7 Wash. 556 | Wash. | 1893
The opinion of. the court was delivered by
The complaint in this case contained the usual allegations of a complaint for the foreclosure of a material man’s lien, showing an agreement to furnish mill work and lumber for respondent Craig’s building — mill work at a gross price of $141.75, and the lumber at various prices per thousand feet, so that the whole claim amounted to $333.85.
The answer admits the furnishing of the lumber as set out in the complaint, and the ownership of the property, and then denies each and every other allegation of the complaint.
This general denial was a sham, for in succeeding portions of the answer the defendants set up a contract with the plaintiff (which estopped them to deny the'existence
In this aspect of the case there was nothing for the plaintiff to prove at the trial, but the agreed prices of the lumber and the filing of its lien; everything else was admitted. A witness testified to the former point, and the lien was offered in evidence, but rejected, the ground of the rejection being, as the record shows, that the lien elaim did not contain the “terms and conditions” of the contract. The statement in the claim is as'follows:
‘ ‘ That claimant furnished the material set forth in the bill of particulars hereto attached and marked “Exhibit A,” and hereby made a part of this claim of lien, to Charles J. Craig, and delivered the same to him . . ■. under and by virtue of an agreement made by said Washington Mill Company with said Charles J. Craig, which said contract was made on or about the said '8th day of November, 1892, . that, as a part of said agreement, said Charles J. Craig promised and agreed to pay the prices set forth and charged in said bill of particulars, so soon as said material should be delivered to said Craig.”
The respondents do not appear here, but stipulate that the case be submitted on the brief of the appellant, showing great confidence in their position, which the court below sustained. It is perhaps unfortunate that the case should not have been briefed on the other side, for we may be committing grave error in making a decision while thus unad
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial
Dunbar, C. J., and Hoyt, Scott and Anders, JJ., concur.