117 Mass. 345 | Mass. | 1875
The only exception taken at the trial which deserves consideration is that to the exclusion of the deed from Richard Blanchard to the tenants’ grantor.
By the partition between Richard and 'John W. Blanchard, the small parcel of land at the entrance of the passageway was left undivided and in common between them. It was not included in the first deed from Richard Blanchard to Greenwood, the de
But we do not see that the issue in regard to the passageway could have been in any way improperly affected by the exclusion of this deed. The deed could have no effect to pass any title in the passageway. The deed of partition and that of Richard Blanchard to Greenwood conveyed the fee to the centre of the passageway, unless he was disseised when he gave the latter deed. If he was then disseised, the title of the disseisee has long since ripened into an indisputable fee. The demandant’s right to recover that part of the premises could be defeated only by establishing the alleged disseisin; and the jury have found that there was no disseisin. The deed from Richard Blanchard in 1869 could have no bearing upon that question.
As the two parts of the demanded premises are distinctly separable, and the right of recovery depends upon entirely different considerations, the new trial may be limited to that part which alone was affected by the errroneous ruling excepted to. The verdict will therefore be allowed to stand as to the passageway, but is* to be set aside as to that part of the demanded premises which remained undivided by the partition between Richard and John W. Blanchard. Exceptions sustained.