114 Ga. 262 | Ga. | 1901
Waterman was accused of the offense of cheating and swindling, the specific allegation being that he represented a certain horse was sound and all right, and by such representations induced Glisson to pay him fifty dollars for the horse, when in fact the horse was diseased, unsound, and worthless, and so known to the seller; that the defects in the horse were-not patent,-and not known by Glisson until after the purchase. The accused on arraignment demurred to the accusation, his grounds of demurrer being that the accusation was defective because it did not set- out what representations as to the soundness of the horse were made hy the accused; that to represent “that said horse was sound and all right” was too indefinite to put defendant on notice, etc. Also, that the accusation does not set out how and in what particulars the horse was diseased and unsound, etc. The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant excepted pendente lite; and the accused was put upon his trial. The evidence of the prosecutor was positive to the facts, that he purchased the horse from the accused on the faith of representations made by him that the horse was sound and all right, was a good work-horse, etc.; that he paid defendant fifty dollars for the horse; that the horse was at the time diseased and unsound; that he did not know what was the matter with the horse; that he did not walk right; that when driven he would stagger from one side of the road to the other; that there was difficulty in his breathing; that when he attempted to use him to the plow he could not keep in the row; that the horse was worthless ; that he appeared to be all right when purchased, etc. The evidence for the defendant tended to show that the horse was sound and all right, and a good work-horse. The defendant in his statement denied the alleged representations. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Waterman made application for a new trial on several grounds, which being refused, he excepted.
Judgment reversed.