139 Ark. 130 | Ark. | 1919
(after stating the facts). It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the court erred in holding that the judgment was void on account of the presiding judge being disqualified because he had acted as counsel for the appellant in the first, suit against appellees which was dismissed for want of prosecution.
On the other hand, it is the contention of counsel for appellees that the judgment was absolutely void and that no valid execution could issue upon it. The decision of the question involves the construction of article 7, section 20 of the Constitution of 1874, and our decisions relative to it. The section is as follows:
“No judge or justice shall preside in the trial of any cause in the event of which he may be interested or where either of the parties shall be connected with him by consanguinity or affinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law; or in which he may have been of counsel or have presided in any inferior court.”
It is claimed by counsel for appellees that according to the 'current of authority where the Constitution or statute expressly provides that- a judge shall not preside or shall not sit in a case by reason of personal disqualification because of relationship, interest or having been of counsel in the cause, his disqualification is absolute, and that any judgment rendered by him is void and, therefore, his disqualification cannot be waived by the parties. We will not consider or review these authorities for the reason that as early as 1884 this court held-that the objection that the judge was disqualified because of relationship was waived by the failure to call the judge’s attention to the fact of disqualification and permitting the case to proceed to judgment. Pettigrew v. Washington County, 43 Ark. 33. This decision has never been overruled; but, on the contrary, has become an established rule of practice in this State since its rendition. It was so understood by this court in the later -ease of Morrow v. Watts, 80 Ark. 57. Doubtless many judgments have been rendered in reliance upon it and many rights have been settled under it. No useful purpose could be served by overruling it; and it might cause much litigation and controversy, or at least might create needless alarm in the minds of lawyers and litigants who, during all these years, have conformed to the decision in the conduct of their affairs.
Again it is insisted by counsel for appellees that this case is not in point; but we do not agree with counsel in this contention. It is true as claimed by him that the circuit court quashed the judgment of the county court against the son of the county judge and affirmed it as to the other defendants. This court said this was not an error of which the appellants could take advantage because they were severally as well as jointly liable. If the judgment of the county court, however, had been void because one of the defendants was the son of the county judge, as is the claim of counsel, in such cases, the circuit court could have acquired no jurisdiction of the case on appeal. Upon appeal from the county court the circuit court acquires only such jurisdiction as the county court had, and may render such judgment only as the county court should have rendered. Pride v. State, 52 Ark. 502, and Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195.
This brings us to a consideration of the question of whether or not, under the facts as disclosed by the record, the personal disqualification of the judge was waived in the case at bar. We answer the question in the affirmative. The record shows that appellees were present in court in person as well as by attorney at the time the judgment in question was rendered. They knew that the presiding judge had been one of the attorneys for appellant when the first suit had been brought and dismissed. The record also shows that they announced ready for trial and allowed the case to proceed to judgment without objection. Having taken their chances of a favorable judgment at the hands of a judge, who they knew was personally disqualified, they cannot, after adverse decision, avail themselves of facts which they knew before the judgment was rendered to get rid of it. In other words, litigants cannot take their chances of a favorable decision, with a judge, who they know is disqualified to sit in the case, reserving the right to set the judgment aside, if it appears to their advantage to do so.
It follows from the views we have expressed that the court erred in holding the judgment void and in quashing the execution issued upon it.
For that error, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the circuit court to overrule appellee’s motion to quash the execution and for further proceedings according to law.