Washington Trout, the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1439, and the Central Basin Audubon Society brought a Clean Water Act citizen suit against McCain Foods alleging violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and R.C.W. § 90.48.010 et sеq., based on the discharge of pollutants from a potato processing plant owned by the defendant. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after determining thаt the plaintiffs had not complied with the notice provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 40 C.F.R. § ^¿(a). 1 Specifically, the district court found that the plaintiffs had not properly provided the dates of the alleged viоlations or the addresses and phone numbers of any of the plaintiffs as required by the statute and regulation. Plaintiffs appeal.
On February 25, 1992, plaintiffs’ attorney, Bill Kloos, sent McCain Foods [McCain] a sixty-day notice under the Clean Water Act [CWA] alleging that McCain’s potato processing plant in Othello, Washington was discharging pollutants into the Owl Creek and/or its tributaries without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [NPDES] permit. The letter stated in part that “the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1439, among perhaps others, intend to file a suit against McCain for violations of the Clean Water Act.” Regarding the potential plaintiffs, the letter did not provide the address and phone number of the named plaintiff, nor did it furnish the identity, address, and phone number of Washington Trout and the Central Basin Audubon Society. Further, the notice failed to specifically identify the dates of the alleged violations. The letter alleged that “[t]his pollution is substantial, longstanding, continuing, and unрermitted by an NPDES permit.” 2
After receiving the notice, representatives for McCain communicated with Kloos during the sixty-day notice period regarding the alleged violations. In the course of these discussions, neither Washington Trout nor Audubon was mentioned as a potential plaintiff.
On June 15, 1992, the Union, Washington Trout, and Audubon filed a citizen suit under the Act. The Union was dismissed from the suit four months later when it went into trusteeship. The defendant then moved for summary judgment alleging the notice was defective because it did not (1) identify Washington Trout or Audubon as potential
*1353
plaintiffs; (2) contain the address and telеphone number for the Union; or (3) specify the dates of any alleged violations. The district court held that under
Hallstrom v. Tillamook
County,
We review
de novo
a district court’s decision to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Smith v. United States,
The Clean Wаter Act allows a citizen to bring a private suit against alleged violators, but requires specific notice to be given to the suspected polluter. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b). The statute’s notice section provides:
No action may be commenced—
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section—
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (hi) to any alleged viоlator of the standard, limitation, or order, ...
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Under the regulations, the notice must include sufficient information to allow the recipient “to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order allеged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the persons or person responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the аlleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.” 40 C.F.R. 135.3(a) (1994).
The Supreme Court addressed the sixty-day notice requirement in
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
In
Hallstrom,
the petitioners owned a dairy fаrm located next to the Tillamook County landfill.
Id.
In believing that the landfill violated RCRA standards, the petitioners sent the respondent a notice stating their intent to sue.
Id.
When the petitioners commenced an action, the respondent moved for summary judgment on the grounds that petitioners failed to notify Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] оf their intent to sue.
Id.
at 23-24,
The district court denied the respondent’s motion and held that the notice defect was cured by the petitioner’s formal notification to the State and EPA on March 2, 1983, one day after the motion for summary judgment.
Id.
at 24,
In order to resolve the conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiora-ri. The Court found, under the plain language of the statute, the choice was clear. The Court held that “[u]nder a literal reading of the statute, compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit.”
Hallstrom,
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hallstrom is applicable in this suit involving the CWA. The plaintiffs are bringing an action as citizens under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and therefore must satisfy the notice requirements under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). The letter dated February 25, 1992 sent by Mr. Kloos does not provide the necessary information as required under the regulations. The notice fails to name two of the organizations that eventually became the only plaintiffs, namely Audubon and Washington Trout.
Plaintiffs argue that
Hallstrom
is distinguishable because in
Hallstrom
the petitioners provided no “presuit notice.” Therefore, they contend, the Supreme Court held that there could be no suit without any presuit notice. The plaintiffs’ understanding of the
Hallstrom
decision is misplaced. In
Hallstrom,
the petitioners did send a notice to the respondent that they argued qualified as notice under the statute.
See Hallstrom,
Plaintiffs also argue that technical deficiencies in the notice do not defeat jurisdiction because the purposes of giving presuit notice are served. As noted by other courts, the purpose of giving a sixty-day notice is to allow the parties time to resolve their conflicts in a nonadversarial time period. Once the suit is filed, positions harden and compromise is less likely. Secоnd, the notice alerts the appropriate state or federal agency, so administrative action may initially provide the relief the parties seek before a court must become involved. Here, the notice Mr. Kloos served, fails to satisfy either purpose. The notice provided to McCain and the copy sent to the EPA Administrator did not provide the namеs of the two additional plaintiffs. Therefore, because neither the EPA nor McCain knew other plaintiffs were involved, they were not in a position to negotiate with the plaintiffs or seek an administrative remedy. This made any sort of resolution between the parties during the notice period an impossibility.
We are guided by the Court’s decision in Hallstrom and find its holding applicable to the notice requirements under the Clean Water Act. The notice provided to McCain was insufficient as required by the regulations *1355 promulgated under the CWA. Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdic- ,. tion.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The district court treated McCain's motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
. The plaintiffs argue that by stating in their notice that the "pollution is substantiаl, longstanding, and continuing” they have complied with the regulation’s requirement of specifying the dates of the violation. Because of our resolution of the case on other grounds, we need not reach this issue.
.The sixty-day notice provision in
Hallstrom
was modeled after § 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments, 84 Stat. 1706, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Since 1970, a number of federal statutes have incorporated notice provisions patterned after § 304. The notice provision involved in this case, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), is also modeled after § 304.
See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
.See, e.g., Garcia v. Cecos Int’l, Inc.,