Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
In 1982 the Maritime Subsidy Board issued a grant of authority to United States Lines to conduct around-the-world shipping service with unsubsidized ships. It did so in a manner that effectively denied U.S. Lines’s competitors, including Waterman Steamship Corporation and Farrell Lines, Inc., an opportunity to contest the grant. Waterman and Farrell sued the Board in district court, which ordered a remand to the Board and thereby afforded them the missed opportunity.
Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Dole,
I
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 1101-1294 (1982), authorizes the Maritime Administration to subsidize the construction and operation of U.S.-flag vessels in foreign trade. 46 U.S.C.App. § 1173. The agency does so by giving an “operating-differential subsidy” to merchant marine operators, amounting to the difference between the domestic cost of operating ships on a given trade route and the cost for foreign competitors. See 46 U.S.C.App. § 1173(b).
In November 1980 U.S. Lines submitted an application for an operating subsidy contract for service on certain routes. In the application it also sought permission to undertake an unrestricted number of unsubsidized voyages. At the time, a set of regulations known as “General Order 80” required subsidized operators to show a “definite need” for unsubsidized service and gave competition a chance to be heard in opposition. See 46 CFR § 281.11 (1986), repealed, Non-Subsidized Voyages Restric
After the contract was approved, but before it was actually awarded, U.S. Lines sought to amend the contract to allow it to build 14 “Jumbo Econships” and operate them without subsidy on any legal trade route. In June 1982 the Board approved an amended contract, reducing the original subsidy, requiring construction of the Jumbos, and authorizing their use in unsubsidized around-the-world service. The Board acted without complying with General Order 80, and U.S. Lines’s competitors learned of the amended contract through a Maritime Administration press release.
In 1984 Farrell and other competitors of U.S. Lines requested the Board to reopen the contract to inquire into the effects of the authorized Jumbo service on them, arguing that they had been lulled into believing no such service would be authorized without compliance with General Order 80. The Board denied the requests as untimely.
Four of U.S. Lines’s competitors, including Farrell and Waterman, then sued the Board. The district court ruled that refusal to reopen the case in 1984 was an abuse of discretion because it was not until long after the 1982 order that the competitors learned of the full scope of the authority granted, evidently by observing U.S. Lines’s actual conduct. See
While the remand was pending before the Board, Farrell and Waterman moved in the district court for an award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The court awarded the fees, finding that Waterman and Farrell were each a “prevailing party” and that the government’s litigating position was not “substantially justified.” It also found that specializing in maritime law was a “special factor” justifying a deviation from the standard $75 per hour cap on attorneys’ fees under EAJA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), and awarded fees for the entire amount of the lawsuit, with some minor reductions. This appeal followed.
II
Waterman and Farrell may be considered prevailing parties if they have “succeeded on ‘any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’ ”
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. School Dist.,
— U.S. — -,
In
Sullivan v. Hudson,
— U.S. -,
Although the Sullivan decision is not a direct holding on the issue before us, the analysis appears a critical step in support of the Court’s holding and we see no reason not to take it seriously. Both an agency and a trial court may make missteps along the way to a perfectly lawful conclusion, and parties certainly have the right to use reviewing courts to correct the missteps. From a party’s viewpoint, however, correct procedures and use of correct substantive standards are largely (if not entirely) instruments to a desired end — a change in someone’s primary conduct in the real world: relief from a restriction, grant of a benefit, imposition of a restriction on others, etc. To treat the ultimately fruitless quest for such relief as making the litigant a “prevailing party” assumes a peculiarly litigation-centered notion of human purpose. Moreover, award of EAJA fees for corrective efforts that yield no real-world benefit would reduce the normal deterrent to litigative nit-picking.
Repeat litigants might appear to be a special case, for even if improved procedures (for example) do not produce victory in the case at hand, they might enhance the probability of future victories. Conceivably Farrell and Waterman are in such a spot, although, for all we know, the likelihood may be as great that the district court’s precedent will inconvenience them as often as it will advantage them. In any event, identifying such longterm winners appears to be so speculative a task as to
Appellees suggest that they achieved more than a remand to the agency because they succeeded in shifting the burden of proof onto U.S. Lines to reapply for authorization to conduct unsubsidized service. While this doubtless increased the odds of their ultimately securing a real-world benefit (more curbs on U.S. Lines’s competition), it provides no material difference between them and the remand-winning plaintiffs in Sullivan or the other Social Security cases, or in National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides. The plaintiffs in those cases surely improved their chances — removing an error that at least arguably had caused their initial defeat before the agency. Yet they did not qualify as prevailing parties.
It is true that burden shifts, like other interim triumphs that are ultimately unproductive, literally satisfy an alternative formulation of the test, a requirement that a party secure a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”
Texas State Teachers,
Of course the terms of a remand may be such that a substantive victory will obviously follow. Thus in
Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin.,
Farrell suggests that where the plaintiff’s main purpose is to secure a remand to correct, say, a want of reasoned decision-making, a remand must represent “some of the benefit ... sought” within the meaning of Hensley and Texas State Teachers; in some cases it may be all the benefit sought. To the extent Farrell argues that the concept of benefit should be proportional to what is sought, we disagree. That a party can only ask a court to compel agency reconsideration, or that it chooses to do so, should make no difference. It would seem absurd to grant fees to such a party, while denying them to a party that differs only in that it asked for a more complete victory (one that “necessarily dictate[s] the receipt of benefits,” in Sullivan’s terms) and lost on that. Under our view both are equally ineligible for fees, as neither has garnered a benefit in the real world, outside the judicial/administrative process. Proportionality would come in only after an adequate victory is found and the court considers what share of the fees is reimbursable.
Finally, this court’s decision in
Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Reg
Ill
On remand, the Board complied with the applicable procedures, and approved U.S. Lines’s request for authority to conduct unsubsidized operations — a request which Waterman and Farrell tell us is more narrowly framed than the original grant, and represents a victory for them under EAJA. See
United States Lines, Inc.,
23 Shipping Reg. (P & F) 794, No. S-774 (January 31, 1986). The district court made no such finding, relying exclusively on the remand itself. If indeed the narrowing is due to plaintiffs’ litigation (either because it led the Board to cut down U.S. Lines’s request, or because the remand induced U.S. Lines to trim its sails), this could represent the sort of benefit the appellees sought in bringing suit, the kind of “distinct external effect” on the real world that can render appellees partially prevailing parties.
Grano v. Barry,
As the district court did not pass on the matter, the parties have not briefed the issue in any detail, and the 1982 amended contract was not made part of the record before us, we must remand to permit plaintiffs to show that there was such a victory, and that their litigative success caused it. See
Miller v. Staats,
As appellees may not be found to have prevailed at all on remand, it would be premature for us to decide now whether the district court erred in departing from the $75 per hour cap, which is permissible only if the court finds it justified by a “special factor.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). We note that the two instances cited by
Pierce v. Underwood,
The judgment is
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. Although
Texas State Teachers
dealt with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and not EAJA, the Court explained that it had granted certiorari in part because of "the importance of the definition of the term ‘prevailing party' to the application of § 1988
and other federal fee shifting statutes."
See
. Helms in fact secured two favorable due process holdings, but on one the defendants obtained certiorari and reversal by the Supreme Court.
Id.
