210 Conn. 333 | Conn. | 1989
The plaintiff, the Watertown Police Union Local 541, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying its application, brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a),
In February, 1985, the town discharged Michael Thompson, a probationary police officer. The plaintiff, claiming the discharge was not justified, grieved the town’s action to arbitration. After an arbitration hearing on March 5,1986, the board, in a written decision, cited the following findings of fact concerning Thompson’s discharge:
The plaintiff grieved Thompson’s discharge arguing that article VI, § 8 of the contract must be read in conjunction with article XIII, § 1, thereby requiring the town to show just cause for the discharge of a probationary employee. Based on its reading of the contract, the plaintiff claimed that the town had failed to meet its burden of showing just cause for dismissing Thompson and that his discharge was, therefore, in violation of the contract.
Because the parties disagreed as to the relevant contract provision to be applied, they were unable to reach an agreement on the issue to be submitted to the board. The board decided to reject the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract, stating that Thompson, a probationary employee, was not entitled to the protection of the “just cause” standard. It then adopted the town’s formulation of the issue and framed the submission as follows: “[Wjhether the discharge of Michael Thompson was consistent or in violation of Article VI, Section 8 [of the labor contract].” Citing Thompson’s failure to follow the orders of his superior, the board rendered an award in favor of the town stating that “there was a reason for [his] termination and that
The plaintiff subsequently applied to the Superior Court to vacate the board’s award. In support of its application to vacate, the plaintiff argued that the board had exceeded or imperfectly executed its powers in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4) both in framing the issue, because it “prejudged the merits of the dispute and precluded, ab initio any possibility of relief to be awarded to the plaintiff,” and in rendering an award that sanctioned the disciplining of an officer who did not follow an order of his superior that is against public policy.
On March 24, 1987, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it rejected both of the plaintiff’s claims.
On May 4, 1987, the plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Appellate Court. The plaintiffs claim on appeal is that the board exceeded its powers in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4) in that its award sanctioned the order of Sheehan “not to make any motor vehicle stops,” and that this order is contrary to public policy. On April 28, 1988, we transferred the case to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Because Sheehan’s order does not violate established public policy, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the board’s award.
“We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 of the General Statutes.” Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266, 270, 487 A.2d 553 (1985); Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 173 Conn. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 323 (1977); International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 653, 201 A.2d 656 (1964); Board of Education v. Local 818, 5 Conn. App. 636, 639, 502 A.2d 426 (1985). “A challenge of the arbitrator’s authority is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission.” Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 584, 440 A.2d 774 (1981); see also American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 186, 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME, supra, 271; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985); Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102, 106, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981); Board of Education v. Local 818, supra. An award,
In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator’s authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists under § 52-418 (a) (4) when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 416-17, 544 A.2d 186 (1988); Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 590-91, 519 A.2d 1 (1986); Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); Stamford v. Stamford Police Assn., 14 Conn. App. 257, 259, 540 A.2d 400 (1988); State v. Connecticut Council 4, CEU, AFSCME, 7 Conn. App. 286, 290, 508 A.2d 806 (1986); International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Windsor, 40 Conn. Sup. 145, 483 A.2d 626 (1984); Avco Corporation v. Preteska, 22 Conn. Sup. 475, 174 A.2d 684 (1961). This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award “approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than
Section 54-If (a) has no application to the facts in the present case because Sheehan’s order did not prohibit Thompson from making arrests under it. Rather, his order was to make no “motor vehicle stops.” (Emphasis added.) Implicit in that order is that Thompson was to make no routine or investigative stops for minor infractions of the state motor vehicle laws. Section 54-If (a) is not a motor vehicle law, but rather, is a criminal procedure statute that is invoked when police officers arrest, without a warrant, those who have committed the serious crimes set out in the state penal code. Had Thompson seen or been asked to respond to a serious crime, Sheehan’s order would not have prohibited him from making an arrest pursuant to § 54-lf (a).
In addition to the absence of any statute or administrative ruling establishing a duty requiring police officers to stop every person they see violating traffic laws, there is no case law setting forth such a policy mandate. While the United States Supreme Court and federal court cases cited by the plaintiff do state that police officers have a duty to preserve law and order, those cases are not on point.
Finding that the plaintiff has no explicit public policy on which to rely, we are bound by the decision of the board. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, supra. We find, therefore, that the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the board’s award.
There is no error.
In this opinion Shea, Covello and Hull, Js., concurred.
General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in pertinent part: “vacating award, (a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
In its brief, the plaintiff recites facts beyond those cited by the board in its written opinion. This court, however, is bound by the board’s findings of fact. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985); Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 584, 440 A.2d 774 (1981); Meyers v. Lakeridge Development Co., 173 Conn. 133, 135, 376 A.2d 1105 (1977) (on appeal courts will not review the evidence presented to an arbitrator). See generally discussion, infra.
Prior to the court’s ruling, the town filed a motion to strike a portion of the plaintiff’s application and a motion for nonsuit. Because the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, both of the town’s motions were rendered moot. Subsequently, the plaintiff motioned the trial court to open its judgment denying its application to vacate the arbitration award stating that the court prematurely ruled on its motion to vacate and should have ruled only on the town’s motion to strike at that time. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to open on November 19, 1987.
In the few cases where arbitration awards have been vacated on public policy grounds it was because they contravened a well defined public policy mandate. See Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); State v. Connecticut Council 4, CEU, AFSCME, 7 Conn. App. 286, 290, 508 A.2d 806 (1986) (awards were set aside pursuant to General Statutes § 54-418 [a] [4] because they were found to be in direct conflict with the provisions of a state statute); International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Windsor, 40 Conn. Sup. 145, 483 A.2d 626 (1984) (arbitration award set aside that upheld the disciplin
The plaintiff cites three primary cases. In the first case, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-42, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), .a search and seizure case, the plaintiff relies on a general discussion by the United States Supreme Court of the “community caretaking functions” state and local police officers perform. While the court’s discussion does indicate that police officers have a great deal of contact with motor vehicles and often make investigative stops, it creates no public policy regarding motor vehicle stops. Also cited by the plaintiff are United States v. Markland, 635 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991, 101 S. Ct. 2332, 68 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1981), and Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Sup. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), for the proposition that it is a police officer’s duty to preserve law and order. Neither of these cases, however, dealt with the enforcement of traffic laws. In United States v. Markland, supra, the court