123 Iowa 390 | Iowa | 1904
Lead Opinion
This long statement of the issues and proceedings seems necessary to an understanding of the exact points presented. Defendant complains of the ruling made March 29th on the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s answer and amendment thereto, and of the ruling striking its substituted answer and amendments thereto, pursuant to plaintiff’s motion filed August 22, 1902. Plaintiff says that, by pleading over after the ruling on the demurrer, defendant waived any error in that ruling, and that the only question is the correctness of the ruling on the motion to strike, while the defendant contends that it has tho right to be heard on both of these rulings. There is no doubt that, when one pleads over after an adverse ruling on a demurrer, he by so doing waives the particular error in that ruling, but such ruling does not, under our present practice, constitute an adjudication; and the same question may be presented in other ways, as by motion in arrest, to direct a verdict, objections to evidence, or in any other recognized mode. Pierson v. Ind. Dis., 106 Iowa, 695; Frum v. Keeney, 109 Iowa,
Even on plaintiff’s theory of the case, we find that new matter was pleaded in the substituted answer and amendments thereto, and the trial court ivas in error in striking it, for the reasons stated. But we find that many, if not most, of the questions presented by 'the demurrer to defendant’s first answer and amendments thereto were again presented by objections to evidence, and in defendant’s motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, and that we must consider the questions presented by the rulings complained of; that is to say, the rulings on the demurrer, and on the motion to strike the substituted answer as amended.
In another amendment to its answer, the defendant pleaded that the Centerville, Moravia & Albia Kailroad Company took possession of the right of way in question in the year 1880, laid down its track thereon, and has operated its
For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that defendant company has not used this strip of ground for railway purposes since the year 1810. But, before plaintiff can recover, he must show that the title thereto reverted to him by this nonuse'r. Remembering that this strip was conveyed
In the instant case the deed to the defendant was not of a right of Avay, or for railway purposes, but of a fee-simple title. That a railway company has the right to take such a deed, see M. & St. L. R. R. v. Lindquist, 119 Iowa, 148; Page v. Heineberg, 40 Vt. 81 (94 Am. Dec. 378); State v. Brown, 27 N. J. Law, 13; Holt v. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408; Yates v. Van De Bogert, 56 N. Y. 526; Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302. There cazr be no doubt .that Hock parted with the fee-simple title to this strip of land, and that defendant, a corporation duly organized, reeeiAd that fee. If it cannot hold it, it is because of some limitation in its charter or some provision of laAV. We find no provision of laAV which prevents its acquiring such title by purchase, and nothing appears as to its charter powers. Even if the state had passed an act prohibiting it from acquiring absolute title AA'e do not see how plaintiff could advantage himself thereof The original grantor might in some cases do so, but surely a stranger can not. When a corporation is authorized to hold real estate for some purposes, or to a limited extent, a deed to it is not void, although the lands were for other purposes or beyond the limit allowed. As between the parties, the deed passes title, and the state alone can inquire into the matter by direct proceedings. Natoma Water & Min. Co. v. Catkin, 14 Cal. 544; Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55 (25 L. Ed. 547); Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 (25 L. Ed. 188); Barnes v. Suddard, 117 Ill. 237 (7 N. E. Rep. 477); Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; De Camp v. Dobins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671. There is broad presumption that a conveyance to a corporation is for a purpose for which it is authorized to hold
This settles, as it seems to us, all question regarding the right of the defendant company to hold the title which it purchased, to wit, the fee-simple title. It follows, then, that, as defendant company received a deed in fee simple for the strip of land in controversy, there is .nothing to revert or pass either to Mock or to plaintiff, who claims it by reason of being an adjoining owner. Moreover, it is evident that Mock
This settles the case, and, of necessity, calls for a reversal thereof.
The writer, however, cannot forego expressing these further thoughts, which, to his mind, are also determinative of the case: Birst, that, as defendant obtained its right of way by deed, sections 2015 and 2016 do not apply, in the absence of pleading and proof of adverse possession, under the doctrine of the Noll Case, and others like it, which have already been cited. In other words, mere nonuser will not forfeit the easement, conceding it to be such, when that easement is obtained by deed, rather than by ad quod condemnaaon proceedings. He is further of opinion that, upon nc nuser of an easement acquired either by condemnation or by deed, the title does not pass to a stranger to the legal title. If the railway company acquires nothing but an easement, the title has never been out of the original grantor; and it would be unconstitutional for the Legislature to attempt to pass that title to a stranger who never had any interest in it, and who did not wish to use it for public purposes. Plaintiff never did buy this strip of land. If the title passed to the railway company, then, of course, he never had any interest therein.
Many of the questions we have considered as arising on the demurrer and the motion to strike were raised by objections to testimony and by requests for instructions; hence, ■even if it be said that, for technical reasons, the matters already .considered are not in the case on these rulings, we should ycefc be compelled to consider them, because of these ■objections and requests.
The ilesult of the whole matter is that the case must be reversed, and remanded for a new trial in accord with the views expressed by the majority in this opinion. — Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I cannot concur in the opinion prepared by the Chief Justice. In my judgment, it gives ■an unwarranted force and effect to the alleged conveyance to the railroad company, and reverses the policy of this court, as -settled by its former decisions.
II. The point made in the majority opinion, that, as plaintiff claims under a deed describing his land as bounded upon one side by the outer line of the railroad right of way, he cannot claim anything beyond that line by virtue of the statutory reversion of title, and the further point that the reversion, if any, is to the original grantor, and not to his grantees of the tract on either side of the right of way, are both unequivocally disapproved in Smith v. Hall, supra. There a right of way had been granted (not condemned.) through a tract of farm land. Later the owner conveyed to one grantee all the land on one side of the right of way, and to another grantee all the land upon the other side; the right of Avay being in each instance as clearly excluded from the grant as in the case at bar.' The principal question presented by that appeal was Avhether, upon abandonment of the right .of way, the statutory reversion inured to the benefit of the grantees of the divided tract, or to the original grantor. We 'there pointed out that, the land having been subjected to a
III. That the conveyance from John Mock was for' a right of way is not, in my judgment, negatived by the defendant’s pleading to which the demurrer was sustained. The copy of the deed set up as an exhibit professes to disclose only the “material part.” Having thus brought the conveyance into the record and having by the abstract exhibited to this court only an incomplete statement of its contents, I think it was competent for the appellee to show by an amended abstract, as he has done, that the deed contained a provision expressly limiting the grant to right of way pur
IV." While fully satisfied that the case is governed by the statute, there are certain general principles to which I ■desire to call attention. There is a fundamental and ineradical distinction between a fee-simple title in lands held by a corporation for public or quasi public uses, and a fee-simple title to lands held by an individual for private uses. Of the cases usually cited" to uphold the contrary doctrine, an examination will reveal that most of them are based upon constitutional or statutory provisions, or upon extraordinary grants of power contained in special charters, which have never obtained in this state. A grant or conveyance to a corporation is, as is well said by the Chief Justice presumed to be for a purpose for which it is authorized to hold real estate. Stated in the language of the distinguished jurist and law writer Chief Justice Redfield, “A contract to convey land for a particular use or to a party having capacity tó acquire a certain estate in land for a particular use, must of necessity carry the implication of such limitation upon the estate to be conveyed.” Hill v. R. R., 32 Vt. 74. To hold that the fee in land conveyed to a'railroad company for its right of way is thus impressed with a public use, and that when abandoned it is subject to reversion, as a matter of common right ■or of statutory direction, is not in the least inconsistent with the existence of power in the company to take lands by way of donation or.in payment of debt, or for any ordinary commercial or business purpose consistent with the purposes for which the company is organized, and convey them again in fee simple for private uses. Hill v. R. R., supra. Such power is often essential for the accomplishment of the public purposes which railroads are designed to promote. Title to such lands is acquired by the free and voluntary act of the individuals from whom the conveyance is received. But the
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.