Washington v. StateWashington v. State
This is an appeal from the Superior Court‘s dismissal of the plaintiff‘s appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court transferring the fourteen-year-old plaintiff to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court рursuant to the provisions of
The hearing in the Juvenile Court tended to establish the following underlying facts: On December 7, 1974, at approximately 11 p.m., Gary Stein was shot by a shotgun while оn a public sidewalk in New Haven. He subsequently died as a result of the wounds received. A spent cartridge shell recovered at the scene was shown to have been fired from a shotgun which was in the possession of the plаintiff earlier in the evening of December 7. The shotgun was subsequently found to have been in the possession of Ernest Washington, the plaintiff‘s brother, at some time following the shooting.
Over the plaintiff‘s objection, Chief Inspector Vincеnt DeRosa of the New Haven police department testified to statements made to him by the plaintiff on December 10, 1974. DeRosa‘s testimony,
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Juvenile Court granted the motion to transfer Eriс Washington to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that he had “committed the crime of murder.”
The plaintiff claims that the Juvenile Court was without power to transfer him to the Supеrior Court. He argues that the only authority for such a transfer appears in
The plaintiff‘s reasoning is strained. The word “commit” means to do or to perpetrate. Webster,
The plaintiff next claims that the Superior Court erred in upholding the Juvenile Court‘s admission of Chief Inspector DeRosa‘s testimony concerning the incriminating statements made to him by the plaintiff on December 10, 1974. The plaintiff contends that evidence of those statements should not have been admitted because they were made whilе he was unlawfully detained in violation of
At about 1 р.m. on December 9, Donald Russel, a social worker for the state department of children and youth services, and the person assigned by that department to handle the plaintiff‘s case since 1973, was advised by the poliсe that the plaintiff had been detained. On Tuesday, December 10, Russel went with the police to the juvenile detention facility and accompanied the plaintiff to the investigative unit of the New Haven police department.
We find no merit in the plaintiff‘s assertion that DeRosa‘s testimony should have been suppressed because the plaintiff‘s detention was in violation of
The record reveals that the plaintiff was not informed of his rights when admitted to the detention center, but noncompliancе with technical requirements of Practice Book § 1108 (3) is only one element to be considered in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the accused‘s rights were waived voluntarily and the statements made were the product of free will. Cf. United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.); State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94, 273 A.2d 867, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946, 91 S. Ct. 1637, 29 L. Ed. 2d 115; State v. Raiford, 7 Ore. App. 202, 488 P.2d 295. The plaintiff was adequately informed of his rights prior to his admission to the juvenile detention center and prior to his making the statements sought to be excluded. No incriminating statements were made while he was in the detention center. Considering the fact that the plaintiff had been advised of his rights at least three times prior to making the statements of December 10, 1974, that he was with his social worker when the statements were madе, that he waived his rights in writing twice, and that he understood his rights and indicated to Chief Inspector DeRosa that he “didn‘t have to talk if he didn‘t want to,” the Superior Court‘s conclusions that, upon the totality of the
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.