*1 v. DIXON WATSON [132 (1999)] at 267. In ren- 744-45, Id. at thus, “stand alone.” and, could Hawkins, 101N.C. decision, on the rule stated we relied dering may support damages 472, that nominal 529, plaintiff had established damages. Weheld that punitive award of therefore, damages; nominal was, least, entitled to at her claim plaintiff awarding order compels that the the conclusion “Hawkins at 267. be affirmed.” Id. punitive damages must evidence to produced sufficient held, plaintiff previously As we plaintiff jury, and since the issue of submit puni- awarding test for compensatory damages, $1.00 received jury’s dis- was within was met. It under Hawkins damages tive damages to award the amount of determine the cretion to the amount greatly exceeded this amount plaintiff, and the fact that a new not, by itself, warrant compensatory damages does did not abuse its judge trial Therefore, we hold that the id. trial. See trial on the issue for a new defendant’s motion denying discretion punitive damages. in view of the remaining arguments examined defendant’s Having amount to reversible do not analysis, we conclude that foregoing error.
No error. WALKERconcur. LEWISand Judges UNIVERSITY, DIXON and DUKE v. BOBBY JOAN WATSON, SARAH No. COA97-638 1999) (Filed 16 February aggra- necessary Damages and Remedies— — vating factor support an present to was factor aggravating
The arising damages in an the issue of instruction properly denied court and the trial workplace harassment from trial, or remittitur nov, a new motions for defendants’ prima facie plenary to establish evidence plaintiff offered where distress, one of the of emotional infliction of intentional IN THE COURT OF APPEALS WATSON v. DIXON *2 elements of being outrageous such claim extreme and conduct imputed defendant or a third which is then to defendant. it would seem that Duke’s was based on more than mere ratification and it cannot be said as a matter lawof against $5,000 defendant Dixon for against $500,000 and defendant Duke for were an abuse of dis- cretion where it was uncontroverted that Duke has a net worth of employee, Dixon, virtually millions while its judgment proof. Judge concurring part. McGEE and in dissenting appealed from an order entered 15November 1996 Judge Stanback, County A. Leon Superior Jr. Durham Court. This January was heard in opinión this Court on 15 and the July was filed on 7 petitioned 1998. Plaintiff and defendants for petitions rehearing. granted by Both order of this Court entered September 1998, and the petitions matter was heard on the rehear without additional briefs or oral argument.
Glenn, Fisher, P.A., by Mills & W. Stewart Fisher and William S. Mills, plaintiff-appellee.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Stewart, P.C., by Guy Smoak & F. Driver, Lentz, defendants-appellants. Jr. and Barbara R. TIMMONS-GOODSON,Judge.
Only the facts for determination of the issue on rehear- ing complete are set out here. For a more statement of the facts of previous opinion see this Court’s at 130 N.C. S.E.2d 15. Plaintiff Sarah Joan against Watson initiated this action (Dixon) University (Duke) Duke on 22 October alleging claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent distress, infliction of emotional negligent hiring, negligent By retention and assault. 1995, plain- order dated 18 against tiff’s claims assault, negligent Duke for infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, as well as negligent Dixon for distress, infliction of emotional were dismissed. remaining Plaintiff’s claims Duke for intentional infliction of emotional negligent retention, distress and Dixon for assault and intentional distress, infliction of emotional were tried A. Judge Stanback, duly empaneled jury before Leon Jr. and a during September County 1996 civil Superior session of Durham Court.
IN THE COURT DIXON WATSON v. jury determined that By on verdict returned 10 October Watson, was not for an on Duke Dixon was not liable assault find, however, jury did of Dixon. The liable for the retention battery of and awarded her liable for Watson that Dixon was (1) was liable for compensatory (2) $100 that Dixon damages; Duke had ratified distress and that intentional infliction emotional distress, and awarded this emotional inflicting Dixon’s actions puni- $100,000,and compensatory in the amount of damages Watson $500,000 from amount from Dixon tive jury’s Judge judgment on the verdict Duke. Stanback entered October 1996.
Thereafter, judgment motions for notwith- defendants made oral trial, alternative, for a standing or, in the new (j.n.o.v.) the verdict summarily 1996, filed were On 28 October defendant which denied. trial, j.n.o.v. or, alternative, for a new or written motions for in the damages. These motions alternative, for a remittitur as the 1996, 1996, 7 order entered 15 November heard on November appealed. motions. Defendants Judge Stanback denied defendants’ July 1998, affirmed that of In this decision filed 7 we Court’s inten- plaintiff’s against Dixon for trial court’s claims the Duke for ratifica- against of emotional distress tional infliction the determination of However, we reversed and remanded for tion. Duke. punitive damages Dixon and against of to be amount petitioned rehearing, for orders defendants Plaintiff and 1998, petitions, without addi- September 9 we allowed these entered addressing purpose the of argument, oral limited briefing tional or Duke. propriety damage the awards the of opinion 7 respects, of this Court filed original In all other the adopted and reaffirmed. 1998is are not entitled rehearing, plaintiff that defendants
On contends Dixon and Duke to reversal of the by joining in the trial court invited error since defendants the separate punitive damage issue be submitted to request that a a retrial on the sole Defendants contend that as to each defendant. States and North punitive damages violate the United would issue Indeed, case law. existing North Carolina Constitutions Carolina compels to limit the precedent this Court argue against Duke. award change recent in North Carolina’s
We are well aware of the Statute, Statues, which Chapter ID of our General Damages Punitive IN 332 THE COURT
WATSON DIXON
v.
N.C.
329
requires
relating
same trier of fact that tried the issues
“[t]he
compensatory
try
relating
shall
the issues
dam-
ages.”
note, however,
pro-
N.C.
Stat.
ID-30 (1997).
§
Gen.
We
that this
govern
vision
section ID-30 does not
instant
as
case
prior
subject
originated
to the enactment of the
restriction on the trial
compensatory
damages.
We are also
aware of
line
employer’s liability
it
of cases wherein
has been held that “when an
solely
theory
liability,
respon-
derivative under a
of vicarious
such as
liability
ratification,
employer
deat
or
cannot
employee.”
Copland,
Inc.,
exceed
Poole v.
App. 235, 246,
88,
(1997),
grounds,
rev’d on other
348 N.
260,
Thompson
(1998);
C.
“[P]unitive ages punish[.]” Equipment to and intended Maintenance Co. v. Godley Builders, (1992). WATSON v. DIXON circumstances to consider the “the is allowed Accordingly, setting position when conduct and financial [amount defendants’ determi- well settled that the award.” Id. It is punitive damage] aof awarded, and the be punitive damages should of whether nation jury. sound discretion award rests within the amount of the Martin, Stone v. upheld although many awards have been
Hence,
compen-
award of
disproportionate to the
significantly
Equipment Co., 107 N.C.
satory damages. See Maintenance
354,
The evidence tends to Center, Processing of the Medical in the Sterile employed with Duke harassing difficulty with Dixon’s experience began Watson to when telephone calls, rub- consisted of crank Dixon’s behavior behavior. breasts, confining Watson body Watson, touching her his bing her picture depicting of Watson will, drawing a a room her her, scaring Watson penis, obscene comments about making with a scary making comments about rapes occurred, and area where roadways. This conduct continued on dark long her drive home to late approximately August 1991 eight (from months about seven or crying, vom- plaintiff experienced bouts of 1992),during which March finally a nervous break- inability sleep, she suffered until iting, depression and diagnosed with result, plaintiff has been down. As a post-traumatic stress disorder. Department manage- amongst the Sterile reputation a
Dixon had new lot, and intimidated joked played around as one who ment disciplinary any However, never taken serious employees. Duke had plaintiff, began to harass problem. When Dixon to address this supervisor, Haskins her Eunice reported his behavior she Processing, Vickie of Sterile Turrentine, the Assistant Director Rouse, and Representative, Oscar Barnette, Employee Relations anything was However, little if Minnis. Officer Sarah Duke Police March until around 20 harassing behavior about Dixon’s done spoke with Management, Material Dennis, Director of when Bill separated plaintiff reported behavior, his Dixon about *5 to first was thereafter transferred Plaintiff in the work environment. posi- in her new after less than a week shift, position, but a low stress work not return to leave and did tion, plaintiff went out of work on mid-July 1992,when she part-time until and worked until June were still and Dixon both to work full-time. returned trial. Duke at the time of employed with IN THE COURT OF APPEALS WATSON v. DIXON chief, case in During defendants’ Dixon contended that he had intentionally Watson, not harassed and Duke maintained that the uni- versity responded light had as best it could in of the circumstances. Many deny personnel reports behavior, of of receiving Duke’s Dixon’s keep or testified that Watson told them that she wanted to her com- plaints confidential. opinion plaintiff
Weheld in our 7 and reaffirm now that plenary prima offered to establish a evidence of inten- facie tional distress, infliction of emotional one of elements constituent of a being outrageous” such claim “extreme and conduct defend- imputed Accordingly, ant or a third which is then defendant. to present support factor aggravating was an instruc- jury. tion on the of issue Brown Burlington Industries, Inc.,
236-37 jury In the instant must note that drafted a rather plaintiff’s terse letter denouncing plight to Duke its indifference to and suggesting policies place that abide that those jury workplace address harassment. Although did exonerate retention, letter, Duke of specifically its upon remarked somewhat Duke’s reckless indifference to complaints place policies university addressing and the complaints. such It would seem then that Duke’s in this upon instance is based more than mere ratification. it is millions, uncontroverted Duke has a that net worth while its employee, Bobby Dixon, virtually proof. is a It would take greater punitive far damage punish entity, award to a thriving than employees. one of its light egregious lower echelon In nature status, say Duke’s its behavior and financial we cannot that as a damage matter of law the awards $5,000 Duke for was abuse discretion. Because a there was more than scintilla of evidence damage Duke and Dixon the “cold record” in ruling “probably case does not show the trial court’s amounted to miscarriage justice,” Boyd, substantial ruling S.E.2d at affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges LEWISand McGEE concur. *6 CO. v. DUKE POWER
VANASEK N.C. part. dissenting concurring Judge McGEE is direct evidence majority opinion that there with the agree I Bobby and Duke against both support punitive damages majority opinion from the University. However, respectfully I dissent amount of Duke award affirming a Duke not liable for jury itself found $500,000 when the only liable for ratification employee Dixon but of its retention prior opinion, it is in our employee. As we stated actions of its theory vicar- employer under a that the well settled be ratification, cannot respondeat or liability, such as ious Griffin, employee. See Pinnix v. of that of the excess Lassiter, Thompson v. (1942); S.E.2d 88 Copland, Inc., (1957); Poole 260, 498 grounds, 348 N.C. remanded on other (1997), rev’d and award (1998). The set S.E.2d 602 lia- Courts limits Duke’s present case law of our Dixon at bility equal amount. to an OF JEFFREY VANASEK, Administratrix the ESTATE
MARGARET VANASEK, CITY OF v. DUKE POWER COMPANY, MARGARET VANASEK, UNKNOWN OFFICER #1, R.C. STAHNKE, J.M. BUTLER, CHARLOTTE, FIREMAN FIREMAN and UNKNOWN #2, UNKNOWN #1, No. COA98-607 1999) (Filed 16 February dangling power duty public Cities and Towns— doctrine — duty special police and fire officers — no line — dismissal and 12(b)(6) a Rule properly granted The trial court police officers City Charlotte and its summary for the duty negligence in a public doctrine firemen on the There power line after an ice storm. dangling live arising from a City made a complaint allegation nois any relied, or that decedent which he promise to decedent on con- City Plaintiff’s relationship with the defendants. special an ultrahazardous power line constituted the downed tention that rec- does not immaterial, North Carolina because circumstance duty public doctrine. exception high risk ognize