Robert Watkins appeals from his convictions and sentences for the malice murder of Yan Sing Ku, the aggravated assault of Guadalupe Parilla, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during thе commission of a crime. 1 We affirm.
*360 1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that at 10:45 p.m. on April 21, 2006, Watkins, Colton Williams, Marcus Brown, Terrance Coleman, Maya Keating, and Christina Pascarella parked outside the China Wok restaurant on Delk Road. At Watkins’ direction, Pascarella and Keating went inside the restaurant to see how many people were there. They saw no other customers, and after purchasing a drink, they returned to the car and told Watkins. Armed with handguns, Watkins and Williams then went through the back door of the restaurant into the kitchen, where they encountered Parilla, who worked as a cook. One of the robbers demanded money from Parilla, who said he did not have any. Yan, who was also a cook, then walked into the kitchen and was immediately shot by the other robber. The robber who initially demanded money from Parilla demanded money again, and when Parilla again said he did not have any, the man shot him. Yan died from his injuries; Parilla, who was shot in the arm, survived.
When Watkins and Williams arrived back at the car, Watkins told the group that he thought he had killed someone and that “if anybody told anybody about what had happened that he would kill them all and kill their family.” After the shooting, Brown called his mother, Marlynn Mays, asking for help. Brown said he was with Watkins and told his mother that he was in trouble and that she needed to watch the news. After Ms. Mays saw that there had been a shooting, she called her son, who said that he and his co-defendants were “riding around” looking for drugs. Brown told his mother that Watkins and Williams went into a building and that he heard two gunshots. When Watkins returned, he told Brown that “he thought he killed somebody.” Brown later told his mother that Watkins and Williams “went in and robbed the China Wok and killed somebody.” Ms. Mays contacted the police.
In a statement to the police, Watkins admitted that he entered the restaurant with a .25 caliber handgun to rob it, but he claimed that he “heard gunshots and left the restaurant.” Williams gave a similar statement to the police.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient tо authorize a rational jury to find Watkins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. (a) Watkins contends that the State engaged in unconstitutional gender-based discrimination by using seven of its eight peremptory strikes against women. See
J. E. B. v. Alabama,
(b) Watkins also contends that the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its eight peremptory strikes agаinst African-Americans. See
Batson v. Kentucky,
*362 See id.
3. Watkins raises three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail on these claims, Watkins
must show that his trial counsel provided deficient performanсe and that, but for that unprofessional performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington,466 U. S. 668 , 687, 694 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a сourt need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. at 697.
Long v. State,
(a) Watkins first argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to elicit sufficient testimony from his expert at the
Jackson-Denno
hearing about his mental abilities and condition when he made his statement to the police, thereby failing to adequately support his claim that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
Miranda
rights.
3
However, to demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged failure to elicit favorable testimony at trial, “the defendant may not rely on hearsay or speculation but must either call the witness or ‘introduce a legally recognized substitute for the uncalled witness’s testimony.’ ”
Bell v. State,
(b) Watkins next contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial or request a curative instruction when the State showed the jury two photographs of the murder victim’s body at the crime scene, which the trial court had previously ordered the State not to show on the ground that thеy were duplicative of other photographs. However, given that the two photographs did not show the jury more than other crime scene photographs, and given the strength of the evidence against Watkins, he has failеd to show that, even if trial counsel had moved for a mistrial or requested a curative instruction, there is a reasonable probability that the trial
*363
court would have granted a mistrial or that the outcome of the trial otherwisе would have been different.
See Allen v. State,
(c) Watkins also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to object to the State reviewing his expert’s notes at the
Jackson-Denno
hearing. However, trial counsel gave a reasonable strategic explanation for that decision — that there was nothing detrimental to Watkins in the notes. See
Johnson v. State,
4. Watkins contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to thе police because the State failed to show that he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
Miranda
rights. We disagree. “The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the circumstances.”
Vergara v. State,
At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Watkins’ expert witness testified that Watkins said that he used ecstasy on a regular basis and that he had used alcohol, ecstasy, and marijuana on the day of the crimеs. The expert also testified that he watched the videotape of Watkins’ police interview, that Watkins’ behavior was consistent with being high on ecstasy, and that, in his opinion, Watkins was impaired at the time to the extent he could not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. However, the detective who interviewed Watkins testified that Watkins said that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that the detective had experience in dealing with people under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that he saw no evidence that Watkins was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that Watkins had no difficulty speaking or communicating, that the detective read Watkins his Miranda rights, and that Watkins said he understood each of these rights.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that Watkins made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
Miranda
rights.
See Krause v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on April 21, 2006. On July 6, 2006, a Cohb County grand jury indicted Watkins and five co-defendants for the malice murder, felony murder (two counts), and aggravated assault of Yan, for the aggravated assault of Parilla, for cоnspiracy to commit armed robbery, and for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. After a joint trial, a jury found Watkins guilty on all counts on April 25, 2007. The trial court sentenced Watkins to life in prison for the malice murder conviction and to consecutive terms of years in prison for the conspiracy, aggravated assault of Parilla, and firearm convictions. The felony murder convictions were vacated as a matter of law, аnd the court merged the conviction for *360 the aggravated assault of Yan into the malice murder conviction. On May 4,2007, Watkins filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on April 10, 2008. The trial court denied the motion on September 4, 2009, and Watkins filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the January 2011 term of this Court and was submitted for decision on the briefs.
We reject the State’s assertion that Watkins is procedurally barred from raising these jury selection issues on appeal. The record shows that Watkins joined in a co-defendant’s motion challenging the State’s peremptory strikes.
See
Jackson v. Denno,