WATKINS v. UNITED STATES
No. 261
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued March 7, 1957. - Decided June 17, 1957.
354 U.S. 178
Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, Philip R. Monahan and Doris H. Spangenburg.
Osmond K. Fraenkel filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner, and Telford Taylor filed a brief for Metcalf, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Herbert R. O‘Conor filed a brief for the American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Julius Applebaum, Tracy E. Griffin, John M. Palmer, Paul W. Updegraff and Louis C. Wyman.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a review by certiorari of a conviction under
On April 29, 1954, petitioner appeared as a witness in compliance with a subpoena issued by a Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. The Subcommittee elicited from petitioner a description of his background in labor union activities. He had been an employee of the International Harvester Company between 1935 and 1953. During the last eleven of those years, he had been on leave of absence to serve as an official of the Farm Equipment Workers International Union, later merged into the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. He rose to the position of President of District No. 2 of the Farm Equipment Workers, a district defined geographically to include generally Canton and Rock Falls, Illinois, and Dubuque, Iowa. In 1953, petitioner joined the United Automobile Workers International Union as a labor organizer.
Petitioner‘s name had been mentioned by two witnesses who testified before the Committee at prior hearings. In September 1952, one Donald O. Spencer admitted having been a Communist from 1943 to 1946. He declared that he had been recruited into the Party with the endorsement and prior approval of petitioner, whom he identified as the then District Vice-President of the Farm Equip-
Petitioner answered these allegations freely and without reservation. His attitude toward the inquiry is clearly revealed from the statement he made when the questioning turned to the subject of his past conduct, associations and predilections:
“I am not now nor have I ever been a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. Rumsey was wrong when he said I had recruited him into the party, that I had received his dues, that I paid dues to him, and that I had used the alias Sam Brown.
“Spencer was wrong when he termed any meetings which I attended as closed Communist Party meetings.
“I would like to make it clear that for a period of time from approximately 1942 to 1947 I cooperated with the Communist Party and participated in Communist activities to such a degree that some persons may honestly believe that I was a member of the party.
“I have made contributions upon occasions to Communist causes. I have signed petitions for Commu-
nist causes. I attended caucuses at an FE convention at which Communist Party officials were present. “Since I freely cooperated with the Communist Party I have no motive for making the distinction between cooperation and membership except the simple fact that it is the truth. I never carried a Communist Party card. I never accepted discipline and indeed on several occasions I opposed their position.
“In a special convention held in the summer of 1947 I led the fight for compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act by the FE-CIO International Union. This fight became so bitter that it ended any possibility of future cooperation.”3
The character of petitioner‘s testimony on these matters can perhaps best be summarized by the Government‘s own appraisal in its brief:
“A more complete and candid statement of his past political associations and activities (treating the Communist Party for present purposes as a mere political party) can hardly be imagined. Petitioner certainly was not attempting to conceal or withhold from the Committee his own past political associations, predilections, and preferences. Furthermore, petitioner told the Committee that he was entirely willing to identify for the Committee, and answer any questions it might have concerning, ‘those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party,’ provided that, ‘to [his] best knowledge and belief,’ they still were members of the Party....” 4
The Subcommittee, too, was apparently satisfied with petitioner‘s disclosures. After some further discussion elaborating on the statement, counsel for the Committee
“I am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse to answer certain questions that I believe are outside the proper scope of your committee‘s activities. I will answer any questions which this committee puts to me about myself. I will also answer questions about those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. I will not, however, answer any questions with respect to others with whom I associated in the past. I do not believe that any law in this country requires me to testify about persons who may in the past have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged in Communist Party activity but who to my best knowledge and belief have long since removed themselves from the Communist movement.
“I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of this committee nor do I believe that this committee has the right to undertake the public exposure of persons because of their past activities. I may be wrong, and the committee may have this power, but until and unless a court of law so holds and directs me to answer, I most firmly refuse to discuss the political activities of my past associates.”5
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The conviction was reversed by a three-judge panel, one member dissenting. Upon rehearing en banc, the full bench affirmed the conviction with the judges of the original majority in dissent. 98 U. S. App. D. C. 190, 233 F. 2d 681. We granted certio-
We start with several basic premises on which there is general agreement. The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. This was freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument of this case.8 Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to “punish” those investigated are indefensible.
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees and to testify
The rudiments of the power to punish for “contempt of Congress” come to us from the pages of English history. The origin of privileges and contempts extends back into the period of the emergence of Parliament. The establishment of a legislative body which could challenge the absolute power of the monarch is a long and bitter story. In that struggle, Parliament made broad and varied use of the contempt power. Almost from the beginning, both the House of Commons and the House of Lords claimed absolute and plenary authority over their privileges. This was an independent body of law, described by Coke as lex parliamenti.9 Only Parliament could declare what those privileges were or what new privileges were occasioned, and only Parliament could judge what conduct constituted a breach of privilege.
In particular, this exclusion of lex parliamenti from the lex terrae, or law of the land, precluded judicial review of the exercise of the contempt power or the assertion of privilege. Parliament declared that no court had jurisdiction to consider such questions. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, an action for false imprisonment was brought by one Jay who had been held in contempt. The defendant, the Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons, demurred that he had taken the plaintiff
It seems inevitable that the power claimed by Parliament would have been abused. Unquestionably it was. A few examples illustrate the way in which individual rights were infringed. During the seventeenth century, there was a violent upheaval, both religious and political. This was the time of the Reformation and the establishment of the Church of England. It was also the period when the Stuarts proclaimed that the royal prerogative was absolute. Ultimately there were two revolutions, one protracted and bloody, the second without bloodshed. Critical commentary of all kinds was treated as contempt of Parliament in these troubled days. Even clergymen were imprisoned for remarks made in their sermons.11 Perhaps the outstanding case arose from the private conversation of one Floyd, a Catholic, in which he expressed pleasure over the misfortune of the King‘s Protestant son-in-law and his wife. Floyd was not a member of Parliament. None of the persons concerned was in any way connected with the House of Commons. Nevertheless, that body imposed an humiliating and cruel sentence upon Floyd for contempt.12 The House of Lords inter-
Later in that century, during the reign of Charles II, there was great unrest over the fact that the heir apparent, James, had embraced Catholicism. Anti-Catholic feeling ran high, spilling over a few years later when the infamous rogue, Titus Oates, inflamed the country with rumors of a “Popish Plot” to murder the King. A committee of Parliament was appointed to learn the sources of certain pamphlets that had been appearing. One was entitled: The Grand Question Concerning the Prorogation of this Parliament for a Year and Three Months Stated and Discussed. A Doctor Carey admitted to the committee that he knew the author, but refused to divulge his name. Brought to the bar of the House of Lords, he persisted in this stand. The House imposed a fine of £1,000 and committed the witness to the Tower.14
A hundred years later, George III had managed to gain control of Parliament through his ministers. The King could not silence the opposition, however, and one of the most vocal was John Wilkes. This precipitated a
“He had won a victory for freedom of the press. He had directed popular attention to the royally-controlled House of Commons, and pointed out its unrepresentative character, and had shown how easily a claim of privilege might be used to sanction the arbitrary proceedings of ministers and Parliament, even when a fundamental right of the subject was concerned. It was one of life‘s little ironies that work of such magnitude had been reserved for one of the worst libertines and demagogues of all time.”15
Even as late as 1835, the House of Commons appointed a select committee to inquire into “... the origin, nature, extent and tendency of the Orange Institutions.” This was a political-religious organization, vehemently Protestant in religion and strongly in favor of the growth of the British Empire. The committee summoned the Deputy Grand Secretary and demanded that he produce all the records of the organization. The witness refused to turn over a letter-book, which he admitted contained his answers to many communications upon Orange business. But it also contained, he said, records of private communications with respect to Orangeism. Summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, he remained adamant and was committed to Newgate Prison.16
Modern times have seen a remarkable restraint in the use by Parliament of its contempt power. Important investigations, like those conducted in America by congressional committees, are made by Royal Commissions
The history of contempt of the legislature in this country is notably different from that of England. In the early days of the United States, there lingered the direct knowledge of the evil effects of absolute power. Most of the instances of use of compulsory process by the first Congresses concerned matters affecting the qualification or integrity of their members or came about in inquiries dealing with suspected corruption or mismanagement of government officials.19 Unlike the English practice, from the very outset the use of contempt power by the legislature was deemed subject to judicial review.20
There was very little use of the power of compulsory process in early years to enable the Congress to obtain facts pertinent to the enactment of new statutes or the
It is not surprising, from the fact that the Houses of Congress so sparingly employed the power to conduct investigations, that there have been few cases requiring judicial review of the power. The Nation was almost one hundred years old before the first case reached this Court to challenge the use of compulsory process as a legislative device, rather than in inquiries concerning the elections
Subsequent to the decision in Kilbourn, until recent times, there were very few cases dealing with the investigative power.25 The matter came to the fore again when the Senate undertook to study the corruption in the handling of oil leases in the 1920‘s. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, and Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, the Court applied the precepts of Kilbourn to uphold the authority of the Congress to conduct the challenged investigations. The Court recognized the danger to effective and honest conduct of the Government
Following these important decisions, there was another lull in judicial review of investigations. The absence of challenge, however, was not indicative of the absence of inquiries. To the contrary, there was vigorous use of the investigative process by a Congress bent upon harnessing and directing the vast economic and social forces of the times. Only one case came before this Court, and the authority of the Congress was affirmed.26
In the decade following World War II, there appeared a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history. Principally this was the result of the various investigations into the threat of subversion of the United States Government, but other subjects of congressional interest also contributed to the changed scene. This new phase of legislative inquiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens. It brought before the courts novel questions of the appropriate limits of congressional inquiry. Prior cases, like Kilbourn, McGrain and Sinclair, had defined the scope of investigative power in terms of the inherent limitations of the sources of that power. In the more recent cases, the emphasis shifted to problems of accommodating the interest of the Government with the rights and privileges of individuals. The central theme was the application of the Bill of Rights as a restraint upon the assertion of governmental power in this form.
It was during this period that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was frequently in-
A far more difficult task evolved from the claim by witnesses that the committees’ interrogations were infringements upon the freedoms of the First Amendment.30
Abuses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead to abridgment of protected freedoms. The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous. This effect is even more harsh when it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged by current standards rather than those contemporary with the matters exposed. Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the same glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to
suspected of subversive actions. Subpoenas duces tecum had been issued calling for the correspondence and other records of these organizations. Refusals to comply were followed by prosecutions under
The Court recognized the restraints of the Bill of Rights upon congressional investigations in United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. The magnitude and complexity of the problem of applying the First Amendment to that case led the Court to construe narrowly the resolution describing the committee‘s authority. It was concluded that, when First Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation of power to the committee must be clearly revealed in its charter.
Accommodation of the congressional need for particular information with the individual and personal interest in privacy is an arduous and delicate task for any court. We do not underestimate the difficulties that would attend such an undertaking. It is manifest that despite the adverse effects which follow upon compelled disclosure of private matters, not all such inquiries are barred. Kilbourn v. Thompson teaches that such an investigation into individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any legislative purpose. That is beyond the powers conferred upon the Congress in the Constitution. United States v. Rumely makes it plain that the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual‘s
Petitioner has earnestly suggested that the difficult questions of protecting these rights from infringement by legislative inquiries can be surmounted in this case because there was no public purpose served in his interrogation. His conclusion is based upon the thesis that the Subcommittee was engaged in a program of exposure for the sake of exposure. The sole purpose of the inquiry, he contends, was to bring down upon himself and others the violence of public reaction because of their past beliefs, expressions and associations. In support of this argument, petitioner has marshalled an impressive array of evidence that some Congressmen have believed that such was their duty, or part of it.32
Petitioner‘s contentions do point to a situation of particular significance from the standpoint of the constitutional limitations upon congressional investigations. The theory of a committee inquiry is that the committee members are serving as the representatives of the parent assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose. Their function is to act as the eyes and ears of the Congress in obtaining facts upon which the full legislature can act. To carry out this mission, committees and subcommittees, sometimes one Congressman,
An essential premise in this situation is that the House or Senate shall have instructed the committee members on what they are to do with the power delegated to them. It is the responsibility of the Congress, in the first instance, to insure that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose. That requires that the instructions to an investigating committee spell out that group‘s jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity. Those instructions are embodied in the authorizing resolution. That document is the committee‘s charter. Broadly drafted and loosely worded, however, such resolutions can leave tremendous latitude to the discretion of the investigators. The more vague the committee‘s charter is, the greater becomes the possibility that the committee‘s specific actions are not in conformity with the will of the parent House of Congress.
The authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee was adopted in 1938 when a select committee, under the chairmanship of Representative Dies, was created.35 Several years later, the Committee was made a standing organ of the House with the same mandate.36 It defines the Committee‘s authority as follows:
“The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.”37
It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the meaning of “un-American“? What is that single, solitary “principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution“?38 There is no need to dwell upon the language, however. At one time, perhaps, the resolution might have been read narrowly to confine the Committee to the subject of propaganda.39 The events that have transpired in the fifteen years before the interrogation of petitioner make such a construction impossible at this date.
The members of the Committee have clearly demonstrated that they did not feel themselves restricted in any way to propaganda in the narrow sense of the word.40
Unquestionably the Committee conceived of its task in the grand view of its name. Un-American activities were its target, no matter how or where manifested. Notwithstanding the broad purview of the Committee‘s experience, the House of Representatives repeatedly approved its continuation. Five times it extended the life of the special committee.41 Then it made the group a standing committee of the House.42 A year later, the Committee‘s charter was embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act.43 On five occasions, at the beginning of sessions of Congress, it has made the authorizing resolution part of the rules of the House.44 On innumerable occasions, it has passed appropriation bills to allow the Committee to continue its efforts.
Combining the language of the resolution with the construction it has been given, it is evident that the preliminary control of the Committee exercised by the House
The Government contends that the public interest at the core of the investigations of the Un-American Activities Committee is the need by the Congress to be informed of efforts to overthrow the Government by force and violence so that adequate legislative safeguards can be erected. From this core, however, the Committee can radiate outward infinitely to any topic thought to be related in some way to armed insurrection. The outer reaches of this domain are known only by the content of “un-American activities.” Remoteness of subject can be aggravated by a probe for a depth of detail even farther removed from any basis of legislative action. A third dimension is added when the investigators turn their attention to the past to collect minutiae on remote topics, on the hypothesis that the past may reflect upon the present.
The consequences that flow from this situation are manifold. In the first place, a reviewing court is unable
More important and more fundamental than that, however, it insulates the House that has authorized the investigation from the witnesses who are subjected to the sanctions of compulsory process. There is a wide gulf between the responsibility for the use of investigative power and the actual exercise of that power. This is an especially vital consideration in assuring respect for constitutional liberties. Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need.
It is, of course, not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid rules for the Congress to follow in drafting resolutions establishing investigating committees. That is a matter peculiarly within the realm of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the courts up to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected rights of individuals is affected. An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of
Absence of the qualitative consideration of petitioner‘s questioning by the House of Representatives aggravates a serious problem, revealed in this case, in the relationship of congressional investigating committees and the witnesses who appear before them. Plainly these committees are restricted to the missions delegated to them, i. e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere. No witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area. This is a jurisdictional concept of pertinency drawn from the nature of a congressional committee‘s source of authority. It is not wholly different from nor unrelated to the element of pertinency embodied in the criminal statute under which petitioner was prosecuted. When the definition of jurisdictional pertinency is as uncertain and wavering as in the case of the Un-American Activities Committee, it becomes extremely difficult for the Committee to limit its inquiries to statutory pertinency.
Since World War II, the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House. The sanction there imposed is imprisonment by the House until the recalcitrant witness agrees to testify or disclose the matters sought, provided that the incarceration does
The appropriate statute is found in
“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.”45
In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases. Among these is the right to have available, through a sufficiently precise statute, information revealing the standard of criminality before the commission of the alleged offense.46 Applied to persons prosecuted under
The problem attains proportion when viewed from the standpoint of the witness who appears before a congressional committee. He must decide at the time the questions are propounded whether or not to answer. As the Court said in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, the witness acts at his peril. He is “. . . bound rightly to construe the statute.” Id., at 299. An erroneous determination on his part, even if made in the utmost good faith, does not exculpate him if the court should later rule that the questions were pertinent to the question under inquiry.
It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is entitled to have knowledge of the subject to
The first possibility is that the authorizing resolution itself will so clearly declare the “question under inquiry” that a witness can understand the pertinency of questions asked him. The Government does not contend that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee could serve such a purpose. Its confusing breadth is amply illustrated by the innumerable and diverse questions into which the Committee has inquired under this charter since 1938. If the “question under inquiry” were stated with such sweeping and uncertain scope, we doubt that it would withstand an attack on the ground of vagueness.
That issue is not before us, however, in light of the Government‘s position that the immediate subject under inquiry before the Subcommittee interviewing petitioner was only one aspect of the Committee‘s authority to investigate un-American activities. Distilling that single topic from the broad field is an extremely difficult task upon the record before us. There was an opening statement by the Committee Chairman at the outset of the
No aid is given as to the “question under inquiry” in the action of the full Committee that authorized the creation of the Subcommittee before which petitioner appeared. The Committee adopted a formal resolution giving the Chairman the power to appoint subcommittees “. . . for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.”50 In effect, this was a device to enable the investigations to proceed with a quorum of one or two members and
The Government believes that the topic of inquiry before the Subcommittee concerned Communist infiltration in labor. In his introductory remarks, the Chairman made reference to a bill, then pending before the Committee,52 which would have penalized labor unions controlled or dominated by persons who were, or had been, members of a “Communist-action” organization, as de
This view is corroborated somewhat by the witnesses who preceded and followed petitioner before the Subcommittee. Looking at the entire hearings, however, there is strong reason to doubt that the subject revolved about labor matters. The published transcript is entitled: Investigation of Communist Activities in the Chicago Area, and six of the nine witnesses had no connection with labor at all.53
The most serious doubts as to the Subcommittee‘s “question under inquiry,” however, stem from the precise questions that petitioner has been charged with refusing to answer. Under the terms of the statute, after all, it is these which must be proved pertinent. Petitioner is charged with refusing to tell the Subcommittee whether or not he knew that certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party in the past. The Subcommittee‘s counsel read the list from the testimony of a previous witness who had identified them as Communists. Although this former witness was identified with labor, he had not stated that the persons he named were involved in union affairs. Of the thirty names propounded to petitioner, seven were completely unconnected with organized labor. One operated a beauty parlor. Another was a watchmaker. Several were identified as “just citizens” or “only Communists.” When
The final source of evidence as to the “question under inquiry” is the Chairman‘s response when petitioner objected to the questions on the grounds of lack of pertinency. The Chairman then announced that the Subcommittee was investigating “subversion and subversive propaganda.”54 This is a subject at least as broad and indefinite as the authorizing resolution of the Committee, if not more so.
Having exhausted the several possible indicia of the “question under inquiry,” we remain unenlightened as to the subject to which the questions asked petitioner were pertinent. Certainly, if the point is that obscure after trial and appeal, it was not adequately revealed to petitioner when he had to decide at his peril whether or not to answer. Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to make such a determination with so little guidance. Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject
The statement of the Committee Chairman in this case, in response to petitioner‘s protest, was woefully inadequate to convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the subject under inquiry. Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional depository of legislative power. Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional investigations. The conclusions we have reached in this case will not prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our scheme of government. The legislature is free to determine the kinds of data that should be collected. It is only those investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility and which provide the constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses. A measure of added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
I deem it important to state what I understand to be the Court‘s holding. Agreeing with its holding, I join its opinion.
The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority is, as the Court points out, rooted in history. It has been acknowledged by this Court since 1821. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204. Until 1857, Congress was content to punish for contempt through its own process. By the
While implied authority for the questioning by the Committee, sweeping as was its inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated acquiescence by Congress in the Committee‘s inquiries, the basis for determining petitioner‘s guilt is not thereby laid. Prosecution for contempt of Congress presupposes an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have awareness of the pertinency of the information that he has denied to Congress. And the basis of such awareness must be contemporaneous with the witness’ refusal to answer and not at the trial for it. Accordingly, the actual scope of the inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous at the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness. The circumstances of this case were wanting in these essentials.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
As I see it the chief fault in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress. While I am not versed in its procedures, my experience in the Executive Branch of the Government leads me to believe that the requirements laid down in the opinion for the operation of the committee system of
I.
It may be that at times the House Committee on Un-American Activities has, as the Court says, “conceived of its task in the grand view of its name.” And, perhaps, as the Court indicates, the rules of conduct placed upon the Committee by the House admit of individual abuse and unfairness. But that is none of our affair. So long as the object of a legislative inquiry is legitimate and the questions propounded are pertinent thereto, it is not for the courts to interfere with the committee system of inquiry. To hold otherwise would be an infringement on the power given the Congress to inform itself, and thus a trespass upon the fundamental American principle of separation of powers. The majority has substituted the judiciary as the grand inquisitor and supervisor of congressional investigations. It has never been so.
II.
Legislative committees to inquire into facts or conditions for assurance of the public welfare or to determine the need for legislative action have grown in importance with the complexity of government. The investigation that gave rise to this prosecution is of the latter type. Since many matters requiring statutory action lie in the domain of the specialist or are unknown without testimony from informed witnesses, the need for information has brought about legislative inquiries that have used the compulsion of the subpoena to lay bare needed facts and a statute,
The Court indicates that in this case the source of the trouble lies in the “tremendous latitude” given the Un-American Activities Committee in the Legislative Reorganization Act.3 It finds that the Committee “is
Permanent or standing committees of both Houses have been given power in exceedingly broad terms. For example, the Committees on the Armed Services have jurisdiction over “Common defense generally“;4 the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have
The Court finds fault with the use made of compulsory process, power for the use of which is granted the Com
III.
Coming to the merits of Watkins’ case, the Court reverses the judgment because: (1) The subject matter of the inquiry was not “made to appear with undisputable clarity” either through its “charter” or by the Chairman at the time of the hearing and, therefore, Watkins was deprived of a clear understanding of “the manner in which the propounded questions [were] pertinent thereto“; and (2) the present committee system of inquiry of the House, as practiced by the Un-American Activities Committee, does not provide adequate safeguards for the protection
Watkins had been an active leader in the labor movement for many years and had been identified by two previous witnesses at the Committee‘s hearing in Chicago as a member of the Communist Party. There can be no question that he was fully informed of the subject matter of the inquiry. His testimony reveals a complete knowledge and understanding of the hearings at Chicago. There the Chairman had announced that the Committee had been directed “to ascertain the extent and success of subversive activities directed against these United States [and] On the basis of these investigations and hearings ... [report] its findings to the Congress and [make] recommendations ... for new legislation.” He pointed to the various laws that had been enacted as a result of Committee recommendations. He stated that “The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950” which, if made law, would restrict the availability of the Labor Act to unions not “in fact Communist-controlled action groups.” The Chairman went on to say that “It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area. The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation .... Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago ... [is] known to possess information which will assist the Committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.”
A subpoena had issued for Watkins to appear at the Chicago hearings but he was not served. After Watkins was served the hearing in question was held in Washington, D. C. Reference at this hearing was made to the one conducted in Chicago. Watkins came before the
IV.
I think the Committee here was acting entirely within its scope and that the purpose of its inquiry was set out with “undisputable clarity.” In the first place, the authorizing language of the
The Court makes much of petitioner‘s claim of “exposure for exposure‘s sake” and strikes at the purposes of the Committee through this catch phrase. But we are bound to accept as the purpose of the Committee that stated in the Reorganization Act together with the statements of the Chairman at the hearings involved here. Nothing was said of exposure. The statements of a single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose of the Committee into something not authorized by the parent resolution. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 290, 295 (1929). The Court indicates that the questions propounded were asked for exposure‘s sake and had no pertinency to the inquiry. It appears to me that they were entirely pertinent to the announced purpose of the Committee‘s inquiry. Undoubtedly Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of communism and the Communist Party. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950). As a corollary of the congressional power to inquire into such subject matter, the Congress, through its committees, can legitimately seek to identify individual members of the Party. Barsky v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 127, 167 F. 2d 241 (1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843. See also Lawson v. United States, 85 U. S. App. D. C. 167, 170-171, 176 F. 2d 49, 52-53 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 934; United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 90-92 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 838.
The pertinency of the questions is highlighted by the need for the Congress to know the extent of infiltration of communism in labor unions. This technique of infiltration was that used in bringing the downfall of countries formerly free but now still remaining behind the Iron Curtain. The Douds case illustrates that the Party is not an ordinary political party and has not been at least since 1945. Association with its officials is not an ordinary association. Nor does it matter that the questions related to the past. Influences of past associations often linger on as was clearly shown in the instance of the witness Matusow and others. The techniques used in the infiltration which admittedly existed here might well be used again in the future. If the parties about whom Watkins was interrogated were Communists and collaborated with him, as a prior witness indicated, an entirely new area of investigation might have been opened up. Watkins’ silence prevented the Committee from learning this information which could have been vital to its future investigation. The Committee was likewise entitled to elicit testimony showing the truth or falsity of the prior testimony of the witnesses who had involved Watkins and the union with collaboration with the Party. If the testimony was untrue a false picture of the relationship between the union and the Party leaders would have resulted. For these reasons there were ample indications of the pertinency of the questions.
V.
The Court condemns the long-established and long-recognized committee system of inquiry of the House because it raises serious questions concerning the protection it affords to constitutional rights. It concludes that com
As already indicated, even if Watkins’ associates were on the stand they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on
We do not have in this case unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures with respect to a witness’ personal and private affairs so ably and properly denounced in the Sinclair case, supra, at 291-292. This inquiry is far different from the cases relied upon by the Court. There is no analogy to the case of Richard Thompson13 involving the sermons of clergymen. It is not Floyd‘s14 case involving criticism of the royal family. There is no resemblance to John Wilkes’ struggle for a seat in Parliament. It is not Briggs15 where the prosecutor sought to develop the national origin of policemen. It is not Kilbourn16 involving a private real estate pool.
Notes
“All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the subjects listed under the standing committees named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively:...”
“(q) ... (2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.” 60 Stat. 823, 828.
The Committee is authorized to sit and act at any time, anywhere in the United States and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers. A resolution of the Eighty-third Congress adopted the Rules of the previous Congresses as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 15, 16, 18, 24.
“This committee is set up by the House of Representatives to investigate subversion and subversive propaganda and to report to the House of Representatives for the purpose of remedial legislation.
“The House of Representatives has by a very clear majority, a very large majority, directed us to engage in that type of work, and so we do, as a committee of the House of Representatives, have the authority, the jurisdiction, to ask you concerning your activities in the Communist Party, concerning your knowledge of any other persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have been members of the Communist Party, and so, Mr. Watkins, you are directed to answer the question propounded to you by counsel.”
In a report to the House, the Committee declared:
Quotations: “While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and naziism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13.
A year later, the Committee reported that “. . . investigation to inform the American people . . . is the real purpose of the House Committee.” H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2.
A pamphlet issued by the Committee in 1951 stated that: “Exposure in a systematic way began with the formation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, May 26, 1938.” The Committee believed itself commanded “. . . to expose people and organizations attempting to destroy this country. That is still its job and to that job it sticks.” 100 Things You Should Know About Communism, H. R. Doc. No. 136, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 67.
In its annual reports, the Committee has devoted a large part of its information to a public listing of names along with a summary of their activities. “. . . [T]he committee feels that the Congress and the American people will have a much clearer and fuller picture of the success and scope of communism in the United States by having set forth the names and, where possible, the positions occupied by individuals who have been identified as Communists, or former Communists, during the past year.” H. R. Rep. No. 2516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7.
“The committee will be in order. I should like to make an opening statement regarding our work here in the city of Chicago. The Congress of the United States, realizing that there are individuals and elements in this country whose aim it is to subvert our constitutional form of government, has established the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In establishing this committee, the Congress has directed that we must investigate and hold hearings, either by the full committee or by a subcommittee, to ascertain the extent and success of subversive activities directed against these United States.
“On the basis of these investigations and hearings, the Committee on Un-American Activities reports its findings to the Congress and makes recommendations from these investigations and hearings for new legislation. As a result of this committee‘s investigations and hearings, the Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted.
“Over the past fifteen years this committee has been in existence, both as a special and permanent committee, it has made forty-seven recommendations to the Congress to insure proper security against subversion. I am proud to be able to state that of these forty-seven recommendations, all but eight have been acted upon in one way or another. Among these recommendations which the Congress has not acted upon are those which provide that witnesses appearing before congressional committees be granted immunity from prosecution on the information they furnish.
“The committee has also recommended that evidence secured from confidential devices be admissible in cases involving the national security. The executive branch of Government has now also asked the Congress for such legislation. A study is now being made of various bills dealing with this matter.
“The Congress has also referred to the House Committee on Un-American Activities a bill which would amend the National Security Act of 1950. This bill, if enacted into law, would provide that the Subversive Activities Control Board should, after suitable hearings and procedures, be empowered to find if certain labor organizations are in fact Communist-controlled action groups. Following this action, such labor groups would not have available the use of the
“During the first session of this 83rd Congress, the House Un-American Activities Committee has held hearings in Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; Albany and New York City, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Columbus, Ohio. We are here in Chicago, Illinois, realizing that this is the center of the great midwestern area of the United States.
“It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area. The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation that has been conducted by the committee‘s competent staff and is a part of the committee‘s intention for holding hearings in various parts of the country.
“The committee has found that by conducting its investigations and holding hearings in various parts of the country, it has been able to secure a fuller and more comprehensive picture of subversive efforts throughout our nation. Every witness who has been subpoenaed to appear before the committee here in Chicago, as in all hearings conducted by this committee, are [sic] known to possess information which will assist the committee in performing its directed function to the Congress of the United States.” (R. 43-44; Hearing, supra, note 2, Part 1, at 4165-4166.)
The Committee convened in executive session on January 22, 1953, and adopted the following resolution:
“BE IT RESOLVED, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.” (R. 91.)
The bill pending at the time of the Chairman‘s remarks, March 15, 1954, and when petitioner testified a month later was H. R. 7487, 100 Cong. Rec. 763. No action was ever taken on this proposal. Introduced by Representative Velde, it would have withdrawn the rights, privileges and benefits under the National Labor Relations Act of any labor organization which was substantially directed, dominated or controlled by persons who were or ever had been members of a “Communist-action organization,” as that phrase is used in the Internal Security Act.
On July 6, 1954, after extensive hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported favorably on S. 3706, a bill drafted by that committee to amend the Internal Security Act. Two days later, Representative Velde introduced H. R. 9838, which was identical to S. 3706. These bills eventually became law. 68 Stat. 775. The Act created the concept of a “Communist infiltrated organization,” and part of its provisions declared that a labor union that came within that definition should be barred from the rights, privileges and benefits of the National Labor Relations Act. The same sanctions were applied to a labor group that was a “Communist-action” or “Communist-front organization” under the original Internal Security Act.