66 Ky. 635 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1868
delivered the opinion op the court:
In the progress of the suit of B. F. Avery and others against John Watson and others, in the Louisville chancery court, involving the question whether said A.very and D. McNaughton, and J. A. Leech, were ruling elders of the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, in the city of Louisville, and as such were authorized to act as members of the session of the church in the control of its property, including the church edifice— that court, by an interlocutory order made on the 20th of March, 1866, appointed Henry Farley, George Fulton, and said B. F. Avery, who were the trustees of the church, the 'court’s receivers, “to take charge of the church building, and all property belonging to said church, during the pendency of this suit, or until the further order of the court.”
And afterwards, on the 15th day of June, 1866, the following further order was made by the court: “That the trustees, B. F. Avery, Henry Farley, and George Fulton, now receivers, open the church for divine worship and congregational meetings, whenever ordered to
And afterwards, on the 23d day of June, 1866, the following order was made by said court: “This day came the plaintiffs by counsel, and moved the court to remove George Fulton and Henry Farley as receivers herein, and filed notice thereof; and also filed the affidavit of B. F. Avery herein.
“And then came defendants by counsel and filed the separate affidavits of George Fulton and Henry Farley.
“And said motion being heard, it is ordered that the marshal of this court do take possession of the church property herein mentioned, until the further order of the court, and that the same be opened — 1. For Sunday school and other like purposes; 2. For the meeting of the session when notified thereof; 3. For public worship, and such using of the pulpit and the house generally, as the session shall order.
“And it is ordered, that he be respectful to the order of the session; as this court said on the 15th June, the session, according to the decision of the General Assembly, at Peoria, Illinois, has the control of the church building, &c.
“ The keys of the church, &c., are ordered to be delivered to the marshal.”
It appears in the record, that, on the 23d of July, 1866, the marshal took possession of the church propertJy.tfh4e;&.' said order of the court, and that he held it, and «ón'tvctlédi * $ . the use of it, in accordance with the orders of ^majority of the session, as recognized by the cour$' m'dltfdiflg, Avery, McNaughton, and Leech. | r ^
At this present term the said appellants, by their counsel, moved this court “ to award a summons against the Hon. Henry Pirtle, chancellor of the Louisville chancery court, to appear and show cause why he has refused to carry into effect the mandate of this court in this cause;”' and, waiving the summons, the chancellor has appeared- and filed his written response to the motion.
From a transcript of the record of the case since the reversal of the judgment by this court, it appears, that, on the 21st day of February, 1868, the following order was made by the court below:
No action appears to have been taken on this motion until the 28th of February, 1868, when the follpwing order was made:
“ Came the parties herein, and, by way of objection, and in response to the motion herein made by the defendants on the 21st, presented and offered to file a petition in equity against the defendants, to which they object; and plaintiffs moved the court for an injunction against the defendants, enjoining and restraining them from any further prosecution of their said motion, made on the 21st of February, 1868, and from all proceeding by motion, suit, or otherwise, to obtain the possession, control, or use of the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, to which defendants object; and said motions coming on to be heard, were submitted, and the court not being advised, took time.”
And, afterwards, in March, 1868, the following order was entered: .
“The court being advised, it is ordered, that, upon plaintiffs executing bond in the sum of two thousand dollars, conditioned according to law, the defendants, Joseph Gault, John Watson, George Fulton, and Henry Farley, be, and they are hereby, enjoined and restrained from any further proceedings of this motion in said action,
The power of this court to enforce its own mandates .cannot be controverted, and is not questioned by the chancellor. Even before the adoption of the Civil Code of Practice, the 902d section of which expressly declares that “the court of appeals shall have power to enforce its mandates,” this court, in the case of Gorham vs. Luckett (6 B. Monroe, 630), asserted and exercised that power. And the court said in that case, that “ a court without power to execute its judgments or decrees would be an anomaly in government.”
But the motion is resisted on other grounds; which we will examine in the order in which they are stated in the chancellor’s response.
1st. It is insisted that the mandate of this court gives the lower court no positive orders to put the defendants or others in possession of the church property; but that the cause being .‘ remanded for propér corrective proceedings respecting the possession, control, and use of the church property,” it was within the discretion of the lower court to determine what might be proper orders in the premises; and that the court was not bound to grant the motion of the defendants, made on the 21st of February, 1868, unless, in its judgment, such an order would be a proper corrective order respecting the possession, control, and use of the church property.
But, in our opinion, the mandate, considered, as it. must be, with reference to the principles announced in the opinion preceding it, admits of no such construction. On the contrary, the point being expressly decided that “the judgment of the chancellor, which commits, the management and control of said church property to. said Avery, MeNaughton, and Leech, in conjunction with said Watson, Gault, and Hackney,” is erroneous. The mandatory order for “proper corrective proceedings respecting the possession, control, and use of the church property,” plainly imports a direction to restore to the defendants such rights of possession, control, and use of the property, as the former judgment had erroneously taken or withheld from them. No undecided question is reserved for further litigation in the court below; but the cause is remanded “for final judgment in conformity” to the opinion of this court.
It seems to us, the directions of the mandate are sufficiently explicit to authorize their enforcement according to section 902 of the Civil Code; and it is the duty of this court to cause them to be executed, unless the refusal of the chancellor to carry them into «effect was authorized by some other reason than a want of certainty in the decision and mandate of this court.
2d. But, by the response of the chancellor, his refusal to carry the order of this court into effect is also, defended on the ground that the petition which the
Whatever may be the rights of a defeated litigant to review,- by proper original proceedings, a final judgment against him, or to enjoin or vacate it for causes not litigated and concluded in the previous action, it
In the case of Morgan vs. Hart (9 B. Monroe, 79), cited and relied on by the chancellor, this court said: “We are also satisfied that it would be an inconvenient practice to allow any other demand outside of the original suit, and not disposed of by the decree, to be brought into litigation on the rule or motion for restitution.”
Such demand, if just and subsisting, should be set up in an independent suit; and, if there be any equitable reason for not coercing the order or decree for restitution, it should be made available as a ground for enjoining, and not for preventing or modifying, the order of restitution.
Whether the court might have enjoined its own final judgment or not, after correcting previous errors and conforming the record to the mandate of this court, we are of the opinion that it was not authorized by granting the injunction to suspend its owii power to enter the corrective judgment asked by the defendants, in conformity with the opinion of this court and in execution of its mandate.
We are gratified to be assured, by the response of the chancellor, that he has not intended to act in contempt' of the authority of this court, and do not doubt that he will cheerfully render a judgment in the cause in conformity to said opinion and mandate of this court, restoring the possession, use, and control of the church building and property to the parties entitled thereto,’ according to said opinion, and so far as they were
Judge Williams does not concur in this opinion, nor in any order requiring the chancellor to make any order of restitution, until the injunction granted by him is regularly and judicially disposed of and corrected, if erroneous, on appeal, and may hereafter file his reasons.