604 N.E.2d 181 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *148 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *149 This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Washington County Court of Common Pleas granting a summary judgment to appellees and dismissing *150 the action filed against them by appellants.1 Appellants assign the following errors:
"1. The court of common pleas erred in holding that the sole remedy available to plaintiffs [in asserting the failure of the Marietta City Board of Education to obtain the consents of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and of the State Tax Commissioner before submitting the bond issue to the electors, and prior to thirty days before the election, as required by division (C) of R.C.
"2. The court erred in holding that the consents of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Tax Commissioner before the Marietta City Board of Education might submit the bond issue [the passage of which would make the district's net indebtedness (after the issuance of the securities) exceed an amount equal to four percent of its tax valuation] were procedural in nature, rather than substantive; so that the failure to obtain the consents was cured by the passage of Amended Substitute House Bill 61 of the 119th General Assembly.
"3. The court erred in holding that the passage of Am.Sub.H.B. 61 on March 14, 1991 [intended to cure the failure of the Marietta City Board of Education to obtain the consents of the two state officers before submitting the bond issue to the electors] was not retroactive in nature, hence did not violate the Ohio Constitution, Section 28 prohibiting such retrospective laws.
"4. The court erred in holding that Am.Sub.H.B. 61 did not deprive plaintiffs of any property rights, hence did not deprive them of any property rights without due process.
"5. The court erred in holding that the disparate and unrelated subjects contained in Am.Sub.H.B. 61 did not violate the Ohio Constitution, Article
"6. The court erred in holding that the plaintiffs-appellants have failed to sustain their burden in challenging the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. 61." *151
The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. On November 6, 1990, voters residing in the Marietta City School District approved, by majority vote, a bond issue in the principal amount of $10,320,000 with proceeds therefrom to be used for general improvements to school facilities within the school district. The bond issue was to be repaid over a maximum of fifteen years with such repayment to be funded by a real property tax levy, outside the ten-mill limitation, to average 4.64 mills for each one dollar of valuation, or $0.464 for each one hundred dollars of valuation.2
On February 17, 1991, appellants commenced the action below seeking both a declaratory judgment that the bond issue and tax levy were invalid and a permanent injunction to prevent implementation of the same.3 The averments giving rise to this action were that the bond issue caused the school district's net indebtedness to exceed an amount equal to four percent of the tax valuation thereof. Appellants further alleged that, under such circumstances, appellee, Marietta City Board of Education, was required to procure supervisory permission under R.C.
On March 14, 1991, before any of the appellees had filed an answer to the Complaint, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61 (see [1991] Baldwin's Ohio Legislative Service 5-4 through 5-6), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"SECTION 3. In any case in which the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines that because of ministerial error or oversight the consents of that Superintendent and the Tax Commissioner contemplated by division (C) of *152
section
On March 18, 1991, appellants moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 15(E) in order to challenge the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61. Such leave was, subsequently, granted and on March 20, 1991, appellants filed their supplemental complaint. This pleading incorporated all allegations and prayers for relief as were set forth in the original complaint and, additionally, sought to have Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61 declared unconstitutional. In support of that request, appellants alleged that Section 3 of that legislation was passed in order to "cure the defects and insufficiencies of the Marietta City School District election of November 6, 1990." Appellants further averred that the enactment was unconstitutional because it was discriminatory, retroactive, "extinguished a vested legal relation" and contained more than one subject matter. Appellees filed their answers denying all allegations of invalidity and further contending that the action should be dismissed for, among other reasons, mootness and the operation of the statute of limitations applicable to election contests under R.C.
On April 15, 1991, a motion for summary judgment was filed on the grounds that, as a matter of law, appellants' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, therefore, it should be dismissed.5 First, appellees argued that the only permissible method by which appellants could have challenged the bond issue was through an election contest action which could only be commenced within fifteen days after the election results had been ascertained. See R.C.
Appellants filed their memorandum contra summary judgment and argued, in essence, that the curative legislation enacted by the Ohio General Assembly was unconstitutional and, therefore, incapable of eliminating any defects or irregularities which occurred in submitting the bond issue to the voters in Washington County. Further, appellants argued that they were not limited to an election contest action as the sole method by which to challenge that issue. Thus, appellants concluded, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
On June 5, 1991, the court rendered its decision and found that any defect in obtaining consent before placing the bond issue to the voters of Washington County was cured by the passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61. The court further ruled that such legislation was valid and constitutional. A judgment entry to that effect was entered on June 13, 1991, and this appeal followed.
In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in holding that the sole remedy available for them to challenge the bond issue below was through an election contest action brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3515. However, after reviewing the record, we cannot ascertain that the trial court ever made such a ruling. Indeed, the judgment entered below is silent with respect to this issue and the court's decision reveals the following:
"This court is not convinced by defendants' [appellees'] argument that Section
Thus, notwithstanding appellants' assertion to the contrary, it does not appear that the trial court confined them to an election contest action as the sole method by which to challenge the bond issue. If it had, the trial court would have dismissed the action for being outside the permissible time limit of R.C.
We shall jointly address appellants' remaining five assignments of error as they all challenge the validity and constitutionality of the curative legislation passed as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61. It is undisputed that this Act was passed to alleviate the failure to comply with the following provisions of R.C.
"A school district shall not submit to a vote of the electors the question of the issuance of securities in an amount that will make the district's net indebtedness after the issuance of the securities exceed an amount equal to four per cent of its tax valuation, unless the superintendent of public instruction, acting under policies adopted by the state board of education, and the tax commissioner, acting under written policies of the commissioner, consent to the submission. A request for the consents shall be made at least thirty days prior to the election at which the question is to be submitted."
Appellants offer a number of arguments to the effect that the relief from compliance with this provision, as granted in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61, is invalid and constitutionally infirm and does not alleviate the defect caused by the failure to obtain supervisory permission before submitting the November 6, 1990 bond issue to the voters. We disagree.
We begin our analysis from the premise that all legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of validity and constitutionality. See State ex rel. Petroleum UndergroundStorage Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Withrow (1991),
Although not entirely clear, appellants' first contention appears to be that R.C.
Appellants also argue that the provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61 were unconstitutionally retroactive and deprived them of vested property rights. We are not persuaded. Although the Ohio General Assembly has no power to pass retroactive laws, it may pass legislation curing defects and errors in proceedings which arise out of their want of conformity with state law. See Section
A "vested right" may be created by common law or statute and is generally understood to be the power to lawfully do certain actions or possess certain things; in essence, it is a property right. See 17 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 54-55, Constitutional Law, Sections 535 and 536. Appellants argue that the provisions of R.C.
Whatever incidental benefit the electorate may have enjoyed, the provisions of R.C.
Moreover, in the exercise of its plenary power, the General Assembly may enact remedial and retrospective legislation to cure and render valid that which it could have authorized in the first instance. Burgett, supra,
Finally, appellants argue that the curative legislation of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61 is unconstitutional because its enactment violates the so called "one subject rule" in Section
The "one subject rule" of the Ohio Constitution is merely directory in nature. State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984),
"[E]very presumption in favor of the enactment's validity should be indulged. The mere fact that a bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal, as long as a common purpose orrelationship exists between the topics. However, where there is a blatant disunity between topics and no rational reason for their combination can be discerned, it may be inferred that the bill is a result of log-rolling — the practice by which several matters are consolidated in a single bill for the purpose of obtaining passage for proposals which would never achieve a majority if voted on separately. This is the very practice which Section 15(D) was designed to prevent." (Emphasis added.)
With this standard in mind, we turn to the provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61. Appellants contend that because sections one and two of that *157 legislation relate to the election of municipal clerks, whereas section three contains the retrospective validation of the bond issue, the bill impermissibly contains more than one subject matter and is therefore unconstitutional. However, we believe appellants give too restrictive a reading to the "one subject rule."
The aforementioned provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 61 all generally relate to the topic of elections, be it for municipal clerk or passage of a bond issue. The election of a municipal clerk, or the passage of a bond issue, would be merely subcategories of this general topic and there is no constitutional prohibition against their inclusion in a single bill. Thus, we are not persuaded that there has been a "manifestly gross and fraudulent violation" of the one subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. For these reasons previously set forth, appellants remaining assignments of error are not well taken and the same are overruled.7 *158
Having considered all such errors assigned and argued herein, and finding them to be without merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
GREY and PETER B. ABELE, JJ., concur.
Most significantly, the portion of legislation deemed to be offending in Hinkle was an emergency provision set forth in sections seven and eight of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 200, which bore no relationship, whatsoever, to the remaining portions of that enactment. See Baldwin's 1991 Legislative Service at 5-321, 5-338. Rather, the offending emergency provision related solely to legislation previously enacted in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 405. See 143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5012. The Supreme Court then held that such emergency provision in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 200 was unconstitutional. Hinkle, supra,
Moreover, as was forewarned, the Supreme Court's decision precipitates confusion in an area of the law which once seemed relatively settled. See Hinkle, supra, at 153,