42 S.E. 983 | N.C. | 1902
The substantial questions raised by the defendant's assignments of error are:
1. Could the cause of action for damage done to the house and land be maintained by plaintiff trustor?
2. Does the complaint state a cause of action for physical injury to plaintiff?
3. Does a cause of action lie for physical injury resulting from fright and nervousness caused by negligent acts?
As to the first question it is clear that the plaintiff had the right to bring this action for damages done to the freehold. She owned the premises in fee, subject to a deed of trust executed thereon to secure a debt. The conveyance of the title to the trustee did not disturb her possession or ownership as to trespassers and tort feasors. So long as the property was of sufficient value to secure the payment of the debt the trustee andcestui que trust could sustain no loss or injury by reason of damages done to the premises, therefore the loss by reason of the damage would fall upon the trustor, the equitable owner, and she being the party really injured had a right to maintain the action. She was in possession of the land, and being the equitable owner had the right to recover in an action of ejectment, although the legal title was in the trustee. Murray v.Blackledge,
The trustee, holding the legal title, might have been made a *388 party to the action, but his recovery would have enured only to the benefit of the trustor, which could be of no concern to the trespasser or tort feasor. A judgment in an action between the equitable owner in possession and the defendant for (538) damages to the premises would be a bar to an action by the trustee. So no loss could befall the defendant. Had defendant deemed the trustee a necessary party to the action he should have demurred (Code, sec. 239, subsection 4) or answered (section 241), otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. Section 242.
As to the second question: Plaintiff alleges that she "became so nervous and frightened from the negligent and careless conduct and blasting of defendant that she could not sleep at night, and was greatly disturbed in body and mind, as well as for herself and the safety of her children as the destruction of her property, to her great damage, in the sum of nineteen hundred and ninety-nine dollars." To sustain this allegation she was allowed to prove that the blasting rendered her almost helpless; that she could not go about her daily duties, and could not keep on her feet to attend to her children; that it has affected her ever since and has caused her female trouble out of its regular course. Under the old system of pleading this variance would be fatal, but under the provisions of the Code the rule is greatly modified, and pleadings must be liberally construed for the purpose of determining their effect with a view to substantial justice between the parties. Code, sec. 260. From a liberal construction of plaintiff's allegation it appears that the alleged negligent blasting greatly disturbed her in body and mind, causing her to become so nervous and frightened that she could not sleep at night, causing her great damage; and as the result she proves that she was physically injured as above stated, to which defendant excepted, but did not allege that it was misled by such a variance; therefore plaintiff was not called upon to amend her complaint so as to conform to the proof, and the variance is deemed immaterial. Code, sec. 269; Lilly v. Baker,
Counsel having disagreed upon the issues, they were framed by the judge, and it is contended by the defendant that there was error in submitting the fourth and fifth issues, (540) for that they were not raised by the pleadings; Millerv. Miller,
As to the third question, we are of the opinion that an action will lie for physical injury or disease resulting from fright or nervous shocks caused by negligent acts; from common experience we know that serious consequences frequently follow violent nervous shocks caused by fright, often resulting in spells (541) of sickness, and sometimes in sudden death. Whether the physical injury was the natural and proximate result of the fright or shock is a question to be determined by the jury upon the evidence, showing the conditions, circumstances, occurrences, etc. But it must also appear that the defendant could or should have known that such negligent acts would, with reasonable certainty, cause such result, or that the injury resulted from gross carelessness or recklessness, showing utter indifference to the consequences, when they should have been contemplated by the party doing such acts. As a condition precedent to recovery in such cases it must appear that the defendant must or ought to have known of plaintiff's perilous position or condition, against which he should have to exercise care, otherwise such injury could not be within the contemplation of the actor, and put him upon notice as to this special care.
In the case at bar defendant company's servants acted with utter indifference to the plaintiff's safety, and knew that plaintiff was a woman and that she and her little children lived and were in her house only sixty steps away, and exposed to the danger; and after being asked by her to direct the blasting so as not to throw the rocks upon her house, continued to blast, throwing the stones from the size of a gallon bucket down to small stones upon and through her house and into her yard and garden (depositing as much as a wagon load of rock in her yard, and several wagon loads in her garden), making it necessary for her and her children to secret themselves in the basement behind a stack chimney, and even there they were in danger. From the fright and nervous shocks received from such blasting she testified that she was rendered almost helpless and could not go about her daily duties, and could not keep on her feet to attend to her children, and has been affected ever since; that it has caused her female trouble out of its regular course. They, knowing that plaintiff was a woman, and knowing (or ought (542) to have known of) the weaknesses of a woman, should have contemplated the effects likely to be produced upon her by such danger and fright. *391
We do not wish to be understood as holding that an action in a case like this would lie for mental suffering and anguish from which no physical injury or disease directly resulted, as that question is not squarely presented in this appeal.
In Bell v. R. R., L. R. 26 Ir., 428, the leading case in support of such action, it is held that if such bodily injury (serious impairment to health) might be a natural consequence of fright, it might be an element of damage for which a recovery might be had. Sedgewick on Damages (8 Ed.), sec. 861, in commenting upon it, says: "The principle adopted in this case would seem to be the true one. The negligence of the company being admitted, any injury directly resulting should be compensated."
In Purcell v. R. R.,
In Mack v. R. R.,
Those which hold contra are Haile v. R. R., 60 Fed., 557; 23 L.R.A., 774; which holds that where a passenger on a railroad train receives no bodily injury from an accident caused by the company's negligence, but is made insane by the excitement and suffering resulting therefrom, the company is not liable in damages, since insanity is not a probable or ordinary result of exposure to railroad accidents. Ewing v.R. R.,
After a careful examination of all of the defendant's assignments of error we find no substantial error, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
Cited: Hinton v. Moore,