9 Wash. 607 | Wash. | 1894
— The complaints in these cases were drawn with a view to obviate the objections sustained to the complaint in First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Bounty of Chehalis, 6 Wash. 64 (32 Pac. 1051). This endeavor is made by the allegation that certain taxable moneyed capital, alleged in the former case to be “ owned by citizens of said state resident in said county, and there invested in loans and securities to them payable and owing by other citizens of said state residing in said county,” is “owned by individual citizens of said state, resident in said county (or city) and there invested in interest bearing loans, discounts and securities to them payable and owing by other citizens of said state residing in said county (or city), of vast amount.” It is also alleged in these cases that the capital referred to is “ all the moneyed capital in the state owned by resident individual citizens and invested as aforesaid in interest bearing loans, discounts and securities except that owned by and invested in incorporated banks located in this state,”.and that it was purposely omitted from assessment and taxation.
In these cases our attention is particularly called again to the case of Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689 (5 Sup. Ct. 706), and it is claimed that the allegations contained in the complaints before us, as well as in the case of First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Bounty of Bhehalis, supra, are equally as strong as those of the Boyer case in which the federal supreme court held that answer should be made to the allegations of the bill. While, as was remarked in Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138 (7 Sup. Ct. 826), in the Boyer case no attempt was made “to define the meaning of the words £ moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens ’ as used in the statute, or to enumerate all the various kinds of property or investments that
But, whatever may be said of the decision in Boyer v. Boyer, it seems clear to us that the case of Mercantile Bank v. New York, while it does not overrule the decision in the former case, so clearly sets forth the principles upon which alone the question of what is ‘ ‘ moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens” can be decided, that it is at least doubtful whether a like ruling would have been made had the two cases been considered together, at least as to some of the items set forth in the bill. The facts upon which the court ruled in Mercantile Bank v. New York are clearly set forth on page 146 of the report, and it is held that no discrimination existed by reason of the exemption of certain capital from taxation in the state of New York because, according to subsequent definitions laid down in the decision, it does not constitute “moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens” within the meaning of the act.
Now, in the cases before us, it may be that the allega
The only attempts made in the complaints to designate the classes of capital alleged to have been exempted by the assessors is through the allegation that moneyed capital invested in the stocks and bonds of insurance, wharf and gas companies, is not intended to be included in the term “moneyed capital” as used by the pleader. Now, without attempting an analysis, it is clear from the Mercantile Bank case that investments of money can be made in various ways, and even in loans and discounts, without necessarily bringing such investments within the term ‘ ‘ moneyed capital” as used in the act of congress. The conclusion of the whole matter seems to us to lie in the language used by the supreme court of the United States in this wise :
“The terms of the act of congress, therefore, include shares of stock or other interests owned by individuals in all enterprises in which the capital employed in carrying on its business is money, where the object of the business is the making of profit by its use as money. The moneyed capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in securities by way of loan, discount, or otherwise, which are from time to time, according to the rules of the business, reduced again to money and reinvested. It includes money
It is moneyed capital of this class, employed in carrying on operations of the same character as those which are within the powers of national banks, which comes into competition with the business of national banks, and such capital in the hands of individual owners is what is intended to be described by the act of congress, and until it appears that there is some considerable amount of moneyed capital of this kind employed in this way, which is exempted by operation of law, or by the wilful act of the assessors, a case is not made showing a discrimination against national banks.
A further point is made in this case, viz., that the revenue law of 1893 (Laws, p. 323) unconditionally repealed the revenue law of 1891 (Laws, p. 280), and contains no saving clause covering uncollected taxes on personal property, and that, therefore, the treasurers of the county of King and of the city of Seattle, are without power or authority to proceed with the collection of such taxes. It is true that § 137 (Laws 1893, p. 385) of the revenue law of 1893, in sweeping terms, repeals all acts theretofore enacted providing for the assessment and collection of taxes. The unpaid taxes on real property are clearly saved by the terms of § 136 (p. 385), but, if the taxes on personalty are preserved at all, the saving clause is found in § 75 of the act. It cannot be presumed for a moment that it was the intention of the legislature to release unpaid taxes from soi recent an assessment as that of the year 1891, and we think it would be the duty of this court to construe any even doubtful provisions which might be found in the act of 1893 as fairly tending to show an intention on the part
The judgment of the superior court sustaining the demurrers will be affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., and Anders, Scott and Hoyt, JJ., concur.
