BENJAMIN S. WATKINS v. BIRD-SYKES-BUNKER COMPANY, Appellant.
Division Two
April 5, 1929
16 S. W. (2d) 38
HENWOOD, C. - Benjamin S. Watkins, as plaintiff below, obtained a verdict and judgment in the sum of $12,500 for personal injuries suffered by him while employed by defendant as an automobile mechanic and while working under an automobile in defendant‘s used automobile department in Kansas City, Missouri. The case is here for review on defendant‘s appeal.
The petition contains numerous specifications of negligence, in connection with the general allegation that defendant failed to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe appliances with which to work, but plaintiff submitted his case upon two of these specifications only: first, “defendant negligently failed to furnish blocks or timbers in sufficient number for blocking up said automobile so as to be reasonably safe to work thereunder;” second, “the place where plaintiff was working was dark and with insufficient light for plaintiff to see that the blocks or supports were properly and securely placed under said automobile and on one another or to see when the said automobile or said blocks had slipped or moved from under the wheels of said automobile.”
The reply is in conventional form.
In view of our conclusion that plaintiff failed to make a case for the jury, it will be necessary to consider only the evidence relating to the specifications of negligence above mentioned. With reference thereto, plaintiff‘s testimony (allowing for some alterations) is stated in his brief as follows:
“Plaintiff, to sustain his case, testified that at the time of receiving his injury, on February 21, 1923, he was thirty-seven years of age, and had been employed by the defendant as an automobile mechanic since July, 1922. He had previously worked for other companies as an automobile mechanic for seven years, and, prior to that time, had been employed as a railroad car carpenter and repairer. He did the general run of automobile mechanical work. Harry McFall was service manager for defendant, and Carl Hallen was his foreman. Defendant was agent for Paige and Jewett automobiles in Kansas City, Missouri, and maintained their sales room and service station equipment at 24th and McGee Streets, and six and one-half blocks away, at 1729-31 McGee, they had a used car branch. The used car branch was housed in a building that faced west, and was composed of a main floor, an upstairs and a basement. The basement ran from the street to the alley and had no outside windows except a coal chute window, which opened into the furnace room on the east end of the basement. There were no windows from the furnace room into the basement. The basement was one hundred and four feet long from the street to the stairway in the rear. In the southeast end of the basement was an elevator shaft, just north of the elevator was a stairway, north of the stairway was a wash rack, and east of the wash rack was the boiler room and coal room. The stairway was boarded up. The day of the accident was the first time plaintiff was ever in the basement. The defendant has no repair shop in the basement. On the day of the accident, he reported for duty at the defendant‘s place of business, at 24th and McGee, at about eight A. M. Shortly after reporting for work, his foreman told him to go to the used car place to do some electrical work. He got his box of tools, and another employee hauled him up to the used car place at 1729-31 McGee. He had been up there only once before, when he was sent up there to put some light bulbs on the main floor. Defendant had occupied the building at 1729-31 McGee only since about January 1, 1923. When he first got there, he reported to a salesman, Dooley, who referred him to McKinney. McKinney told him to work on a car standing on the main floor; to
“Cross-Examination.
“There was a stairway leading from the main floor to the basement. His first visit to the used car place was immediately after defendant moved into 1729-31 McGee. His tool box contained wrenches, service cord, hammer, chisels, punches. He went down the stairway into the basement where he was hurt. He got down before Peterson did, with the car on the elevator. Peterson set the car in the basement. He set his tool box down and looked around to see where he was going to work. He stood beside the car while Peterson placed it. He asked Peterson about the jack. He searched for ma-
“Re-Direct Examination.
“He didn‘t see anyone around there to whom he could complain regarding the blocks and lights. The porter, McGrew, came downstairs once. The emergency brake apparently held.”
“Plaintiff read the deposition of Ralph H. Peterson in his part of the case, which deposition had been taken by defendant. Peterson then resided in California. Peterson testified that he was a mechanic at the used car department, and put in all of his time there. Because he was busy on another job, plaintiff was called from the service station at 24th & McGee. The equipment at the used car department, for doing mechanical work on automobiles, consisted of wrenches and other tools, a three-wheeled Weaver jack and two or three smaller jacks. There was a bunch of blocks in the basement, off from the cars, on the north side of the wall. There were four or five of these blocks, and they were 4 x 4 or 4 x 6. They had blocks of the same kind upstairs, on the main floor. The Weaver jack could be used for holding the car up. McKinney was the manager at the used car department, but each mechanic handled the jacks and blocks according to his best knowledge. When additional equipment was needed, it was the practice of the mechanics to take cars to the main service shop or to go there and get such equipment and take it to the used car department. At the place he had left the car in the basement, it was perfectly level and there was plenty of light for a man to work in the basement. The lighting conditions were suitable for doing mechanical work, and an extension or drop service light was sufficient for working underneath an automobile. He thinks he took the Paige car down in the basement the evening before the accident. He left the car in the basement a few feet west of the wash rack, with the front of the car headed in a northeasterly direction. After seeing plaintiff that morning, he went away to do some work. He had never had any trouble working in the basement on account of the insufficiency of lights. He was gone about an hour or more, and, when he returned, he went down into the basement and looked at the automobile and saw that it was in the same position as he had left it, only it was down off the blocks. ‘It appeared that the car rolled back off the blocks some way.’ The blocks were in front of the car. There were also extra blocks upstairs, if plaintiff needed any more. Plaintiff had never made any complaint to him about the blocks. The next day he finished taking up the bearings on this Paige car. The Weaver jack could have been left under the front axle as an extra precaution against the car dropping to the floor when the wheels dislodged themselves from the blocks. Plaintiff, afterwards, in relating to him as to how the accident occurred, said: ‘I was taking up one of the main
The evidence offered by defendant is contradictory to plaintiff‘s testimony on every matter of vital importance. It will serve no purpose, therefore, to state it in detail. In substance, it tends to show that the basement of defendant‘s used car department was well equipped with lighting facilities, having from ten to sixteen 60-watt drop lights, several of which were near the wash rack and the place where plaintiff was working when he was injured; that there was a large number of blocks, of various dimensions in the basement, and that there were blocks of the same kind on the main floor and upstairs floor of the building; that all of its mechanics were instructed to take cars from its used car department to its main service station, or to come there or telephone there, whenever they needed additional materials, tools or appliances in repairing cars, and that such was the custom and practice of its mechanics.
Other facts and circumstances will be noted in the further discussion of the evidence.
I. According to the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, he was ordered by his foreman (Hallen), at defendant‘s main service station, to go to the used car department “to do some electrical work.” Upon reaching there, he was ordered by the manager of that department (McKinney) “to take the knock out of the motor” of the automobile in question. McKinney told plaintiff‘s fellow-servant (Peterson) “to take the car to the basement and get plaintiff the stuff to work with.” Peterson placed the car in the basement, “threw down” six 4 x 4 blocks about twelve to fourteen inches long, “and said that was all they had.” There was only one light in the basement. This light was “of fifty or sixty candle-power” and fifteen feet east of the car. There were no bulbs in the other light sockets. He looked for other lights and found none. There was no natural light in the basement. He attached his drop-cord service light, “of fifty or sixty candle-power,” to an empty socket in the ceiling “at the place indicated by Peterson.” While Peterson was getting the blocks, he drained the oil from the car. “Peterson told him of a jack underneath another car,” and he got it. First setting the emergency brake on the car, he placed the two prongs of the jack under the front axle of the car and jacked up the front end of the car sufficiently to enable him to place two blocks under each front wheel, lengthwise, and one on top of the other. He released the prongs of the jack from the axle, but left the jack in its original position under the front end of the car. He used the other two blocks by placing one immediately in front of and one immediately behind the right rear wheel. He then took down the crank
(a) Conceding, as plaintiff says, that one light, fifteen feet east of the car, and his service light, were the only available lights for his use in doing the work in question, nevertheless it appears that, by the aid of these two lights, he was able to jack up the front end of the car, block up the front wheels, block the right rear wheel, take down the crank case, “diagnose” the trouble in the motor, and complete his work on two or three of the six bearings, before the front wheels fell off the blocks and thereby injured him. In addition to such light as was furnished by the one drop-ceiling light, fifteen feet east of the car, the 60-watt service light, with a cord twenty feet long, was available for plaintiff‘s use at any point underneath or along the outside of the car. It was intended for this very purpose, and he admits that he so used it. He says that he thought the blocks under the front wheels “would require watching,” and that “he took his service light and examined the blocks to see if the car was sitting on the blocks, every time he crawled out from under the car to crank the car or to see how tight he had a bearing; any time he thought he had used any excess strength, he examined the blocks; he did this last about ten or fifteen minutes before he was hurt; during the last ten or fifteen minutes, he was working on bearings, screwing and unscrewing them, and his service light was lying by his side.” In the face of such testimony from the plaintiff himself, was it for the jury to say whether or not defendant negligently failed to furnish plaintiff with sufficient light to see that the blocks were properly and securely placed under the wheels of the automobile or to see when the blocks were slipping from under the wheels of the automobile? We think not. It being admitted that the service light was available for plaintiff‘s use at all times, and that he actually used it in blocking up the front wheels of the automobile and in watching the condition of the blocks during the progress of the work, it follows that the failure of defendant to furnish more drop-ceiling lights was not the proximate cause of his in-
(b) It seems equally clear that there is no causal connection between plaintiff‘s injuries and the charge that “defendant negligently failed to furnish blocks or timbers in sufficient number for blocking up said automobile so as to be reasonably safe to work thereunder.” True, plaintiff testified that Peterson “threw down” six 4 x 4 blocks about twelve to fourteen inches long, “and said that was all they had.” But, conceding that Peterson made such a statement (though, in his deposition read in evidence by plaintiff, he denies it), and conceding, for the sake of the argument only, that plaintiff had a right to act upon Peterson‘s statement without further search or request for additional blocks, the evidence fails to show, either directly or inferentially, that plaintiff would have used any additional blocks, even though there had been an unlimited supply nearby and available for his use. On the contrary, plaintiff‘s own testimony indicates that he would not have used any more blocks, if there had been more blocks within his reach. He says that “it was only customary to block one rear wheel when the emergency brake was applied,” and that he “set the emergency brake before jacking the car up,” and that “the brake worked all right.” When asked, upon cross-examination, why he did not block the left rear wheel with some of the blocks or pieces of lumber, which he saw nearby in the pile of scrap-lumber, he said: “Don‘t think it was necessary with the emergency brake, and the one I had blocked.” Upon further cross-examination, he said that, with one rear wheel blocked and the emergency brake set, “he felt reasonably safe.” Confronted with this testimony, the jury could do no more than speculate as to whether plaintiff would have used more blocks, if more blocks had been available, and as to how or in what way he would have used them. Juries are not permitted to exercise their imagination in reaching verdicts. Verdicts must be based upon substantial evidence, and not upon speculation and conjecture. [Hamilton v. Ry. Co. (Mo. Sup.), 300 S. W. 787.]
(c) There is another reason why plaintiff cannot recover in this case. Although he was ordered “to take the knock out of the motor” of the automobile, he was not directed by anyone as to how the work should be done. He was a skilled automobile mechanic, with a general experience of more than seven years in that kind of work, and knew as much, at least, about a reasonably safe method of doing the work, as Hallen, his foreman, or McKinney, the manager of the used car department. Nor was he bound, under the orders given him by Hallen and McKinney, to do the work in a way and under conditions that were not reasonably
The applicable rule is well stated by Judge LAMM as follows: “Under modern conditions, the master may carry on a business over a vast field with thousands of employees in different branches of labor, widely separated, and his servants may never come under his actual eye. In this condition of things, looking at the matter from the master down to the servant, it has been said that the master may not delegate (and thus avoid) his primary duties in furnishing his servants a safe place and suitable and safe material and appliances, by merely giving general orders and directions, however wholesome and full, to others, who are foremen, i. e., vice-principals. And such is the law. But, on the other hand, the law entertains another view, from another standpoint - a view that, beginning with the servant and considering him, looks up to the master. By this view, we start with the postulate that a servant is presumed to possess, not only common sense, but certain knowledge peculiar to his trade, or art. The master may be presumed to hire, not only the bodily services of the servant (his hands, eyes, ears, muscles and legs), but the skill and knowledge pertaining to the servant‘s art or trade and possessed by the latter. Hence, it is steadily held as sound law that the master may trust the servant to perform the intermediate, the ordinary and simple duties incident to the servant‘s employment and resting upon the servant‘s knowledge and skill.” [Forbes v. Dunnavant, 198 Mo. l. c. 209, 95 S. W. l. c. 938.]
In discussing this rule, Judge Cox says: “Along with the duty of the employer to use ordinary care for the safety of his employees goes the duty of the employee to use ordinary care for his own safety. He cannot, under all circumstances, blindly rely on the master and pay no attention to his own safety, but must use his own faculties
With special reference to the issue of insufficient light, see Railroad v. Andrews, 171 Ala. 200; Beard v. Hubinger Bros. Co. (Ia.), 141 N. W. 418; Boucher v. Paper Co. (Me.), 96 Atl. 833.
It follows, from what has been said, that the trial court should have given defendant‘s instruction in the nature of a general demurrer at the close of all of the evidence in the case.
II. Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other appellate issues, relating to given and refused instructions and the size of the verdict.
We are not unmindful of the seriousness of plaintiff‘s injuries, nor of the heavy loss he must bear as the result of his injuries, but it is our duty to determine all cases in accordance with the law as it is written. For the reasons hereinabove stated, the judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered. Davis, C., concurs; Cooley, C., not sitting.
PER CURIAM: - The foregoing opinion by HENWOOD, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.
