32 N.C. App. 305 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1977
The sole question is whether the language in the deed that we have heretofore quoted, and which is found only in the same paragraph with the description, creates a valid right of reentry on breach of the stated conditions. The conditions and the right of reentry are not referred to anywhere else in the deed. The trial judge concluded that the language was ineffectual . and we must agree.
We have duly considered the strong arguments in defendants’ brief and the astute analysis of the cases discussed therein. We conclude, nevertheless, that our decision must be guided by that of the Supreme Court in Whetsell v. Jernigan, 291 N.C. 128, 229 S.E. 2d 183, which affirmed the decision of this Court in Whetsell v. Jernigan, 29 N.C. App. 136, 223 S.E. 2d 397. Whetsell involved a reverter clause that appeared only at the end of the description and was not referred to elsewhere in the deed. The Court held that the clause was ineffective. We see no significance in any differences between the deed in Whetsell and the one in the case at bar insofar as the relevant propositions of law are concerned. There, as here, the conveyance was executed prior to the effective date of G.S. 39-1.1. That statute, in effect, requires the Court to determine the effect of instruments of conveyance containing inconsistent clauses (executed after 1 January 1968) on the basis of the intent of the parties as it appears from all of the provisions of the instrument. In Whetsell, the Court considered its decisions in Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 47 S.E. 2d 228; Oxendine v. Lewis, 252 N.C.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
