*1 individually Doug WATHOR, and Shannon Wathor, parents
and as of Nicholas child, individually and on behalf
minor similarly
of themselves and all others
situated, Plaintiffs/Appellants,
MUTUAL ASSURANCE ADMINISTRA
TORS, INC., corpora a domestic
tion, Defendant/Appellee. 97,696.
No.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Jan.
As Corrected Jan.
Rehearing Denied March *2 Mansell, Engel, Mark A. Steven S.
Steven Oklahoma, Ashmore, City, Oklahoma S. Plaintiffs/Appellants. Turner, Voegeli, R. G.
Elaine Susanna Oklahoma, Defen- City, Oklahoma dant/Appellee.
BOUDREAU, J. alleged to suit based on its bad faith actions in administering plan. an insurance employ offered its T1 Oklahoma Wathor, ees, plaintiff Doug like access to its I. STANDARD OF REVIEW program health insurance called self-funded Health and Dental Oklahoma *3 Summary T4 judgment appropri is (Plan}. County Plan Oklahoma hired defen only ate where there are no material facts in Administrators, Inc. dant Mutual Assurance dispute moving party and the is entitled to (MAA) party as its third administrator judgment as a matter of law. v. Oliver (TPA).1 MAA's Administrative Service Con Cos., Group Farmers Ins. 1997OK 941 (Contract) tract with Oklahoma obli purely P.2d 985. As this decision involves provide gated MAA to the ministerial and determinations, legal our standard of review required by in clerical services the Plan con grant summary judgment of a trial court's operation. nection with its Under the Con Kirkpatrick Chrysler is de movo. v. Corp., tract, initially any MAA determines whether We review all pay particular qualifies claim for benefits for inferences and conclusions to be drawn from ment under the Plan. The Oklahoma underlying evidentiary facts contained ma (Oklahoma County) Budget Board handles all light terials in a party most favorable to the appeals of denied claims and has final author Oliver, opposing supra. the motion. If the ity approve deny to claims. The Contract legitimate support uncontroverted facts in provides compensated for MAA to be favoring well-pleaded theory ferences of the solely partici flat fee based on the number of party against judgment sought whom the is day any pants the Plan on the first judgment contrary or if the to substantive given any month. MAA assumes no risk for law, judgment will be reversed. Har claims filed under the Plan. grave Valley v. Co-op., Canadian Elect. (Wathors), 43, 792 T2 Mr. and Mrs. Wathor indi- P.2d 50. Nicholas, vidually parents and as filed a petition alleging that MAA is insurer who II. BAD FAITH CLAIM breached its contract with them and acted 15 The Wathors contend the trial porta- bad faith when violated Oklahoma's they in concluding court erred could not statute, 4509.2, bility 86 0.8.2001 which party maintain a tort action a third prohibits excluding pre-exist- from insurers administrator for breach of insurer's ing coverage conditions from if the insured Every good faith. contract in Oklahoma previous plan. had been covered under a implied good contains an faith and partial The Wathors filed motion for dealing. Doyle Kelly, fair v. summary judgment on the issue of whether ordinary In commercial they coverage could be denied on the basis of contracts, duty merely a breach of that re pre-existing condition. MAA filed a re- contract, damages sults for breach of not sponse summary and its own motion for lability. tort Christian motion, asserted,
judgment.
In its
MAA
American Home Assur.
TPA,
among
things,
other
that because it is a
immunity from tort the latter commits while
ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
hand, if
the other
acting for the former.3 On
Wathor,
Appellants, Doug and
Sharon
prius
found at nisi
that MAA is
it should be
MAA,
brought
against appellee,
alleging
suit
contractor,
inquiry
must
an
breach of contract and breach of an insurer's
go further to determine whether
then
duty
dealing in
failing
faith and fair
County (qua
delegated to MAA
tasks
to settle their claim for certain medical ex
insurer)
1)
are:
those which
principal and
penses
pre-existing
incident
to a
condition.
nondelegable
an insurer or
are either
summary
prius
judgment
At nisi
went
2) encompass a
integral
to its functions and
affirmed, holding
MAA. The
that
COCA
so,
duty
legal
well-defined
of an insurer.
MAA,
administrator,
third-party
as a
is
may
found liable for its own tortious
MAA
subject
to an insurer's
which the
would also be
acts for
Appellants sought
faith.4
certiorari to de
under the rule that one's breach
answerable
third-party
termine whether a
administrator
nondelegable
another's
makes both
an insurer
be liable in tort
bad-
and the holder of a
the actor
duty responsible ex delicto.
denial
a claim.
faith
agent
Cir.1995),
is not
(10th
The rule of law that
excused
America,
Co.
Ins. exception general committing was made to the rule where when tortious or criminal conduct is agent always is liable in tort. is widely recognized. early In an Oklahoma case it Wolf judicial declaration of Oklahoma's neither expressed thusly: recognized nor a source of state common law agent principal apply and does not The law law. agent, pursuit purpose, when the of a lawful suggest a different test from that announced in engages aside, sets and in the commission of a injury property wrong, person- of the There, the federal court focused on Wolf, supra. sufficiently plan whether the administrator "acts rights ... al of another Instead of relation principal agent existing and the law [so] like an insurer ... there of the 'special relationship' and the between the administrator being relating applicable, thereto the transac- plainly Id. at 797. view is insured." conspiracy between tion resolves itself into Wolf with Oklahoma's law. inconsistent common among parties engaged the commis- analysis must focus on The correct whether wrong, every party and each and sion of specific, well-defined the administrator accepting knowledge with benefits alleged integral have violated to the busi- is so engaging wrong, wrong, aiding in the as to make it ness of insurer-hirer nondele- tortfeasors, are and the law will hold each Esau, gable. Coe *7 party jointly severally damages liable in 815, principle 819. For a discussion of the P.2d injury by wronged person. for the suffered III(D) nondelegable duty, Part TY13- of see infra Rogers Brummeit, 711, 13, v. 1923 OK 220 P. text. 16 of the 362, 365. Supreme Court took a similar The United States expressed agency 3. Theheart of is in the ancient position "[Nleither stated that a state nor when it gu? per per maxim alium common-law facit facit agent authority upon an can confer individual an (the agent act of the se act of the or servant is the perpetrator." to commit a tort so as to excuse the master). principal Transport, Sisk v. J.B. Hunt or Hopkins Agric. College Car- v. Clemson South of 17 ex. Inc., 69, 15, 55; 2003 OK n. 81 P.3d State olina, 636, 643, 654, 656-57, U.S. 31 S.Ct. 221 35, Bar Ass'n v. 2000 OK rel. Oklahoma Taylor, (1911). 55 890 31, 1242, 1251; Pollay, 4 v. 119 n. P.3d Nelson L.Ed. 142, 23, 1369, 1374; OK 17 n. 916 P.2d 1996 holding specific 4. The COCA limited its to the County Bank v. Board Com'rs North Side State case, stating not act like "[MAA] facts of this does 894 Tulsa 1994 OK 114 n. County, special that there a relation- an insurer such Eichner, P.2d 1051 n. Anderson v. give ship between it and Plaintiff that could rise T 890 P.2d 1337. As the duty For faith." its conclusion (Second) Agency Restatement 343 states represents that it has relied this court's COCA on agent who does an act otherwise tort is [aln liability by not from the fact that he find no relieved Christian, in note 1. I decision supra quoted support COCA's state- principal in Christian for at or on acted the command of the pertinent rule. principal ment of the account of the ..." I supportive only facts of inferences that favor movant, is error to decide the case NOT APPRO- JUDGMENT IS SUMMARY summary process. Disputed issues of fact PRIATE FOR THIS CASE BECAUSE trial, very must be resolved the law's THE PRIUS COURT MUST NISI summary decision-making. antithesis THE DETERMINE STATUS FIRST principal/agent relationship Whether a exists MAA HELD OKLAHOMA VIS-A-VIS presents generally question fact to be COUNTY,THE INSURER prius.9 resolved at nisi analysis gua non to be made The sine principal/agent of a begin T6 Existence relation determining first wheth here must er MAA stood towards the ship by considering is determined the actual non-employee agent language or of an status of intent and effect of the contract's independent light parties' day-to-day contractor.5 The MAA's status actual 1) if MAA acted as an conduct vis-a-vis one another.10 The label is material because: agent, imposed liability here because contracting parties used to define agent, acting principal, an while for the can relationship their does not alone determine 2) not insulate from tort if itself they in whether fact stand vis-a-vis one an contractor, MAA served as an principal-agent other relation.11 The liability may if MAA nonetheless be visited determining central factor whether performing was a core agency function relationship principal's exists is the duty and its well-defined as an insurer.7 to, of, right as well as its exercise control agent.12 princi over the The essence of a only Summary judgment permissible
1 5
pal/agent
principal's
controversy
any
power
status is the
if no
exists as to
substantial
give
agent's duty
obey
material fact.8
the record is devoid of
directions and the
When
right
present,
them.13 If a
of control is
evidentiary
undisputed
that shows
material
governed by
principles.
Agency
common-law
MAA,
if it were the insurer.
as an independent
(Second)
contractor,
Agency.
(of
discharges
paying
See Restatement
claims)
settling
qua
in bad faith MAA is liable
6. Based on the common-law
that all individ-
Any
contrary
insurer.
other result would be
acting
uals must act or
from
in manner
refrain
principles
liability.
of common-law tort
others,
brings
agent
harm to
cannot
acting
short, MAA, or
other
when
any
entity,
liability.
acting
itself
tort
Whether
insulate
insurer,
for an
must be held to the same
principal,
on his
behalf or on behalf of his
own
dealing
standard of
faith and fair
as an
agent
the conse-
will not be relieved from
insurer itself.
she)
quences
merely
he
of his tort
because
agency relationship
stood in an
when the tort
Cameron,
49, ¶ 5,
8. Hinson v.
occurred.
3 at
31 S.Ct.
note
Hopkins,
citing
549, 551,
Flanders
v. Crane
(Second)
Agency § 343,
654; Restatement
su-
pra note 3.
Carpet
finding
Cleaning Employ
7. A
that MAAserved as
con-
A-Plus Janitorial &
analysis.
complete
required
tractor does
Ass'n,
ers' Workers'
Compensation
The trial court must next determine whether the
¶ 32,
County delegated
to MAA a well-defined
*8
integral
to its business as an insurer.
If MAA
Consultants,
Enterprise Management
10.
Inc.
performed obligations integral
to those of the
State
Oklahoma ex rel.
the Oklahoma Tax
involving
insurer and
the latter's well-defined
Comm'n,
91,
359,
16 n.
12, 768
insured,
legal duty
may
que
it
be liable
12.
n.
insurer.
example,
For
each
insurer has a non-
Oklahoma
Management Consultants,
Inc.,
11.
su-
Enterprise
delegable duty
good
claims in
faith.
to settle
10,
12,
note
at 16 n.
362 n. 12.
pra
Settling
paying
claims is the most basic
Christian,
1,
function
of an insurer.
note
supra
Management Consultants,
Inc.,
su
¶ 25,
Enterprise
("We approve
adopt
at
tractors who for the insurer able claim the actor management, adjustment duties of claims allegation independent and there is no of an settlement). obligor.21 tort liable To vicariously day's pronouncement is final and releases the accident, by design 19 or this Whether liability. Administrator of its bad-faith Relit- relationship quo new sine non of the in igation very of the same issue every sured bad-faith defendant will gua principal obligor theory insurer on a far-reaching impact have a on the future liability vicarious is barred Corporate complexion of that tort. insurers doctrine preclusion.22 issue only through do business others-human If, agents corporate contractors. as the B. appears today,
court
to declare
insurer's
(or
contractors)
agents
independent
bear no
Progeny Requires
Christian's
AOf
Plain-
liability for a bad-faith
while
in
tort
tiff No More Than An
Re-
Insured/Insurer
surers
rather
themselves but
on mission
Policy-issuing
lation with The
Insurer
insurer,
for the
the insurer
itself stands
by operation
cavalierly
exonerated
of law and
10 The court
declares the Ad
preclusion.19
issue
This is so because the
ministrator's
status vis-a-vis the
recognize
responsi
law
"legally
will
no vicarious
irrelevant." This is so because the
bility for
plaintiffs
non-tortious
acts of
contractu
court concludes the harmed
lacked
ally engaged (non-employee)
agent
"special
or for
relationship"
contract-based
vis-a-
independent
very
contractor's
pronounce
non-tortious
vis the Administrator. This
discharge
duties.20 Put
nothing
ment infuses the
tort with
Christian
ting
principle
simpler language,
legal
schizophrenia.
"special
vieari
short of
liability
imposable
ous
is not
no
relationship"
jurisprudence
requires
where
action
our
is
206,
(where
legal paradox
(Mo.App.1995)
19. The court creates a
when it
S.W.2d
208
an em
ployee
respondeat superior
strains to hold that an insurer's
and all of
is exonerated of
lia
exonerated);
bility
employer
contractors are not liable in tort.
also must stand
liability
294,
This would make the insurer's
exclusive.
Company,
Fish v. Southern
173 Or.
Pacific
corporate
294,
(1943),
But insurers are
bodies
act
and cannot
P.2d
143
917
reh. den. 173 Or.
145
agents.
immunizing
(1944)
(where
without human
non-em-
By
991
vicarious
is
liability
ployee agents from bad-faith torts committed for
solely
wrongful
agent,
based
on the
act of an
principal,
today
setting
is
insurers'
agent
princi
exoneration of the
exonerates the
liability-free
controlled instrumentalities
on a
pal).
bad-faith frolic.
voluntary
21. A
affirmative act which an actor
liability
imposed by
respondeat superior setting
20. Vicarious
law when one
in the
is released also
Sisk,
3,
person
liability.
is made answerable for the actionable
releases the master's
note
('The
Hendricks,
conduct
of another.
Braden v.
1985
at 17
common-law doctrine
[of vicarious
lability]
teaches that an effective release of the
14, ¶ 18,
24,
1343,
n.
n. 24.
1351,
(Third)
(Vicarious
Restatement
of Torts
13
Lia
master.").
servant
to release the
operates
bility),
a:
contexts,
Comment
"In
number of
responsibility
legally imputed
of one actor is
See,
Pierce,
eg., Hedquist
Lynch,
v. Merrill
another,
liability
imposed.
and vicarious
Smith,
Inc.,
Fenner &
enough
non-employee
to exonerate
every
agent
independent
independent
contractor
nondelegable-
and
of
contractor. The
doing so,
liability.
operates
In
duty concept
its individual
the
to extend the hirer's
principle
magnifies
liability.
court
the
of nondele-
liability
This is so because that
duty beyond
legal
by
gable
limit
indepen
extends to the torts of the hirer's
immunity
stretching
contractors,
it into
from tort
lia
dent
but it does not relieve the
bility-a
concept
independent
not
included in the con
contractors
of individual
tort
liability.30
teachings
clearly
recovery against
struct. The
Timmons
If there is
an
independent contractor,31
will,
the latter
extending
do not
include exoneration
that
equitable indemnity,
based on
have a claim
far.
against
nondelegable duty.32
28
the hirer with a
nondelegable
14
principle
duty
T The
29
exception
general
is an
to the
rule
that
the
Indemnity
right
15
is a
which inures to
independent
him,
hirer of an
contractor
discharges
duty
by
is not
one who
owed
but
429,
nondelegable duty
Except
employ-
§§
28. One who owes a
to anoth
as stated in
410 to
escape liability
performance by
er cannot
for its
independent
subject
er of an
contractor
is not
engaging
independent
contractor.
In such
liability
bodily
harm caused to another
cases, the
rule
the hirer is not liable for
by a tortious act or omission of the contractor
independent
actionable conduct of an
contractor
or his servants.
Hendricks,
applied.
will not be
Braden v.
1985
14, ¶ 19,
1343, 1352,
26;
695 P.2d
n.
Shell
Sisk,
note 3, at 17.
Line
v. Curtis,
212, ¶ 13,
1955 OK
287
Pipe
Corp.
681, 685;
Hotels,
Barden,
P.2d
Allied
Limited v.
Inc.,
Copeland
Lodge Enterprises,
In
v. The
16, ¶ 15,
968,
1964 OK
P.2d
Okla
36, 112,
2000 OK
25,
695,
n.
homa
Co. v.
OK 82,
157,
282 P.
Ry.
Boyd,
states:
162,
45,
said,
140 Okl.
it is
"Where one owes a
nondelegable duty
persons,
to third
he cannot
person
"The rule in Oklahoma is that a
who
obligation
escape
performing
duty by
such
performs
through
independent
work
con-
performance
engaging
through
by
for its
damages
per-
tractor is not liable for
to third
contractor,
and in such cases
the rule that an
negligence
sons caused
contractor
employer
negligence
is not liable for the
of an
except
inherently dangerous
where the work is
independent
application."
contractor has no
See
employer
or unlawful or where the
owes a
Inc.,
Copeland
Lodge Enterprises,
v. The
2000 OK
legal duty
injured
contractual or defined
to the
36, ¶12,
quoting
4 P.3d
Great
party
performance
(em-
in the
of the work."
Indemnity
Deatherage,
American
Co. v.
1935 OK
added).
phasis
Toyota,
Williamson v. Fowler
827, 830-31,
("...
52 P.2d
pay E. by a third have been borne loss should Immunizing from Bad-Faith The Notion short, parties are party.35 where two In Acting Liability Third Parties As Tort party for a bad- to a third separately liable Agents Indepen and _(Non-employee) (because primarily it tort, one of them faith Managing, Adjust Contractors dent duty), the other and has ing Settling An Insurer's Claims and secondarily, recovery against if there is Symmetry the Procedural offends have an secondary obligor, the latter would By § Art. Okl. Const.38 Mandated pri indemnity against the claim equitable obligor. mary {17 intends to let the Assuming the court painful death to tort die a slow and Christian bear and Administrator The standing lack of by inflicted the insured's liability the latter's bad-faith separately for in- proceed against the insurer-controlled covered losses. refusal to settle strumentalities-ie, corporate human or it has a non- obligor because primary is the insurer) claims duty (gua to settle insurer-hired inde delegable non-employee agents jurisprudence runs liability pendent operators)-its escape its and cannot faith interdie afoul of constitutional contractor. The Oklahoma's by engaging Today's pro special.39 tion of law that is Administrator, obligor secondary who is a * liability nondelega- preserved the insurer's third having with the a causal connection fault illusory. ble becomes party's injuries, latter recover from compelled pay he has been the amount former damages injury"). Restatement See as § pertinent terms of Art. 5 38. The who, ("A (First) person § of Restitution Const., are: discharged which is part, has whole or in not, except legislature as otherwise shall ''The by which as between himself him but owed Constitution, pass any provided local or in this discharged by the oth have been another should authorizing: special law other, unless entitled to er, is indemnity &oge ok wrongful nature of his payor is barred jurisdiction ... Regulating practice or conduct."). inquiry judicial proceedings or before ..." tribunals.. courts ... or other note 32 at 113. Porter, 33. supra Const., supra § Okl. the terms of Art. 5 See Id. single out Special laws are those which note 38. similarly affected entire class of less than an Id. persons things treatment. If or for different absolutely special, § un- rule lawof indemnity may equitable 36. Noncontractual Reyn prohibits passage . law. equivocally its par legal relationship between the arise from ¶¶ 13-21, Porter, 760 P.2d olds v. (National A.A.R. W. Fire Ins. Co. v. ties. Union held that mak In Porter 816, 821-24. Inc., 1989 OK Skyways, applicable ing to one of limitations a statute Serv., Inc., Co. v. L.V. French Truck Travelers Ins. tort-fie., singling tort for a different out one (Okla. 555 n. 16 applicable to other from that which is limitation 1988)). secondarily obligated only who is One Art. 5 of the same rubric-violates torts indemnity pay damages have an claim would Const., pro provides it disuniform Okl. because obligor primary a nondele- who owes By today's Porter, a tort like attributes. cedures for duty. supra gable note 32 at 113. tortfeasors, except pronouncement insurers all cases, under re- would remain liable bad-faith note at 17. Sisk teaches Sisk, agents superior of their spondeat -for the torts vicarious for another's there can be no independent contrac jointly those for the torts of By today's exoneration acts that are immunized. imposed. obligation actor, upon can be tors whom that it has the court's declaration special is indeed intention, nouncement law. It state so. ought that is not its changes common-law time-honored tort la- not leave the hopelessly bad-faith tort in a bility principles by making non-employee explanation chaotic aftermath. An is due on operators and other immune from may proceed how an insured when the bad- They liability. delictual stand exonerated faith refusal directly settle is occasioned want of a direct contractual insurance-an (non-employee) the insurer's human or plaintiff. chored nexus with the corporate agency hiree
assigned management, adjust- the task of IV ment and settlement of losses. *13 ¶ 21 I would reverse trial court's sum
SUMMARY mary exoneration of MAA and remand the ¶18 incorrectly This case was decided cause for proceedings further to be conduct summary process. process That inap was fully ed in a manner piere- consistent with a propriately applied. inquiry Full-scale into ing analytical inquiry urged by this dissent MAA's status vis-a-vis is re post-remand proceedings. quired may to determine whether MAA held liable bad-faith tort. No court can
decide, record, on this whether MAA served non-employee agent
as a for the
as an insurer-hired contractor
performing well-defined core functions of an
insurer. Because the conduct of the con
(MAA
tracting parties
County),
and the
one
may be liable tort to the same extent as its (the principal County). MAA was fact insurer-hired per- contractor
forming a well-defined core function of the Ranger Company, Insurance (County), insurer MAA also be declared Intervenor/Appellant. gua liable insurer. 96,996. No. 1 20 jurisprudence There is no extant state supporting today the notion foisted here Supreme Court of Oklahoma. for imposition liability, of bad-faith if the Feb. management insurer's claims function is han- party, dled third the third must
also stand vis-a-vis the insured in an insur- relationship. precedent Extant
erfinsured
requires no more than insurer/in- solely
sured relation subsist between the
plaintiff policy-issuing entity and the
the covered claim. If the court intends to
now abrogate abandon or prog- its Christian
eny, opinion clearly should explicitly Creating single exemption respondeat from the Quik, Town Mister 138, 15, 1996 OK a. Tony's
superior liability similarly class would fall under 357-58; Haynes 915 P.2d v. Tulsa Pub special-law the axe of a condemnation. Transit, 86, 15, lic Schools jurisprudence, Legisla Our own no less than the J., (Opala, concurring); Great Plains enactments, faithfully ture's must conform Federal & L S Assn. v. 4, T2, Dabney, state fundamental law's interdiction of disuni- J., (Opala, concurring). 1095-96 prohibited subjects. form laws on Johnson v.
