Watson] submitted two Written Complaints and Regular Grievances about receiving an accommodation for the TB skin test. However, Watson did not file any Written Complaints or Regular Grievances related to being retaliated against and/or conspired against by any VDOC employees in regard to the TB test, or VDOC failing to provide a policy for exemptions based on religious objections to the TB test.
Id. at ¶ 18.
The grievance report reveals two relevant submissions. First, Watson submitted a Reasonable Accommodation Request to the facility‘s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator, defendant Duncan, on October 7, 2022. His request stated as follows:
I request VDOC and R.O.S.P. Medical Dept., etc., to make a medical and religion accommodation for my religious belief restriction: “I shall not inject any chemical into my body.” I request a chest X-Ray or any other screening that does not require injection of any chemical into my body as a medical and religion exemption for VDOC/R.O.S.P. enforcement of Fed./State Tuberculosis (TB) PPD injection skin test
Id. Encl. at 47. Duncan denied the request, stating that it “[d]oes not meet the definition of ADA” and advising that Watson could address the issue with the medical department. Id. From the record, it is unclear if Watson submitted a written complaint on the issue. However, Watson filed a regular grievance, numbered ROSP-22-REG-00369, attaching his ADA request form as evidence of “other documentation used to satisfy the informal complaint process,”4 and expressing his disagreement with Duncan‘s response.5 Id. at 45. He further requested that his grievance be logged so he “can exhaust [his] prison administration remedies.” Id.
On Level I review, Watson‘s grievance was determined to be unfounded by defendant White. Id. at 44. Watson appealed the matter to Level II, and defendant Manis upheld the decision finding no policy violation. Id. at 43. Manis stated that
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials a fair opportunity to address the problem that will later form the basis of the lawsuit. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 729 (4th Cir. 2008). Clearly, there is no allegation of any retaliatory or conspiratorial acts by any of the defendants in Watson‘s grievance documents. Thus, it appears that he has failed to exhaust those claims. However, while the issue regarding his religious beliefs are cloaked in an ADA request, Watson has put officials on notice of this issue.6 Although prison officials may have looked into the matter presented under the lens of the ADA, because Watson repeatedly mentioned RLUIPA and his desire for an alternative TB testing option for religious purposes, I cannot conclude that he failed to exhaust that issue when it was appealed through the highest level of review and defendant Manis specifically stated that Watson had exhausted his administrative remedies as to that grievance.
R.O.S.P. Medical Administrator/Provider is refusing to provide me a Medical exemption per my request for the Tuberculosis (TB) PPD injection screening. I requested the exemption because of my religious belief restriction. See: Attached Request Form. Medical Admin./Provider refusal violates my federal right under federal statute
42 U.S.C. Section 2000 et seq. (RLUIPA). Per (RLUIPA) Medical Admin./Provider must provide me a substitution for the (TB) injection screening. If chest-Xray is not a screen for TB, then why did R.O.S.P. medical use a chest X-Ray to screen me for (TB) in 2021?
Id. Encl. at 50, Dkt. No. 79-1. Attached to the written complaint is a completed Facility Request form, in which Watson requested a “medical accommodation” for the TB screening. Id. at 51. Although Watson did not state what his specific religion is, he stated that his “religion belief restriction is: ‘I shall not inject any chemicals into my body.‘” Id. The staff respondent stated that “[a] chest X ray is not a screen for TB.” Id. In response to the written complaint, defendant Trent asked Watson to “[p]lease provide us the name of your religion so we can fully understand what you are referring.” Id. Watson submitted a regular grievance with the same allegations. In response, Meade stated that Watson provided insufficient information and directed him to name his religious belief within five days. Watson did not seek Level
In any event, Watson‘s main contention is that he exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing the decisions on his disciplinary charge. It is true that he appealed the disciplinary proceeding to the highest level, as evidenced by the Affidavit of K. Ramey, a Hearings Officer at ROSP, who conducted Watson‘s disciplinary hearing. Id. Ramey Aff. at ¶ 14, Dkt. No. 79-3. In each appellate document enclosed with Ramey‘s ffidavit, Watson‘s grounds for appeal included a violation of his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation, his rights under RLUIPA, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Id. Encl. at 58, 62. But, as this court has explained, “the disciplinary hearing appeals process is distinct from the [g]rievance [p]rocedure, and fully appealing a disciplinary charge does not exhaust an inmate‘s administrative remedies.” Carter v. Harrison, No. 7:23-cv-00218, 2024 WL 32747188, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2024).
In other cases where inmates have raised a similar argument, judges in this circuit have considered whether an appeal of a disciplinary action could constitute exhaustion, and determined that it could only if prison officials misrepresented the prisoner‘s procedural options, thus making remedies unavailable. See, e.g., Allen v. Waldron, No. 7:21-cv-00214, 2023 WL 4980210 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2023) (denying
Watson alternatively argues that administrative remedies were unavailable because he misunderstood the prison‘s rules. As the Supreme Court has outlined, an administrative remedy is unavailable when three kinds of circumstances are apparent: (1) the administrative procedure “operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates“; (2) the administrative scheme is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use“; and (2) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of the grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44.
Watson claims that he “used the wrong remedy through a reasonable misunderstanding of the rules.” Pl.‘s Resp. 4, Dkt. No. 89. I am unpersuaded. The prison‘s policies are clear, particularly where the Offender Grievance Procedure discusses the exhaustion requirement but the Offender Discipline Operating
Finally, Watson insists that his retaliation and conspiracy claims were within the scope of his grievances, arguing that he is not required to identify every possible defendant or legal theory. Watson is correct that he is not required to name particular defendants in his grievances in order to satisfy the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirements;
Ultimately, I conclude that Watson has failed to exhaust his retaliation and conspiracy claims,8 and they must be dismissed. Furthermore, although it appears that Watson may have exhausted his religious rights claims, those cannot survive on their merits for the reasons that follow.
C. RLUIPA and First Amendment Free Exercise Clause Claims.
As the Fourth Circuit recently said, “[a] prisoner asserting religious liberty claims has at least two arrows in his quiver: the First Amendment and the [RLUIPA]. But the RLUIPA arrow flies farther and strikes harder.” Roberts v. Engelke, 180 F.4th 634, 638 (4th Cir. 2026).
RLUIPA provides that
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if
- is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
- is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Under RLUIPA, “the inmate bears the initial burden of establishing that a prison policy substantially burdens his or her ability to practice in accordance with a sincerely held religious belief.” Id. Then, “once the plaintiff makes the requisite initial showing, the burden shifts to the government to show that the prison policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id.
At the outset, it‘s unclear whether Watson holds a sincere religious belief. Watson has stated that “[t]he name of [his] religion is: ‘The Nation of Gods/Earths’ a religion approved by (VA.DOC),”9 and he refused the TB screening “because of [his] religious belief that: ‘I shall not inject any chemicals into my body.‘” Pl. Resp. Mot. Summ J. Ex. G., Dkt. No. 89-1. The defendants maintain throughout the
Still, Watson must prove that the TB skin injection test substantially burdens his exercise of religion. He has not made this showing. The term “substantial burden” has the same meaning in the RLUIPA context as it does in the First Amendment context. Greenhill, 944 F.3d at 250. Thus,
a “substantial burden” is one that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” . . . or one that forces a person to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
Here, Watson claims that the precept of his religion that would be abandoned by submitting to the TB skin injection test is his belief that he cannot inject “any harmful chemical into his body.” Pl. Resp. at 9, Dkt. No. 89. He asserts that he was
According to affiant D. Trent, a registered nurse serving the Health Services Authority at the prison, inmates are to be screened for TB annually and the most effective testing method is the purified protein derivative (PPD) skin test. The test is administered by “injecting a small amount of solution made with [PPD] under the skin.” Def.‘s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Trent Aff. ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 79-4. Imperatively, “the solution in the PPD test is not a ‘chemical.‘” Id. While Watson insists that the PPD test is harmful, he offers no evidence in support of that argument in order to dispute Trent‘s Affidavit. In fact, attached to Watson‘s response is an article from a Prison Legal News publication written by Eike Blohm, MD, titled, “Prisoner Health Update: Tuberculosis,” which provides information consistent with Trent‘s description of the testing method. Specifically, the article states that “[a]ll prisoners should get a PPD test once a year” and, during that testing process, “[a] protein from the TB bacterium is injected under the skin.” Pl. Resp. Ex. D, Dkt. No. 89-1. Upon review of the evidence submitted by both parties, PPD is not described as a “harmful chemical.” Thus, no reasonable jury would be able to find that injection of the PPD substance for purposes of TB screening would violate a precept of Watson‘s religion.
Because Watson has not met his burden to establish a RLUIPA violation, the burden does not shift to the defendants to show that the prison policy is the least
Finally, a Free Exercise claim under the First Amendment “affords less protection to inmates’ free exercise rights than does RLUIPA.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200. To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that “‘(1) he holds a sincere religious belief and (2) that his religious practice has been substantially burdened by the prison policy or practice.‘” Hammock v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349, 365 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 114 (4th Cir. 2023)). Once the plaintiff makes this “threshold” showing, the burden shifts to the defendants to “offer[] penological interests that justify its infringement on free exercise rights.” Id. Then, “if the prison adequately alleges a penological interest, a plaintiff can still prevail if the policy is not reasonably related to that interest.” Id. It‘s not until that point in the analysis that the factors outlined in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) are examined.10 Id.
D. Due Process Claims.
Watson claims that his due process rights were violated based on the defendants’ conduct surrounding his disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, Watson asserts that defendant Hamilton “manufactured false inculpatory evidence which led to [his] unreasonable seizure and to his prison disciplinary hearing guilty decision.” Compl. at 41-42, Dkt. No. 1. He further claims that defendants Hamilton, Gilbert, Grubb, Ramey, Day, White, and Manis improperly charged, convicted, and/or upheld his disciplinary conviction for refusing the TB skin injection test. Id. at 44-
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Here, the liberty interest at stake was Watson‘s penalty of ninety days loss of good time credit. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “recognized that constitutional procedural due process protections extend to prison disciplinary proceedings that could adversely impact an inmate‘s liberty interests—such as the loss of good time credits.” Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (referencing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)).
The defendants argue, however, that because his conviction has been overturned and his loss of good time credits have been restored to him, his due process claims are now moot. In response, Watson insists that his claims are not
In Claim Q, Watson claims that the Commonwealth of Virginia entered into a contract with the federal government under RLUIPA to receive funding for the VDOC‘s religious programs. He asserts that one of the terms is that the VDOC is prohibited from placing a substantial burden on an inmate‘s religious practice. By failing to provide an alternative to the TB skin test, Watson claims that the Commonwealth, through its agents, has failed to comply with its contractual obligation. As relief for this claim, Watson seeks monetary damages.13
The defendants disagree, arguing that Watson‘s breach of contract claim is barred from review under the Eleventh Amendment, and stating that “[t]here is not a ‘RLUIPA contract’ between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United States Government. Rather, RLUIPA is a federal law that allows state inmates to bring a cause of action to vindicate a violation of their specific religious rights for injunctive relief only.” Def.‘s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 28, Dkt. No. 79.
For all the reasons stated, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and each of the claims pending in this civil action will be dismissed. A separate Judgment will be entered.
ENTER: August 5, 2026
/s/ JAMES P. JONES
Senior United States District Judge