MELVIN J. WASHINGTON, APPELLEE, V. AMERICAN COMMUNITY STORES CORPORATION, A TEXAS CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS AS HINKY DINKY STORES, APPELLANT
No. 40043
Supreme Court of Nebraska
July 28, 1976
244 N.W.2d 286 | 196 Neb. 624
BOSLAUGH, J., dissenting in part.
I concur fully in the holding of the majority opinion that the 1975 Technical Community College Area Act is constitutional. I also concur in the holding that if the predominant purpose of a legislative act is local the activity may be financed by a property tax. The fact that a previous act in the same area was invalid is totally irrelevant so far as consideration of the 1975 act is concerned.
I do not agree that the Duis amendment is a complete restriction upon legislative discretion to convert traditional state functions into local functions. In my view the Legislature still has the power to allocate the various functions and activities of government between the state and local subdivisions as it may see fit. Functions and activities that are in fact local may be financed from sources of revenue that are available to local subdivisions.
SPENCER, J., joins in the concurrence and dissent.
Schmid, Ford, Mooney, Frederick & Caporale, for appellant.
Warren C. Schrempp, Thomas G. McQuade, and Richard E. Shugrue of Schrempp, Dinsmore & McQuade, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C. J., BOSLAUGH, CLINTON, and BRODKEY, JJ., and MORAN, District Judge.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment in the sum of $76,000 arising out of a motor vehicle collision. The trial court directed a verdict against the defendant on the issue of liability but this is not assigned as error. The defendant, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, that the verdict was excessive, and error in instructions, appeals. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
The accident took place April 11, 1972. The plaintiff was then 24 years old and had been actually employed by the state as an adult parole officer since he was graduated from college in December 1971. At the outset we point out that there is no dispute concerning the permanency of the plaintiff‘s injury nor the fact that the injury disabled the plaintiff from pursuing the wrestling sport. Two days after the accident the plaintiff
Summarizing the assignments of error in this case, the basic thrust of the defendant‘s contention in this appeal is that the court should not have submitted the plaintiff‘s loss of earning capacity to the jury. It is argued that the evidence is based upon speculation and conjecture, that evidence of contingent, uncertain future possibilities, and uncertain future happenings, is speculative and conjectural and therefore incompetent, and the verdict is excessive. It is further contended that there was prejudicial error in the giving of instructions Nos. 10, 14, and 15, for the reasons that incompetent evidence was received and more importantly, that there was no proof of past earnings as a wrestler, or from plaintiff‘s wrestling ability, and therefore the submission of such issue was in error.
From what we have said it is clear that there is no issue of liability in the case — no issue as to the con-sequential and permanent personal injuries to the back
The defendant nevertheless argues that the evidence is insufficient and that the instructions submitting the issue are in error because there was no evidence of his earnings from the wrestling sport or profession at the time of the injury or at the time of trial. This argument has been rejected by this court ever since Bliss v. Beck, 80 Neb. 290, 114 N. W. 162, in which this court held that a married woman could recover for her diminished earning capacity, and that it was not necessary that she had actually engaged in business on her own account, or intended to do so before her injury. We have recently rejected the defendant‘s contention in this respect in Wortman v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 195 Neb. 637, 240 N. W. 2d 15. It is settled law in Nebraska that loss of earning capacity, as distinct from loss of wages, salary, or earnings, is a separate element of damage. It is equally well settled that a loss of past earnings is an item of special damage and must be specifically pleaded and proved. Impairment of earning capacity is an item of general damage and proof may be had under general allegations of injury and damage. Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N. W. 2d 393; Siciunas v. Checker Cab Co., Inc., 191 Neb. 766, 217 N. W. 2d 824. Proof of an actual loss of earnings or wages is not essential to recovery for loss of earning capacity. Baylor v. Tyrrell, supra; Wortman v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra. Recovery for loss or diminution of the power to earn in the future is based upon such factors as the plaintiff‘s age, life expectancy, health, habits, occupation, talents, skill, experience, training, and industry.
The defendant complains that the proof of prospective earnings of a coach or a professional wrestler fell short of adequacy and was insufficient to support the verdict. As we have pointed out such specific evidence is unnecessary for the plaintiff to recover under a general allegation of damage. But, more importantly, in this case the plaintiff offered evidence of the earning capacity of coaches and wrestlers. He specifically offered to prove that the average starting salary of a collegiate wrestling coach was approximately $20,000 per year, and that a good professional wrestler would average $500 to $1,000 per week. The defendant objected to this testimony and it was excluded by the court. The defendant is now in no position to complain of the insufficiency of the evidence. A party who objects to the evidence and causes it to be excluded, cannot obtain a reversal of the judgment as unsupported for want of the evidence so
The defendant specifically attacks instruction No. 14 and urges that it is erroneous because it assumes the truth of controverted facts. The instruction is as follows: “You are instructed that where a person, a competitor in a sporting or athletic event, because of his superior ability in that field, has an opportunity of being awarded, with reasonable certainty or probability, a substantial benefit to him which may be of value to him in the future, and that he is deprived of this opportunity by another, through the other‘s negligence, then the person so deprived thereof, may recover such damages which the evidence shows with reasonable certainty that he has suffered therefrom.” It is clear from an examination of this instruction that it is stated in the abstract. Perhaps it would have been better to use the word “if” rather than the word “where.” But the meaning is clear and requires the jury to find that the plaintiff is a “person” who has the abilities and requirements as set out in the instruction. Moreover, the evidence is conclusive that the plaintiff had at least superior ability in the wrestling sport, as his record, previously recited, demonstrates. The fact that the expert witnesses differed as to the description of the plaintiff as being number one does not alter the undisputed testimony that he was a person of at least superior ability. There is no merit to this contention.
Interwoven in the defendant‘s argument in its brief there are other contentions directly relating to the main thrust of its assignments of error, which we have dealt with. We have examined them and find they are without merit.
The judgment of the District Court is correct and is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MORAN, District Judge.
I respectfully dissent. There was no evidence of plain-
In Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F. 2d 664, at page 669, Judge Friendly articulated much better than I can what loss of earning capacity is and what the trier of fact must do to compute damages resulting from its loss or diminution. See, also, Restatement, Torts 2d, T. D. No. 19, § 924, comment d.
Our adversary system requires an injured party to prove his damages. The plaintiff failed to prove an essential element of loss of earning capacity, and it should not have been submitted to the jury as part of his claim for damages.
