41 Wash. 310 | Wash. | 1906
This is an action under the statute of forcible entry and detainer. On March 1, 1902, the respond
The sole question presented by the record is the validity of the oral lease. The appellants concede that ordinarily an oral lease of real property for a longer period than one year is void under the statute of frauds, but they argue that, because of the peculiar natoe of the rental they were to attorn for the use of the land, this case is differentiated from the ordinary oral lease where only a money rent is reserved, and presents equitable features which entitle the appellants to the full enjoyment of the term.
Were this the ordinary case of an oral lease for a fixed period with a yearly reservation of rent and a taking of possession thereunder, we would have no hesitancy in holding that it was a tenancy from year to yeai', as the statute itself provides that such is the effect of an oral lease, void under the statute of frauds, which has been thus partially per
On the other hand, the courts generally hold that, where there is an entry and the payment of rent in advance for a fixed term under an oral lease, the lease is good for an entire term, although the ’lease be a longer term than is permitted
It is this latter principle that the appellants seek to invoke in this case, but we think the finding of the court too meager to bring them within the rule. The evidence is not brought here in the record, and the facts must rest on the findings of the court. And while the court found that permanent improvements had been made on the premises to the value of $300, it did not find whether or not such improvements increased the rental value of the premises. It, of course, is inferable that such improvements would increase the rental value to some extent, but the amount is conjectural, and as the appellants are relying on an equitable principle, the burden was upon them to show that they would suffer some material injury if the ordinary rules of law were enforced against them. This, as we view the findings, they have not done, and we must hold that they were tenants from year to year, and subject to ouster at the end of each yearly period.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mount, C. J., Rudkin, Hadley, Crow, and Root, JJ., concur.