138 P.2d 978 | Idaho | 1943
The two cases involved here, being District Court Civil Case No. 2230 and District Court Civil Case No. 2501, were joined for the purpose of this appeal by order heretofore made and entered by this court. The facts in each case are similar and have been stipulated. Appellant is an Idaho corporation with its principal place of business at Moscow, Idaho, and is engaged in the business of breeding, growing and selling at wholesale, peas, beans, and field seeds in, among other places, Jerome County; it owns and operates at Hazelton, in said county, a warehouse for the purpose of storing and cleaning peas and beans and other grains and field seeds belonging to it. *4
In 1936 respondent William N. Hardwick, then assessor of Jerome County, Idaho, assessed peas and beans belonging to appellant in its warehouse at Hazelton, Jerome County, Idaho, for a valuation of $8,000.00. A tax was levied thereon in the sum of $485.70. In 1940 appellant's peas and beans at said place were likewise assessed by said assessor in the sum of $3,000.00 and the tax levied was the sum of $207.30. The taxes for both years were paid by appellant under written protest lodged with the said assessor as the collector of personal property taxes, prior to, or at the times of payment. Appellant made no appearance or complaint to the County Board of Equalization with respect to the 1936 tax, but did appear before said board on December 2, 1940, prior to payment, with respect to the 1940 tax, and set out its protest and objections to the tax, as levied. This protest was denied by the board.
These suits were then filed for recovery of the sums paid and plaintiff prays judgment against said defendants and each of them, for the sums so paid together with interest at 6% per annum from and after the dates of payment until paid.
The following pertinent facts were stipulated, to-wit: Great quantities of similar crops in the possession of individuals, partnerships and corporations engaged in the business of farming within and without Jerome County were not assessed for said years. That it was the practice of the Jerome County taxing officials to make no assessment and levy no tax whatsoever against peas and beans and other grain and field seeds in the possession of and owned by individuals, partnerships and corporations engaged in the business of farming in said county; that taxing officials of said county did assess peas and beans belonging to all individuals, partnerships and corporations engaged in the business of selling peas and beans in said county, as merchandise, on the same basis as the peas and beans owned by appellant. That respondent assessor attempted in good faith to assess all property in Jerome County subject to taxation in compliance with requirements of the State Board of Equalization, and the statutes of the state, and in accordance with forms prepared by and under the supervision of the State Board of Equalization, and attempted to treat all persons fairly and justly, and without discrimination, and particularly persons within the same class. That all the peas and beans so assessed and taxed in said *5 years to appellant, were grown in Jerome and other counties during the preceding years for which the tax was levied, under what is known as "Growers' Regular Contract", being agreement between appellant and growers in said counties, under which contracts title to the seed and crops were at all times retained by appellant.
The conclusions are similar in both cases, and those to which objections are made, are in effect as follows: (1) That the appellant was not a farmer and not engaged in farming; (2) That appellant's peas and beans were properly classified as "merchandise"; (3) That appellant is in the same class, so far as taxes are concerned, as other warehousemen in Jerome County engaged in the business of buying and selling beans and peas and that said classification is reasonable; (4) That appellant was required to seek redress from the Board of Equalization of Jerome County as a condition precedent to its right to recover 1936 taxes paid under protest, unless the assessment was void ab initio, and that neither of said assessments were void ab initio, or at all; (5) That appellant is not entitled to recover the taxes paid under protest; (6) That respondents are entitled to a judgment and decree that appellant take nothing by its actions herein and that said actions be dismissed and respondents have and recover of and from appellant their costs and disbursements.
We desire to first direct attention to appellant's contention which is ably argued by its counsel, that these assessments were void ab initio, which, as heretofore stated, is contrary to the conclusion of the trial court on the question. It is clear that appellant's peas and beans were levied, assessed and taxed as merchandise, and as stipulated, on the same basis of valuation as peas and beans belonging to all of the individuals, partnerships and corporations engaged in the business of buying and selling peas and beans in Jerome County. Under the provisions of sec.
Certain property is exempt from taxation by the laws of our state (sec.
It is apparent, therefore, that appellant's peas and beans were taxable, and that the acts of assessment and levy of the taxes thereon by the taxing officials were within their jurisdiction. (Weiser Nat'l Bank v. Jefferys,
It appears that respondent assessor did not assess or attempt to assess peas and beans which farmers and other growers had grown, and which at the time of these assessments they had in their possession. It is alleged in the complaint that such peas and beans were of the identical kind and character as appellant's and escaped taxation entirely, but such fact would not make appellant's levied taxes wholly void, since its property was admittedly subject to taxation as personal property under the provisions of our statutes, above cited. The fact that property of like character escaped taxation, would not relieve appellant from paying its tax based on a proper assessment of its property. (City of Los Angeles v. WesternUnion Oil Co., (Calif.)
Appellant not having protested or complained before the Board of Equalization of Jerome County with reference to the 1936 assessment, and not having appealed from the adverse decision of that board to its complaint as to the 1940 assessment, we are called upon to consider its right to apply directly to the courts for recovery of the taxes so paid for these two years.
Art. 7, sec. 12, of our constitution, in substance provides in part that the Board of County Commissioners for the several counties of the state shall constitute Boards of Equalization for the respective counties, whose duty it shall be to equalize the valuation of the taxable property in the county, under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by law.
Under our statutes these county Boards of Equalization are required to meet for the purpose of equalizing the assessments of personal property on the second Monday of July in each year and are to continue in session from day to day and shall determine complaints in regard to the assessment of such property and must complete such business and adjourn as a Board of Equalization on the third Monday of July, provided they may adjourn prior thereto if they have completed all their business as such board. (Sec.
An appeal from any act, order, or proceeding of the board to the courts is provided by sec. 61-1910, I.C.A., *8 reading as follows: "Any time within twenty days after the adjournment of any meeting of the Board of County Commissioners, sitting as a Board of Equalization, an appeal may be taken from any act, order or proceeding of the board, by any person aggrieved thereby, or by any taxpayer of the county when he deems any such act, order or proceeding illegal or prejudicial to the public interest, but nothing in this section shall be construed so as to suspend the payment of taxes pending said appeal."
Thus, our statutes provide a remedy against an excessive erroneous or improper assessment of property by county officials, by proceedings before the County Board of Equalization, and the right to appeal from its decision to our courts.
It is a well settled rule of law that statutory remedies of this nature are exclusive and that a taxpayer may not maintain an action against a county for a general money judgment for the amount of taxes erroneously or illegally exacted, where the tax is not absolutely void. (61 C.J., p. 996, sec. 1274; Black on Tax Titles (2d Ed.), sec. 142; Belknap Realty Co. v. Simineo, (Mont.)
In support of its argument in opposition to the application of this general rule to the facts in the cases at bar, appellant has cited many authorities, all of which we have carefully considered, but under the circumstances related in the stipulations and in view of our statutes which set up this administrative County Board of Equalization, for the purpose of hearing and determination of the questions presented here, and which are herein cited, these authorities are not persuasive and the facts in many of these cases cited by appellant, are distinguishable from the facts here, and as a matter of fact, some of appellant's cases and authorities adhere to the general rule that where a tax is not void ab initio, and the legislature has provided an administrative board with power to hear and determine these questions with right of appeal to the courts from these decisions, that such remedies are exclusive. (Hodgins v. Board of Commissioners, (Kans.) supra; Salthouse v.Board of Commissioners, (Kans.) supra.)
In the case of Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, supra, the United States Supreme Court said: "A taxpayer who does not exhaust the remedy provided before an administrative board to secure the correct assessment of a tax, cannot thereafter be heard by a judicial tribunal to assert its invalidity."
In the case of Cotton v. Blake, supra, the Oklahoma Court, quoted from the prior decision in First National Bank of Templev. Achenbach, et al.,
In Wilson v. Wiggins, et al., (Okla.)
The reason for the inapplication of this general rule is stated by the California District Court of Appeals in the case of Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corp. v. Los AngelesCounty, supra, as follows: "If the property is the proper subject of taxation, as here, but not taxable because it possesses no taxable value, an appeal to the board of equalization would still lie even though the board might reduce its assessed value to zero. The question would still be: 'What is the taxable value?' and not: 'Is the property of a class which is not subject to taxation?'. It should not be forgotten that the requirement of appeal to the board of equalization in cases of overvaluation in assessments for tax purposes is grounded in an important public policy. In fixing the tax rate, the board of supervisors must perform a mathematical calculation in which the sum of the estimated expenditures for the ensuing fiscal year is applied to the total assessed valuation of the taxable property. If the latter figure becomes a variable, the possible confusion in the fiscal affairs of the county would be incalculable. In view of this fact, the courts should be, as they have been, slow to extend the cases in which recourse to the board of equalization is not made a prerequisite to the recovery of taxes paid."
In view of our conclusions on the assignments herein expressed, we do not think it necessary to specifically notice the other assignments of error. It is sufficient to say that under the circumstances, the judgments, and each of them, must be, and hereby are, affirmed, with costs to respondents.
Holden, C.J., Ailshie, Budge and Givens, JJ., concur. *12