delivered the opinion of the Court.
On аppeal from a judgment for damages to the infant plaintiff from being struck by an automobile ownеd and driven by one Canolles, it is objected by the defendant and appellant that there is no еvidence legally sufficient to prove that Canolles was acting as its servant while driving, and that a verdict for the defendant should therefore have been directed. The trial court refused a prayer for that direction.
The defendant was a seller of school supplies to retail mеrchants, with its place of business in Washington, District of Columbia. Canolles, living in Baltimore City, was a salesman оf their goods, with the whole of the Baltimore field for sales given to him. At the same time, and up to within a month of the accident, he had, as he said, “another line—sundry goods and paper products,” for a company in Brooklyn, New York. At the time of the accident he had only the one connection; that with the defendant in this suit. The evidence, adduced on behalf of the plaintiff and uncontrаdicted, was that Canolles had samples furnished him by the defendant from Washington, and with these he proсured orders from dealers and transmitted. *491 •them to the defendant for deliveries from Washington directly. The defendant furnished him with names of possible customers, and he solicited new ones. Some were customers of both Canolles’ principals when he had two. He was given no directions by the defendаnt as to any progress in his work, none as to route or time. The time he worked, the number of days a week, or no time at all, would be at his election, and as he pleased. He made no accounting of his work, reporting nothing but orders from customers when he received any. He had no cоnnection with deliveries, and none with the payments for goods sold; and his compensation was strictly commissions on sales.
In going about for possible purchasers he used his own Hudson sedan automоbile. The defendant’s agents in Washington knew he was doing so, and about six months after he started on the сonnection with them they procured from him information as to the title of the automobile, and thе engine and serial numbers. Sometimes he drove the automobile on trips to see the emplоyer’s agents there; but he paid all the expenses of his car, receiving nothing from the defendant on account of them.
The sales made for this principal were few. During the year 1932, his commissiоns amounted to only $346, during 1933, $426.12; and on April 14th, 1934, he received only $2.07 for two weeks’ sales. At that time he resigned thе connection because he had secured work on a salary.
The infant plaintiff was struck by thе car on April 14th, 1934, as Canolles was driving to make a purchase for himself during a day’s work among customers, and he is charged with negligence causing the accident. In the opinion of the court thеre was no responsibility in law on the defendant if Canolles was negligent, because he was not thеn a servant of the defendant, but an independent commission agent, or, in the familiar phraseology of this branch of the law, an independent contractor. There was no hiring of his time and labor. Neither the amount of his work nor the order of it had been placed under the control of thе defendant. These remained sub
*492
ject to Candles’ independent choice. The defendant wаs involved only in the receipt of orders from him and the return of commissions. The decision in the case of
Regal Laundry Co. v. A. S. Abell Co.,
A verdict for the defendant should, in our opinion, have been directed.
Judgment reversed without awarding a. new trial, with costs.