On the one issue made by the defendant’s pleadings as to whether his deed to the plaintiff had been delivered, the verdict was authorized by the evidence, not ■ only under the presumption of delivery from the recording of the instrument
(Stinson
v.
Daniel,
193
Ga.
844, 849,
"While the only issue under the pleadings was whether the deed had been delivered, the defendant excepted to the charge quoted in the statement of facts as to the fraudulent chаracter of the defendant’s conveyance, on the ground that it was unauthorized by any. evidence. This charge set fоrth no erroneous principle of law, and the record does not sustain the contention that the instruction as given wаs not authorized by the evidence.
(«)■ “Every conveyance of real or personal estate, by writing or otherwise, had or made with intention to delay' or defraud creditors, and such intention known to the party taking, is void as to creditors of the maker;” and “Every voluntary deed or conveyance, not for a valuable consideration, made by a debtor insolvent .at the time of such conveyance, is likewise void against creditors of the maker;” but these conveyances, “though void as to creditors and the other persons designated, are good between the parties.”
Gunn
v.
Chapman,
166
Ga.
279 (
(&) While it was inaccuratе for the judge to charge the jury that it was their duty to pass upon the question as to whether the defendant had a fraudulent purpose and intent when he made the deed, this inapt instruction seems to have been completely nullified by what was said in connection therewith, to the effect that it made no difference, so far as the rights of this plaintiff and defendant were concerned, whether the defendant’s purpose was fraudulent or not. Accordingly, if, as contended, the injeсtion of the question of a fraudulent intent in the conveyance was unauthorized by the evidence, it tended to militate against the interests of the plaintiff grantee just as much or more than it did against the present movant. If the deed was delivered and was not fraudulent, it would be good. If the deed was delivered and was fraudulent, under the instruction given it still would be good as far as the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant were concerned. In submitting to the jury the question as to a fraudulent intent, the judge in so сharging expressly conditioned their finding on a further finding that the deed “was delivered,” and plainly and emphatically told the jury, “But rеmember, before [the wife] would have any title at all, you would first have to find that this deed was delivered to her.” Thereforе, construing together all of the instruction complained of, it was not erroneous as a 'matter of law.
Had not the defendant himself by a portion of his testimony made it appear that the deed was executed to hinder, delay, or dеfraud creditors, and had the record failed to show any other evidence as to fraudulent intent, nice questions would arise as to whether the instruction as given was erroneous in that its language was calculated to inflame and prejudice the minds of the jury
*286
against the defendant; and whether the assignment of error as made was sufficient to raise that particular point, or would be limited to the point specifically stated, that said charge "is error for the reason that there was no evidence to warrant the court in charging the jury
on the subject”
of fraudulent intent, so as to invoke an applicatiоn only of the general rule relating to legal prejudice from a charge unsupported by evidence, that "An instructiоn to the jury that is unauthorized by the evidence is erroneous, and, if it is not apparent that the jury could not have been misled thereby, is cause for new trial.”
Citizens & Southern National Bank
v.
Kontz,
185
Ga.
131 (6), 148 (
Judgment affirmed.