35 Wash. 641 | Wash. | 1904
The respondent, plaintiff below, brought this action against the appellants to compel them to convey to it an undivided one-half interest in certain real property situated in the city of Ellensbnrg. The property Was known as “The Snipes hank building.” The facts out of which the controversy arises are, in substance, these: On Ecvember 4, 1889, the property belonged to the estate of Ben. E. Snipes & Company, an insolvent co-partnership, which was then in the hands of a receiver appointed by the superior court of Kittitas county. The property had theretofore been ordered sold by the superior court, and the receiver had advertised it for sale — the sale to take place on the day above named. In anticipation of the sale, the appellants George E. Dickson and Frank E. McOandless, together with one E. E. Wager and one O. V. Warner, entered into an agreement for the purchase of the property. While -the terms of the agreement are not very clear, it seems that Dickson was to bid the property in at the sale in his own name, and that each of the others was to have a one-fourth interest therein on the payment of
*644 “Ellensburg, Wash., Sept. 25, 1902.
“Received of C. W. Johnsons One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) part payment on one undivided one-half interest in and to the bank building known as “The Snipes bank building,” situated on the corner of Pearl and Fourth streets, in Ellensburg, Wash. The full purchase price of said one undivided half interest being $6,750, the remaining $5,750 to be paid by said C. W. Johnsons to Frank FT. McCandless or order, on delivery to said C. W. Johnsone or order, of a good and sufficient deed of warranty, showing perfect title to said property. Said deed to be' executed and delivered by not later than October 5, 1902. (Signed) Frank FT. McCandless.”
Some months later the appellants McCandless and wife executed a deed to the respondent for an undivided one-half interest in the property, but, pending the proceedings had to procure the delivery of the deed from the receiver to Dickson, the appellant Frank FT. McCandless refused to proceed further with the matter, and announced that he would not deliver the deed he and his wife had executed, or permit a conveyance of his interests in the property to be made to the respondent by the holder of the legal title. Dickson, also, pending the negotiations, refused to recognize the claim of McCandless to a one-half interest in the property, claiming that McCandless had at most nothing more than a one-fourth interest therein.
The respondent thereupon instituted this action. In its complaint it set up, substantially, the foregoing facts, and prayed that it be declared to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property in question, and that the appellants be compelled to convey such interest to it. To the complaint the appellants answered separately; such answers consisting of a denial of the allegations of the complaint, and a separate defense to the effect that the contract was not enforceable because of the statute of
It is first contended that the court erred in finding that the appellants McCandless had an undivided one-half interest in the property in question, but the evidence supporting the finding, it seems to us, does not leave the question in doubt. It is true, Dickson testified that the original agreement for the purchase of the property, entered into by the four persons above named, by which each was to acquire only a quarter interest in the property, was to become effective only in case the property was purchased for $8,000 or less, and that it was to belong to a Mr. Treman, if it cost more than that sum, yet this statement is not home out by any of the other parties to the contract, and one of them testified that he had never before heard of it. Against this are his admissions, shown by unimpeached witnesses, made prior to the commencement of this action and when it was evidently not in contemplation, to the effect that McCandless did have an undivided one-half interest in it. In the lease of the property made to the respondent, as we stated before, both Dickson and Mc-Oandless joined, as if equal owners, and it was then assumed by all of the parties that they owned equal interests. Moreover, it was because of these statements on the part of Dickson and McCandless that the respondents were induced to enter into the contract for the purchase of Mc-Candless’ interest, and good faith would hardly permit them now to successfully deny that he had such an interest.
Lastly, it is said that the interest of Frank 1ST. McCandless acquired in the property by his purchase, was the com
The judgment is affirmed.
Mount, Dunbar, and Anders, JJ., concur.