71 Mo. App. 653 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1897
The respondent is a Missouri corporation. The appellant Bell is a resident of the state of Arkansas. The facts are, that the City Savings Bank and Trust Company, an Arkansas corporation, heretofore doing business at Hot Springs, Arkansas, on April 29, 1896, drew a draft for $253.80 on the American Exchange Bank of St. Louis (its depository) payable to the order of the respondent, which draft was on the second day of May, 1896, presented to the American Exchange Bank for payment, which was refused. The draft was duly protested for nonpayment, of which notice to the drawer was given. The respondent sued the City Savings Bank and Trust Company by attachment, and on the ninth day of May, 1896, summoned the American Exchange Bank as garnishee. On the first day of'May, 1896, the appellant Bell was appointed receiver of the City Savings Bank and Trust Company by the chancery court of G-arland county, Arkansas. Service by publication in the attachment proceedings was had on the City Savings Bank and Trust Company. The American Exchange Bank, in answer to interrogatories, stated that at the date of the service of garnishment it owed the City Savings Bank and Trust Company the sum of $436.23 which sum it paid into court under an order made on its motion. The respondent recovered judgment against the City Savings Bank and Trust Company for $278.60 and costs of suit. Th'e G-arland county chancery court authorized Bell as receiver to sue for' and collect the debt due from the Exchange Bank to the City Savings Bank and Trust Company,
“Whenever, in any case, a receiver shall be appointed for a corporation or the trustees thereof, or any copartnership or joint stock company, and the order or decree of the court, judge or chancellor shall be that the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, funds, assets, moneys, choses in action, rights and interests of every kind, name and nature, either in law or equity, or any part thereof, belonging to the same,
The possession, control, custody and title passed by the order and. the statute, are not absolute, but qualified or limited, The title is passed so far as shall be necessary to collect debts, preserve the assets and property for the benefit of creditors, and is subject to the future orders, etc., of the court. This kind of title falls far short of an absolute one, and is no greater nor of higher quality, than is ordinarily passed to a receiver appointed under the general equity jurisdiction of the courts of chancery of the country, except as to the right to sue and defend suits in his own name. He is nothing more than an ordinary receiver of an insolvent .concern, notwithstanding the statute. As such the ease of Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222, and kindred cases cited in appellant’s brief are inapplicable. It follows that the judgment is affirmed.