Mildred Washington sued Jefferson County and former Sheriff Zollie Compton on behalf of her son, David Washington, and appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, Washington, the evidence was as follows.
Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins,
The gravamen of Washington’s complaint is that Carr should not have been released from jail because he was too dangerous. Specifically, Washington alleged that Jefferson County and Sheriff Compton negligently allowed bail for Carr, breached a duty to protect the public from Carr, and failed to properly train personnel. Washington also asserted various federal constitutional and statutory violations; however, the trial court deemed all the federal claims abandoned except for the 42 USC § 1983 claim. Held:
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment because Washington failed to set forth all the elements of a prima facie case for either his state tort claims or his federal statutory claims.
As to the state tort claims, Washington’s case is legally insufficient for two reasons either of which would have warranted, under the facts herein, a judgment on the pleadings: 1) a lack of control over the bail process, and 2) a lack of a special relationship with Washing *82 ton. See OCGA § 9-11-12 (c).
A superior court judge, not a sheriff or county, controls the bail procedure for aggravated assault, the offense for which Carr obtained bond. OCGA § 17-6-1 (a) (11). Neither Compton, as Sheriff of Jefferson County, nor Jefferson County had any responsibility for determining, setting, or allowing bail for Carr. See
Howard v. State,
Nor is there any merit to Washington’s negligent surety issue. OCGA § 17-6-15 (b) provides statutory authority for a sheriff to make the determination of the acceptability of a surety. Compton’s approval of the surety on Carr’s bond involved the use of judgment and was thus a discretionary function protected by sovereign immunity.
Gilbert v. Richardson,
To survive summary judgment on his negligence claim, Washington had to show that the County and Compton had a special relationship with him, apart from that owed to the general public and that this special relationship created a special duty owed to him which the County and Compton then breached causing his injury.
City of Rome v. Jordan,
In his responsive pleadings, Washington negated an element of his own prima facie case by admitting, “[N]or is any special relationship between the Defendants and David Washington alleged.” Washington also conceded that Carr posed a risk of harm to all members of the public and that “Carr’s victim could have been anyone. . . .” Washington admitted he did not ask for assistance from the sheriff’s department after the first fight. Compton testified he did not know Carr posed a threat to Washington. Because the record lacks any evidence of special assurances, knowledge of danger, and justifiable and detrimental reliance, summary judgment was properly granted.
As to Washington’s federal statutory claim, it also fails because Washington failed to show a nexus between his injury and any state action. Section 1983 imposes liability where persons acting under
*83
color of state law have deprived a person of a federal constitutional or statutory right.
Hendon v. DeKalb County,
After Compton presented testimony that neither he nor any member of his department made any assurances to Washington that he would be protected, the burden shifted to Washington to come forward with some contrary evidence. Washington could no longer rest upon the mere allegations of his pleading but was required to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). This he did not do. Because Washington failed to offer any specific facts which would give rise to a triable issue, we find that summary judgment was properly granted as to the 42 USC § 1983 claim.
Judgment affirmed.