30 Conn. 135 | Conn. | 1861
The arguments of counsel in this case have taken a much wider range than we think is called for by the necessities of the case as it stands before us. There is no rule of pleading better established than that the plea must not be too narrow ; that is, it must answer the whole declaration or plea to which it professes to be an answer; and where a defect of this sort is in the ground of the defense itself, and not in the form of stating it, it is of course apparent that the party thus pleading has no defense that could be aided by a re-pleader, and judgment will therefore be at once given for the adverse party. Applying these well known rules to the case, it seems to us that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, as well on the facts found by the court as upon the pleadings themselves. The action is an ordinary action of debt on the judg-‘ ment of the city court of Hartford. Of course it must be shown that the judgment has in some way been satisfied or discharged, or the plaintiff is entitled to judgment upon it. This is attempted to be done, so far as the defendant Curtis is concerned, by setting up certain proceedings under our insolvent law, instituted by him and one Frederick Curtis, with whom
Now it may be very well doubted whether the legislature had any such object as this in view in passing this act, or contemplated any such result. The more probable object was merely to prevent the merger of claims in suit against insolvent estates, for the purpose of enabling the holders of them to have them allowed against the assigned estate although they had gone into judgment after the assignment, for while the assignment would operate to discharge attachments in many cases, if the judgment was also to have the effect of preventing the claim from being allowed by the commissioners, the party must either withdraw his suit or cause it to be continued until the determination of the proceedings in insolvency, or he must lose, not only all benefit by his attachment; but all claim
The suit is founded upon a judgment, and upon that alone. That judgment includes, not merely the original cause of action, but the costs of the suit in which it was rendered. It was regularly rejidered at the time for the debt then- due, and, by the rendition of it, it made the costs of the suit as much a part of the judgment debt as any other part of it. It indeed became by the judgment one entire thing, for both debt and costs, and however true it may be that the original cause of action, kept alive, that is from merging in the judgment, by the act of 1855, may be discharged by the proceedings in insolvency, yet the judgment itself can not be discharged, for the obvious reason that it did not exist" at the time of the assignment. Nor can it be said that the, insolvent proceedings amount to an equitable discharge of the judgment, since the costs, which entered .into and served materially to increase the amount of the judgment debt, never existed as a legal demand until made so by the rendition of the judgment itself. The judgment is not vacated and rendered a nullity by the insolvent proceedings. Up to the time when the certificate was issued it existed as a perfectly valid judgment. And the act of 1855 kept alive the original cause of action also, so as to give the plaintiff the two securities for his claim. It may be that the discharge of the original cause of action may pro tanto be an equitable discharge of the judgment. Clearly it can amount to no more than this. When therefore the defendant avers in his plea that the claims on which this suit is brought were each and all of them claims founded on contract and existing at the time of said assignment, he is obviously contradicted by the record of the judgment, which includes much that did not and could not have existed at any time previous to its rendition. It seems very obvious therefore that the plea does» not answer the declaration, even if we admit that its general language may be applied to the original
It appears to us therefore, that if the defendant has any defense, even against that part of the judgment debt which is founded upon the original cause of action, he can not take advantage of it in the mode which he has adopted here.
We therefore advise the superior court to render judgment for the plaintiff, for the full amount of his claim.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.