242 F. 441 | 6th Cir. | 1917
(after stating the facts as above). [1] The petition against the mother and sister directly alleges that the conveyance was made by Hamilton with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, but does not say that the grantees participated in this intent. It then proceeds to allege that the deed was within the four months period and constituted a preference, but omits any statement that the recipients were chargeable with notice that a preference would result — a fatal omission on this theory. Carey v. Donohue (C. C. A. 6) 209 Fed. 328, 126 C. C. A. 254. However, we pass by-any question of pleading and come to the merits.
In view of the conclusions we have expressed, it becomes immaterial to consider other questions discussed in the briefs.
The decree below, in this case, No. 2926, is affirmed, with costs.
Although not raised by counsel, the question obtrudes itself whether the values of Mrs. Hamilton’s dower and homestead rights have been properly preserved to her. See Re Lingafalter (C. C. A. 6) 181 Fed. 24, 104 C. C. A. 38, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 103. In two conveyances, we infer that she released her dower, and, in the third instance, it would merge. All seem to have been part of the transaction by which she was getting payments made to her; but now these payments are in effect taken away from her. The affirmance is, therefore, with the condition that the court below permit such modification in this respect as Mrs. Hamilton’s rights may require, if, indeed, she has any equity to compensation which she has not lost by her conduct in the matter or by nonclaim.