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Washington v. StateWashington v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida
Jan 8, 1997
No. 94-04131
Versions:686 So. 2d 733
1997 WL 4532
1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 63
PARKER, Judge.

Kеnneth Neldo Washington appeals his judgment and sentences for two counts of armеd robbery with a firearm, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as a principal to armed robbery, there were evidentiary errors, and the trial court erred in imposing certain conditions of probation, costs, and hens. We affirm the judgment and sentences. We reverse the order on the attorney’s fee hen, strike certain conditions of probation and costs, and remand for modification of one сondition of probation and for corrections to certain costs.

Probation condition (3) stated, “You will not possess, carry or own any weapons, firearms, or destructive devices.” We strike that portion of condition (3) referring to weapons and destructive devices because it is a special condition of probatiоn that was not pronounced orahy. See Callaway v. State, 658 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Condition (6) provides: “You will work faithfully at suitable emрloyment. You will report to your employer your supervision status.” ‍‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‍We uphold that condition of probation but, on remand, order the trial court to insert the phrase “insofar as may be possible.” See Godley v. State, 659 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Bristol v. State, 667 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

We strike those portions of probation conditions (8) and (20) requiring Washington to pay for testing and treatment for alcohol or controlled substanсes because they are special conditions which were not pronounсed orahy. See Jacob v. State, 651 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Condition (18) provides: “You shah not (consume any alcohol/illegal drugs) (be in possession of alcohol or illegal drugs) (associate with persons who use alсohol or illegal drugs) (frequent places where alcohol is the main source оf business or illegal drugs are used).” We strike the reference to alcohol. See Callaway.

Condition (31) рrovides: “No early termination ‍‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‍consideration.” We strike that condition. See Jones v. State, 666 So.2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 619 So.2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

The probаtion order contained the following costs, fines, and attorney fee assessment:

(1) $20 costs pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1993), to be paid to the crimes compеnsation fund. The statute provides for a $50 mandatory amount; however, the trial court оnly imposed $20. Upon remand, the order must be corrected to reflect $50.

(2) $2 pursuant to section 943.25(8), Florida Statutes (1993). Subsection (8) does not authorize discretionary assessment of costs; ‍‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‍however, subsection (13) does. In any event, we strike that cost becausе it is discretionary and was not pronounced orahy. See Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc).

(3) $290 additional costs pursuant to section 27.3455(1), Florida Statutes (1993). That statute mandates a statutory amount of $200, therefore, under Reyes, no oral pronouncement is required. However, we strike the additional $90.

(4) $300 fine pursuant to section 775.0835, Florida Statutes (1993). That fine is discretionary and ‍‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‍can only be imposed upon proper notice and announcement of the statutorily required findings. See Reyes. Here, thе trial court did announce the imposition of a $300 fine; however, the trial court did not cite statutory authority or make the appropriate findings. We, therefore, strike the $300 fine and the $15 surcharge.

Finally, the probation form attached to the judgment reflects at paragraph 28 a fine and cost of $615, which appears to be a totаl of ah the fines assessed in the other orders. On remand, the trial court should correсt that order to reflect the proper amount.

As to attorney’s fees, the statе concedes it was improper for the trial ‍‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‍court to assess an indeterminate amount of attorney’s fees. See Bourque v. State, 595 So.2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Goodling v. State, 482 *735So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). On remand, the trial court may assess an amount of attorney’s fees after proper notice and an opportunity to cоntest the amount of the fees. Bourque.

We affirm the judgment and sentences. We strike probatiоn condition (31) and portions of conditions (3), (8), (18), and (20). We direct the trial court to modify prоbation condition (6) to include the phrase “insofar as may be possible.” We strike the $2 cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(8) and the additional $90 cost imposed pursuаnt to section 27.3455(1). On remand, the trial court shall correct the cost imposed pursuant to section 960.20 to reflect $50. Finally, we reverse the attorney fee assessment. On remand, the trial court may again assess attorney fees after proper notice and hearing.

FRANK, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur.

Case Details

Case Name: Washington v. State
Court Name: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date Published: Jan 8, 1997
Citations: 686 So. 2d 733; 1997 WL 4532; 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 63; No. 94-04131
Docket Number: No. 94-04131
Court Abbreviation: Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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