WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. JOHNSON ET AL.
No. 83-747
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 24, 1984—Decided June 26, 1984
467 U.S. 925
William F. Mulroney argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Peter J. Vangsnes and James M. Hanny.*
Section 4(a) of the Longshoremen‘s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426,
I
Petitioner Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is a government agency created in 1966 by the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia with the consent of the United States Congress.1 WMATA is charged with the construction and operation of a rapid transit system (Metro) for the District of Columbia and the surrounding metropolitan region. Under the interstate compact that governs its existence, WMATA is authorized to hire subcontractors to work on various aspects of the Metro construction project.2 Since 1966 WMATA has engaged several hundred subcontractors, who in turn have employed more than a thousand sub-subcontractors.3
Of the multifarious problems WMATA faced in constructing the Metro system, one has been ensuring that workers engaged in the project in the District of Columbia are cov-
During the initial phase of Metro construction, which ran from 1969 to 1971, WMATA relied upon its subcontractors to purchase workers’ compensation insurance for subcontractor employees. However, when the second phase of construction began, WMATA abandоned this policy in favor of a more centralized insurance program. As a financial matter, WMATA discovered that it could reduce the cost of workers’ compensation insurance if it, rather than its numerous subcontractors, arranged for insurance. Practical considerations
For all of these reasons, WMATA elected to assume responsibility for securing workers’ compensation insurance for all Metro construction employees. Effective July 31, 1971, WMATA purchased a comprehensive “wrap-up” policy from the Lumberman‘s Mutual Casualty Co. Under the policy, WMATA paid a single premium and, in return, Lumberman‘s Mutual agreed to make compensation payments for any injuries suffered by workers employed at Metro construction sites and compensable under the relevant workers’ compensation regimes.7 After arranging for this “wrap-up” coverage, WMATA informed potential subcontractors that WMATA would “for the benefit of contractors and others, procure and pay premiums” for workers’ compensation insurance and that the cost of securing such compensation in-
Respondents are employees of subcontractors engaged in the Metro project. Each respondent filed a compensation claim for work-related injuries. Most of these claims alleged respiratory injuries caused by high levels of silica dust and other industrial pollutants at Metro sites. None of respondents’ employers had secured its own workers’ compensation insurance, and respondents’ claims were therefore handled under the Lumberman‘s Mutual policy purchased by WMATA. Lumberman‘s Mutual paid five of the respondents lump-sum compensation awards in complete settlement of their claims. The remaining two respondents received partial awards from Lumberman‘s Mutual.
The instant litigation arose when respondents attempted to supplement their workers’ compensation awards by bringing tort actions against WMATA. These suits, which were filed before five different judges in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, involved the same work-related incidents that had given rise to respondents’ LHWCA claims. In each of the actions, WMATA moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from tort liability for such claims under § 5(a) of the LHWCA,
In a consolidated appeal, the United States Court оf Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 230 U. S. App. D. C. 297, 717 F. 2d 574 (1983). The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 5(a) of the LHWCA grants general contractors immunity from tort actions by subcontractor employees only if the general contractor has secured compensation insurance in satisfaction of a statutory duty. According to the Court of Appeals, WMATA had not acted under such a duty in this case. Had respondents’ employers actually refused to secure the worker‘s compensation insurance, then WMATA as general contractor would have had what the Court of Appeals considered a statutory duty to secure insurance for respondents. However, WMATA never gave respondents’ employers the opportunity to default on their statutory obligations to secure compensatiоn; WMATA pre-empted its subcontractors through its unilateral decision to purchase a “wrap-up” policy covering all subcontractor employees. The Court of Appeals concluded that, by pre-empting its subcontractors, WMATA acted voluntarily, and was therefore not entitled to § 5(a)‘s immunity. We granted WMATA‘s petition for a writ of certiorari, 464 U. S. 1068 (1984), and we now reverse.
II
Workers’ compensation statutes, such as the LHWCA, “provide for compensation, in the stead of liability, for a class of employees.” S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1926). These statutes reflect a legislated compromise between the interests of employees and the concerns of employers. On both sides, there is a quid pro quo. In return for the guarantee of compensation, the employees surrender common-law remedies against their employers for work-related injuries. For the employer, the reward for securing compensation is immunity from employee tort suits. See
In the case of the LHWCA, § 4(a)(b) and § 5(a) codify the compromise at the heart of workers’ compensation. The relevant portions of these provisions read as follows:
“SEC. 4. (a) Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees of the compensation payable under sections 7, 8, 9. In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such payment.
“(b) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.” 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426,
33 U. S. C. §§ 904(a), (b) .“SEC. 5. (a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee . . ., except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act, an injured employee . . . may elect to claim compensation under this Act, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages. . . .” 86 Stat. 1263,
33 U. S. C. § 905(a) .
The current case stems from an ambiguity in the wording of these sections. It is unclear how § 5(a)‘s grant of immunity applies to the contractors mentioned in § 4(a). This interpretative question divides into two distinct inquiries. First, does § 5(a)‘s grant of immunity ever extend to general contractors? And second, if § 5(a) can extend to general contractors, what must a contractor do to qualify for § 5(a)‘s immunity? We will consider these questions in turn.
The language of § 5(a)‘s grant of immunity does not effortlessly embrace contractors. Section 5(a) speaks in terms of “an employer” and, at least as far as the employees of subcontractors are concerned, a general contractor does not act as an employer.
A few courts have accepted a literal reading of the language of § 5(a) and analogous state immunity provisions. For instance, in Fiore v. Royal Painting Co., 398 So. 2d 863, 865 (1981), a Florida appellate court concluded: “Only the actual employer . . . may get under the immunity umbrella of [33 U. S. C.] § 905.” Similarly, in interpreting an almost identical provision of New York workers’ compensation law,8 the New York Court of Appeals has reasoned that tort immunity shоuld not apply to contractors because “[t]he word ‘employee’ denotes a contractual relationship” and a contractor never is contractually bound to the employees of a subcontractor. Sweezey v. Arc Electrical Construction Co., 295 N. Y. 306, 310-311, 67 N. E. 2d 369, 370-371 (1946) (quoting Passarelli v. Columbia Engineering and Contracting Co., 270 N. Y. 68, 75, 200 N. E. 583, 585 (1936)).
The more widely held view, however, is that the term “employer” as used in § 5(a) has a statutory definition somewhat broader than that word‘s ordinary meaning. The majority of courts considering the issue, including the Court of Appeals in this case, have concluded that § 5(a)‘s tort immunity can extend to general contractors, at least when the contractor has fulfilled its responsibilities to secure compensation for subcontractor employees in accordance with the requirements of § 4(a). See, e. g., Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., supra, at 302, 717 F. 2d, at 581; Thomas v. George Hyman Construction Co., 173 F. Supp. 381, 383
In choosing between these conflicting interpretations of § 5(a), we аre predisposed in favor of the majority view that tort immunity should extend to contractors. This position is presumptively the better view because it is more consistent with the compromise underlying the LHWCA. The reward for securing compensation and assuming strict liability for worker-related injuries has traditionally been immunity from tort liability. See supra, at 931-932. “Since the general contractor is [by the operation of provisions like § 4(a) of the LHWCA], in effect, made the employer for the purposes of the compensation statute, it is obvious that he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation.” 2A Larson, supra, § 72.31(a), at 14-112.
Our only difficulty in adopting the majority view is that it requires a slightly strained reading of the word “employer.” As we have repeatedly admonished courts faced with technical questions arising under the LHWCA, “the wisest course is to adhere closely to what Congress has written.” Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U. S. 596, 617 (1981); see Director, OWCP v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29, 47 (1979). Absent convincing evidence of contrary congressional intent, we are reluctant to depart from this sound canon of statutory construction. However, upon reviewing the use of the term “employer” elsewhere in the Act, we find ample evidence to infer that Congress intended the term “employer” to include general contractors as well as direct employers.
The second sentence of § 4(a) provides that “unless the subcontractor has secured [worker‘s] compensation,” the contractor “shall secure the payment of such compensation.”
Similarly, under § 4(a), contractors are made liable for payment of “compensation payable under sections 7, 8, and 9.” These three sections refer exclusively to employers’ making payments; they contain no referencеs to contractors. See
Further evidence that contractors can be employers under the LHWCA is found in § 33(b), which governs the assignment of an injured worker‘s right to recover damages from third parties to the worker‘s “employer.”
Finally, there are the enforcement provisions of § 38 of the Act,
From the foregoing examples, it is clear that Congress must have meant for the term “employer” in other sections of the LHWCA to include contractors.10 It is reasonable to infer that Congress intended the term “employer” to have that same broad meaning in § 5(a). This is particularly so inasmuch as granting tort immunity to contractors that comply with § 4(a) is consistent with the quid pro quo underlying workers’ compensation statutes. For both of these reasons, we adopt the majority view that general contractors can be embraced by the term “employer” as used in § 5(a).
B
Having concluded that § 5(a) can cover general contractors, we now consider the conditions under which contractors may qualify for § 5(a)‘s immunity. The Court of Appeals took the view that to qualify for § 5(a)‘s grant of immunity, “WMATA must first require its subcontractors to purchase the insurance. It is only by providing compensation insurance when the subcontractors fail to do so that WMATA obtains immunity as a statutory employer.” 230 U. S. App. D. C., at 303, 717 F. 2d, at 582 (emphasis in original). This view—
The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the LHWCA rests on the notion that general contractors are entitled to the reward of tort immunity only when the contractor has been statutorily required to secure compensation. In essence, the Court of Appeals would withhold the quid of tort immunity until the contractor had been legally bound to provide the quo of securing compensation. Though plausible given the logic of workers’ compensation statutes,11 the Court of Appeals’ view is difficult to square with the language of the LHWCA.
Section 5(a) does not say that employers are immune from tort liability if they secure compensation in accordance with the Act. The section provides just the obverse—that employers shall be immune from liability unless the employer “fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act.” Immunity is not cast as a reward for employers that secure compensation; rather, loss of immunity is levied as a penalty on those that neglect to meet their statutory obligations.
Besides being faithful to the plain language of the statute, this reading furthers the policy underlying the LHWCA, which is to ensure that workers are not deprived workers’ compensation coverage. If the benefits of securing compensation insurance—that is, tort immunity—did not accrue to contractors until subcontractors had affirmatively elected to default, then contractors would be reluctant to incur the considerable expense of securing compensation insurance until they were absolutely convinced that subcontractors were in statutory default. Inevitably, such a rule would create gaps in workers’ compensation coverage—a result Congress clearly wanted to avoid. The reason for passing the LHWCA was to bring one of the last remaining groups of uninsured workers under the umbrella of workers’ compensation.12
As the natural reading of §§ 4(a) and 5(a) comports with the policies underlying the LHWCA and is consistent with the legislative history of the Act, there is no cause not to “adhere closely to what Congress has written.” Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U. S., at 617. We conclude, therefore, that §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the LHWCA render a general
III
Applying our interpretation of § 4(a) and § 5(а) to the facts of this case, we conclude that WMATA was entitled to immunity from the tort actions brought by respondents. Far from “fail[ing] to secure payment of compensation as required by [the LHWCA],”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The Court today takes a 1927 statute and reads into it the “modern view” of workers’ compensation, whereby both the contractor and the subcontractor receive immunity from tort suits provided somebody secures compensation for injured employees of the subcontractor.1
In practical terms, the result is undoubtedly good both for the construction industry
The Court admits, as it must, that the subcontractors in this case have “secured” the payment of compensation to their employees as required by § 4(a) of the LHWCA. Ante, at 940-941, n. 14. The fact that those subcontractors did not each sign the check that paid for the “wrap-up” insurance policy is beside the point. The policy was purchased for their benefit, bore their namеs as the insured parties, and was paid for in the form of reduced bids. See App. 104, 106, 113. In subscribing to this “wrap-up” scheme, the subcontractors fulfilled their statutory obligation to secure compensation. An alternative view would not only exalt form over substance; it would also subject most of the 355 subcontractors and 2,765 sub-subcontractors working on the second phase of the Metro construction to criminal prosecution under § 38(a) merely because they did not purchase additional, wholly superfluous insurance for their employees.
The Court also admits that WMATA has not “secured” the payment of compensation to the employees of the subcontractors within the meaning of § 4(a). Under § 4(a), a contractor has a secondary, contingent obligation. As the Court explains, the contractor neеd secure compensation only when a subcontractor has failed to do so. Ante, at 938. Since the subcontractors in this case did not default on their statutory obligations, WMATA‘s secondary obligation never matured. Therefore, WMATA was not “liable for” and did not “secure” the payment of compensation under § 4(a). The fact that
Despite these two concessions, the Court still concludes that WMATA is entitled to the immunity of § 5(a). Contractors such as WMATA are, thus, cast in the role of backup quarterbacks who get paid for sitting on the bench. They need do nothing; as long as the starting quarterbacks perform, the backups receive equal benefits.
The Court reaches this conclusion by means of a rather clumsy sleight of hand. In Part II-A, the Court argues that the term “employer” as used in the LHWCA must be capable of embracing contractors. Otherwise, when a subcontractor defaulted on its § 4(a) duty, there would be no way of enforcing or even making sense of the backup duties imposed on contractors since all the statutory provisions other than § 4(a), which flesh out the obligation imposed by that section, speak only of an “employer.” In Part II-B, the Court then argues that the language of § 5(a) grants immunity to an “employer” unless the employer fails to honor its statutory duty to secure compensation. Since the statutory duty of a contractor does not even arise until the subcontractor defaults, a contractor has not failed to honor its statutory duty as long as the subcontractor secures compensation. Thus, WMATA
The problem with this argument is that the term “employer” is given one meaning in Part II-A, but is then used in a different sense in Part II-B. That is, for purposes of the duty to secure compensation in § 4(a), a contractor is seen as only a backup “employer” who steps into that role when the subcontractor—the actual employer—defaults. But for purposes of the immunity granted in § 5(a), the Court treats a contractor as a full-fledged employer, filling that role regardless whether the subcontractor defaults or not.
Even assuming that a contractor can be an “employer” for purposes of thе LHWCA,3 a contractor at best fills that role contingently. A contractor is certainly not an “employer” of the subcontractor‘s employees for all purposes and at all times under the statute. Otherwise, to continue the previous metaphor, there would be two quarterbacks on the field at all times. Both the contractor and the subcontractor would be directed to make the payments required by §§ 7, 8, and 9, and both would simultaneously be entitled to the assignment of the injured worker‘s right to recover damages
Thus, even accepting the Court‘s analysis in Part II-A, the most that follows is that a contractor becomes an “employer” within the meaning of the various provisions of the LHWCA when the subcontractor has defaulted on its statutory obligations. It follows that a contractor is an “employer” entitled to the immunity of § 5(a) only when the subcontractor has defaulted on its obligation and the contractor has stepped in to secure the payment of compensation to the subcontractor‘s employees.
The Court‘s reading of the statute, alternately contracting and expanding the term “employer,” is, therefore, internally inconsistent. That reading also runs counter to the settled
Notes
Second, the Court argues that a rule granting immunity to a contractor who secures insurance only after default by the subcontractor would
Accordingly, I dissent.
require a difficult factual inquiry into whether “the worker‘s direct employer had been given a reasonable chance to secure compensation for itself and then had failed to respond to the opportunity.” Ante, at 939. As noted, however, see n. 1, supra, the very same factual inquiry is required by the Court‘s own reading, which would deny immunity to defaulting subcontractors.