In connection with events occurring on or around October 26, 2007, Petitioner Ricky Shamar Washington was charged with first degree rape and related offenses. He elected a trial by jury to be held in the
Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted. Washington v. State,
Under the circumstances of this case, was it an abuse of discretion and therefore error to refuse to ask whether any prospective juror would be more likely to believe a witness solely by virtue of the witness having served in the military or being employed by the military?
We shall hold that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to present Petitioner’s proposed question during voir dire of the jury panel. This Court has held that only certain questions are mandatory during voir dire of a jury panel, if they are directly related to the facts and circumstances of the case. Based on the circumstances of this case, Petitioner’s proposed question was not mandatory, and, thus, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to pose the question to the jury panel. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request to ask the question, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During voir dire of the jury panel, Petitioner requested that the trial judge ask the following question: “Would any of you be more or less likely to believe a witness solely by virtue of the witness having served in the military or being employed by the military?” The trial court denied Petitioner’s request to pose this question, and the court again denied Petitioner’s request when it was later renewed at the conclusion of voir dire.
I don’t see where the alleged victim’s employment, even in this community, would play a large role in her credibility in this matter. Otherwise, with respect to the nature of the distinction between police officers and employment of any other nature, we would be asking that question of any other major employment or employer in an area. Given that itjust doesn’t impinge upon the issues before the Court or a jury today, the finder of fact, it’s not really relevant, so the Court’s going to decline to ask that question.
At trial, Ms. Smith, the complaining witness, testified that she met Petitioner, a man she knew as Jamal, in the parking lot of her apartment complex “around Thanksgiving time” in 2006. Ms. Smith stated that after she and Petitioner went on one date, she told him she was not interested in seeing him again. She claimed, however, that she later agreed to go on another date with Petitioner on October 26, 2007. According to Ms. Smith, Petitioner was late arriving to pick her up for their date, so she decided to cancel it. Ms. Smith testified that Petitioner called her later that evening, and she agreed to let him come to her apartment to talk. She indicated that when Petitioner arrived at her apartment, he pushed the door open to force his way inside, and he pointed a black handgun in her face. Ms. Smith testified that Petitioner then forced her to undress, and he raped her. Ms. Smith identified Petitioner at trial and in a pre-trial photo array as the person who raped her.
During cross-examination, Ms. Smith testified, “I was in the military, and I finished my service, and I ETS’d .... I completed my service time. I did my four years and just got out. I didn’t reenlist. I wasn’t discharged like they kicked me out or medically discharged, but I finished.” Ms. Smith indicated that in 2003 she had completed her military service. In response to questions regarding her current employment, Ms. Smith stated that she was employed at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) as a “Human Resources Staffing Specialist.” She maintained that she was working at APG as a civilian. Ms. Smith was questioned on cross-examination regarding the gun she claimed Petitioner brought to her apartment and pointed at her:
Mr. Greenberg: Okay. What kind of gun was that?
Ms. Smith: It was black. It was a handgun. It was not a revolver.
Mr. Greenberg: Was it semiautomatic?
Ms. Smith: I don’t know.
Mr. Greenberg: Are you familiar with guns?
Ms. Smith: I am familiar with the A-l, A-2 rifle, but I’m not familiar with handguns.
Mr. Greenberg: So you have never seen a handgun?
Ms. Smith: Television.
Mr. Greenberg: From television. And from television, what did it appear to be?
Ms. Smith: I have no idea.
Mr. Greenberg: Okay. And you are saying nobody on APG carries around guns? Nobody is armed except with rifles?
Ms. Smith: Not at the Central Résumé Processing Center or at the Human Resources Office I work at.
Mr. Greenberg: You never saw anybody carrying any other kind of weapons in person when you were in California in the Army?
Ms. Smith: Not handguns.
Mr. Greenberg: All they had was rifles?
Ms. Smith: Right.
Mr. Greenberg: Even the MPs?
Ms. Smith: I didn’t have to deal with MPs.
Ms. Smith testified that following the attack, after Petitioner had left her apartment, she called Carolyn Watkins. Ms. Watkins later testified and recounted the details of the call she had received from Ms. Smith on October 26, 2007. Ms. Watkins stated that she had known Ms. Smith
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of first degree rape, third degree burglary, first degree assault, first degree sexual offense, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for the court to pose a question during voir dire of the jury panel regarding bias in favor of, or against, a person serving in or employed by the military. The intermediate appellate court reviewed the trial court’s actions under an abuse of discretion standard. The intermediate appellate court quoted from this Court’s opinion in Dingle v. State,
DISCUSSION
In Stewart v. State,
Voir dire is critical to assure that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees to a fair and impartial jury will be honored. State v. Logan,394 Md. 378 , 395,906 A.2d 374 , 384 (2006); Curtin v. State,393 Md. 593 , 600,903 A.2d 922 , 926 (2006); White v. State,374 Md. 232 , 240,821 A.2d 459 , 463 (2003); Dingle v. State,361 Md. 1 , 9,759 A.2d 819 , 823 (2000). “Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States,451 U.S. 182 , 188,101 S.Ct. 1629 , 1634,68 L.Ed.2d 22 [28] (1981) [ (citation omitted) ].
In Maryland, the sole purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of cause for disqualification, and not as in many other states, to include the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Logan,394 Md. at 396 ,906 A.2d at 384 ; State v. Thomas,369 Md. 202 , 207,798 A.2d 566 , 569 (2002); Evans v. State,333 Md. 660 , [668]637 A.2d 117 , 125 (1994). As we noted in Dingle v. State,361 Md. 1 ,759 A.2d 819 :
Maryland has adopted, and continues to adhere to, limited voir dire. It is also well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in theconduct of voir dire, most especially with regard to the scope and the form of the questions propounded, and that it need not make any particular inquiry of the prospective jurors unless that inquiry is directed toward revealing cause for disqualification.
Id. at 13-14,
We have identified two broad areas of inquiry that may reveal cause for a juror’s disqualification: (1) examination to determine whether the prospective juror meets the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, and (2) examination to discover the juror’s state of mind as to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to have undue influence over him. Davis v. State,
We review the trial judge’s rulings on the record of the voir dire process as a whole for an abuse of discretion, that is, questioning that is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias, partiality, or prejudice. White,
The manner of conducting voir dire and the scope of inquiry in determining the eligibility of jurors is left to the sound discretion of the judge. Curtin,
In Curtin,
These areas are: race, ethnicity, or cultural heritage, Hernandez v. State,357 Md. 204 , 232,742 A.2d 952 , 967 (1999) (“Where a voir dire question has been properly requested and directed to bias against the accused’s race, ethnicity, or cultural heritage, the trial court ordinarily will be required to propound such a question.”)[;] religious bias, [Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt.,217 Md. 595 , 607,143 A.2d 627 , 632 (1958) ] (“[I]f the religious affiliation of a juror might reasonably prevent him from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict in a particular case because of the nature of the case, the parties are entitled to ... have the court discover [¶]... ] them.”); in capital cases, the ability of a juror to convict based upon circumstantial evidence, [Corens v. State,185 Md. 561 , 564,45 A.2d 340 , 344 (1946) ] (“We ... hold that the State has the right to challenge a juror in a capital case on the ground that he would not be willing to convict on circumstantial evidenee.”)[;] and placement of undue weight on police officer credibility, Langley v. State,281 Md. 337 , 349,378 A.2d 1338 , 1344 (1977) (“[W]e hold that in a case such as this, where a principal part of the State’s evidence is testimony of a police officer diametrically opposed to that of a defendant, it is prejudicial error to fail to propound a question such as ... whether any juror would tend to give more or less credence ... [to a police officer].”); violations of narcotics law, [State v. Thomas,369 Md. 202 , 214,798 A.2d 566 , 573 (2002) ] (holding that [the] trial judge abused his discretion in failing to ask [the] question whether any jurors harbored strong feelings towards the violation of narcotics laws where [the] defendant was charged with the possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance); strong emotional feelings with regards to alleged sexual assault against a minor, [Sweet v. State,371 Md. 1 , 9-10,806 A.2d 265 , 271 (2002) ] (holding that [the] trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask whether the charges of second degree assault and third degree sexual offense against a minor stirred up such strong emotional feelings that it would affect the veniremen’s impartiality);cf. Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206 , 222,884 A.2d 142 , 151 (2005) (holding that [the] trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to ask [a] proposed voir dire question regarding bias against plaintiffs in personal injury and medical malpractice cases because an affirmative answer to the proposed question would not constitute grounds for disqualification for cause).
In Moore v. State,
In Langley v. State,
Bowie v. State,
In Moore, we addressed a trial judge’s refusal to ask certain questions during voir dire,
On review in Moore, we analyzed several cases addressing proposed voir dire questions. As our case law indicates, while voir dire is left largely to the discretion of the trial court, the court “must adapt the questions to the particular circumstance or facts of the case, the ultimate goal, of course, being to obtain jurors who will be ‘impartial and unbiased.’ ” Moore,
Of particular importance to the instant case, in Moore, we explained the proper application of the witness occupation voir dire question. We stated that, as with all voir dire, the question must relate to uncovering a bias that could arise, given the particular facts of the case. Moore,
Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to present Petitioner’s proposed voir dire question regarding potential bias in favor of, or against, a person who has served in or been employed by the military. Maintaining that potential jurors would likely use Ms. Smith’s occupation as an important factor in judging her credibility as a witness, Petitioner notes that “the complaining witness was recently in the U.S. Army for four years, until 2003, and then began working as a civilian for the U.S. Army, in the adjacent community.” In addition, Petitioner claims that Ms. Watkins, also an employee at Aberdeen Proving Ground, was a central witness for the State, as “she claimed to have received from the complainant the first report of ‘rape.’ ” Petitioner stresses that the military in general, and Aberdeen Proving Ground specifically, is not a typical major employer and that “[t]he overall influence of the military in Harford County far exceeds that of a routine place of employment.” Because the military is an institution that has historically evoked strong feelings, according to Petitioner, its strong presence in the area where the trial was held supports “the notion that prospective jurors could be biased in favor of a rape complainant or other witness who is an Army veteran or an Army employee,” especially in a time of war. Petitioner also claims that circumstances surrounding the case, such as the “scandal at the APG
Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask Petitioner’s proposed voir dire question to the jury panel, as “[n]either Ms. Smith, nor any other witness, testified in an official capacity as a former (or active) member of the U.S. military, or as a civilian employed by the military, and Ms. Smith’s employment was not otherwise relevant to the issues before the jury.” The State relies on this Court’s holding in Curtin v. State,
We agree with the State’s position, and we hold that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to pose Petitioner’s witness occupation voir dire question. Ms. Smith and Ms. Watkins were not testifying at the trial against Petitioner in an official military capacity and their civilian occupations were not otherwise relevant to the crimes for which Petitioner was charged. Thus, in accordance with our prior case law, the witness occupation question was not mandatory on voir dire of the jury panel.
While this Court has typically addressed the witness occupation question in the context of police officers, in Moore we expressed that “the issue suggested by the police witness question is broader than those witnesses and, therefore, has a relevance beyond cases involving police officers.” Moore,
In Moore, we explained and clarified the principles set out in Langley and Bowie. Notably, we observed, “In Bo'wie, we recognized, as Langley had done, albeit more generally, that favoring a witness on the basis of that witness’s category or affiliation poses the same threat to the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial as favoring a witness on the basis of occupation or status; in other words, we were clear, there is not just one way that prejudgment could manifest.” Moore,
During Petitioner’s trial, Ms. Smith testified as the alleged victim of a rape perpetrated by Petitioner, and Ms. Watkins testified as a corroborating witness who had received a phone call from Ms. Smith near the time of the incident. Neither Ms. Smith nor Ms. Watkins testified in an official capacity.
We expressed in Dingle v. State that “the trial court has broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire, most especially with regard to the scope and the form of the questions propounded, and ... it need not make any particular inquiry of the prospective jurors unless that inquiry is directed toward revealing cause for disqualification.” Dingle,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Notes
. Petitioner presented two questions to this Court in his petition for writ of certiorari. We declined to address the first issue:
Should the trial court have excluded DNA evidence tending to show that sexual acts on that date with another male may have caused the complainant's trauma?
. The trial court did present the following voir dire question to the jury panel: "Is there any member of the panel who would be more likely or less likely to believe the testimony of a police officer than a civilian witness solely because the witness is a police officer?”
. The trial judge did present the following question to the jury panel upon Moore’s request: "Would any prospective juror be more or less likely to believe a police officer than a civilian witness, solely because he or she is a police officer?” Moore,
. The State claims in its Brief that it "did not elicit evidence of Ms. Smith’s military service or current employment. Rather, it was [Petitioner] who elicited that evidence on cross-examination, which he then used to attack Ms. Smith’s credibility.” We stress that the focus of the witness occupation voir dire question is on whether any witness, called by the State or the defense, is expected to testify in an official capacity, such that a potential juror may give more or less credence to the testimony simply because of the witness’s official status. It is not material to our analysis whether details of a witness’s official position are brought out on direct examination or on cross-examination. Thus, we disagree with the State's emphasis on the fact that information regarding Ms. Smith’s military background was only made known to the jury through Petitioner’s cross-examination during trial. As we stated, this fact does not control the issue of whether the witness occupation voir dire question is appropriate.