WARWICK LONG LEAF COMPANY v. ZORN
36424
Court of Appeals of Georgia
FEBRUARY 25, 1957
REHEARING DENIED MARCH 20, 1957
95 Ga. App. 344
Judgment reversed. Gardner, P. J., and Townsend, J., concur.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 25, 1957—REHEARING DENIED MARCH 20, 1957.
A. C. Felton, III, for plaintiff in error.
Roland Arthur, Robert B. Williamson, contra.
The record does not disclose that the defendant made any timely written requests that these charges should be given to the jury, nor did the defendant‘s amended answer raise the question that Tract No. 2 contained timber that was not suitable for sawmill purposes. The only defense raised by the defendant‘s answer as amended was that it was not indebted to the plaintiff in the amount sued for since it did not cut the amount of timber alleged in the plaintiff‘s petition to have been cut from Tract No. 2.
In order for it to be reversible error to fail to charge on a contention of one of the parties in the absence of a timely written request, the issue must be raised by the pleadings and be supported by the evidence. See Turner v. Turner, 186 Ga. 223, 224 (197 S. E. 771, 116 A.L.R. 1396), and citations. Therefore, there is no merit in either of these special grounds of the motion for new trial.
2. The last special ground charges that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for a nonsuit for all sums in excess of the amount admitted by it to be due the plaintiff under the contracts.
A motion for a nonsuit can not be passed on in a case where the movant has filed a motion for new trial, one ground of which complains that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and is without evidence to support it. Brannen v. Bowen, 81 Ga. App. 430, 431 (59 S. E. 2d 7), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Elrod, 91 Ga. App. 403 (1) (85 S. E. 2d 821). Accordingly, this special ground of the motion for new trial cannot be considered.
3. The remaining special ground is but an amplification of the usual general grounds and will not be considered separately.
As shown in the statement of facts the defendant admitted that a balance of $1,199 was due on Tract No. 1, but contended
Marvin Raines, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he cruised the timber on Tract No. 2 and estimated that it contained between 110,000 and 115,000, taking into consideration jump butts (timber that has been turpentined), and E. E. Shealy, also a witness for the plaintiff, testified that Tract No. 2 contained 118,000 feet of timber, that his cruise took into consideration jump butts and timber with red hearts, that he went over Tract No. 2 after the timber was cut and there was no merchantable timber left on it. There was no evidence of anyone other than the defendant‘s agents having cut any timber from Tract No. 2, nor was there any evidence presented as to the exact amount of jump butt and red heart timber on this tract. Therefore, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant had cut from Tract No. 2 110,033 1/3 feet of timber, and that, in addition to the advance made on Tract No. 2, it was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $301 on this tract. This $301 due on Tract No. 2 plus the $1,199 which the defendant admitted it owed on Tract No. 1 authorized the verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,500. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed. Townsend, Carlisle and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., and Gardner, P. J., dissent.
FELTON, C. J., and GARDNER, P. J., dissenting. This was an action for a breach of contract to pay a balance alleged to be due for timber actually cut. There is no evidence which would have authorized the jury to ascertain to a reasonable and moral certainty the number of board feet of lumber cut. In the first
