639 N.E.2d 1236 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1994
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *794 Plaintiff-appellant, Bill Waterson, appeals from a judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims dismissing his defamation action against defendant-appellee, Cleveland State University ("CSU").
Plaintiff's case arises out of an editorial published in the October 10-23, 1991 issue of a CSU student newspaper known asThe Vindicator. The editorial was written by the then-student editor-in-chief of The Vindicator, Zina Quarles ("Quarles"). The editorial stated that plaintiff, a high-ranking official in the CSU police department, had a reputation for using excessive force, and it recounted several incidents of racist and homophobic behavior allegedly committed by plaintiff.
On March 3, 1992, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims alleging defamation, slander, tortious interference with his employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the editorial which appeared in The Vindicator. The complaint named CSU, among others,1 as defendant in the case. Plaintiff amended his complaint on February 17, 1993, deleting the claim for slander and adding a claim for negligence. *795
On June 28, 1993, defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff was a "public official" within the meaning of New York Times v. Sullivan
(1964),
"1. The trial court erred in holding that the appellant was a `public figure'.
"2. The trial court erred in finding that the appellee's conduct was not so outrageous and reckless as to constitute `actual malice' within the meaning of New York Times.
"3. The trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for directed verdict on the basis that the appellant was not defamed within the meaning of New York Times.
"4. The trial court erred in finding that the appellee was not permitted to withhold publication of the defamatory article and that the appellee was not negligent for allowing the publication of the defamatory article."
In his first assignment of error, plaintiff challenges the trial court's application of the "actual malice" standard to this case, arguing that he was not a "public figure" when the editorial in question was published.
Preliminarily, plaintiff's argument misapprehends the basis for the trial court's application of the actual malice standard to his claims. In New York Times and Curtis Publishing Co. v.Butts (1967),
Whether an individual is a public official is a question of law to be determined by the trial court. Rosenblatt v. Baer
(1966),
The public today has a significant interest in the performance of its law enforcement officers. "The abuse of a patrolman's office can have great potentiality for social harm * * *." Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp. (1968),
Further, the interest of the campus community in any individual officer's performance is likely to increase with the authority and influence of the officer. At the time the editorial in question was published, plaintiff was Deputy Chief in the CSU police department. As Deputy Chief, plaintiff was second in command in the department, ranking only below the Chief of Police, and was responsible for the continued training of the approximately thirty officers on the force. Plaintiff thus was in a position to wield considerable influence over the rank and file members of the department and to set the tone within the department on issues such as the appropriate use of force and ethnic sensitivity.
Finally, the CSU community is the principal audience of the publication in which the editorial in question appeared, precisely the audience with the greatest interest in the performance of CSU police officers, including plaintiff.
Given the foregoing circumstances, plaintiff was a public official under the standard announced in Rosenblatt. Bross v.Smith (1992),
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's first assignment of error is overruled.
In his second and third assignments of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his case; plaintiff asserts that his evidence was sufficient to show that the editorial in question was published with actual malice.
Plaintiff's contentions arise in the context of defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2). In ruling upon such a motion, "it is the function of the trial court to review the evidence and the law. Civ.R. 41(B)(2). In this respect, the trial court is not required to construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, but rather may weigh the evidence and render judgment. Central Motors Corp. v. PepperPike (1979),
In the context of a First Amendment case, actual malice refers to the dissemination of a falsehood "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, supra,
In light of our disposition of plaintiff's first, second and third assignments of error, plaintiff's fourth assignment of error is rendered moot, and we decline to address it. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Having overruled plaintiff's first, second and third assignments of error, and determining that his fourth assignment of error is moot, we affirm the judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims.
Judgment affirmed.
BOWMAN and DESHLER, JJ., concur.