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Warrilow v. Norrell
791 S.W.2d 515
Tex. App.
1990
Check Treatment

*1 filing of the statement of facts. motion for no transcript

I reviewed the and find have agree accordingly I

fundamental error. AFFIRMED.

the case should be WARRILOW, Designated

Cyril James

Representative of Underwriters Certain London, Lloyd’s, Appellant, NORRELL, al., Appellees.

Dink et C.

No. 13-88-437-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court of

Corpus Christi.

Nov.

Rehearing April Overruled *2 tragic

This suit out of a accident. arose Norrell On November Carlton friend, shot when Wil- accidentally loaded dropped pistol. liam *3 Norrell, Kerr, buddies,” “hunting three Wolfe, hunting deer in Colorado. went arrival, men from Upon their rented Lee, Richard a local hunter and resident area, drive to four-wheel vehicle hunting from transport to and them deer on day fields. Wolfe shot his five hunt, day the hunt. the last of the On it to the Norrell shot his deer secured vehicle; yet Kerr had not shot a deer. afternoon, men to leave That decided hunting fields and drive back to Lee’s place to rented Accord- return the vehicle. Chasnoff, Rosenblum, Barry A. Rick H. ing Kerr, keep told him his Norrell Akin, Strauss, Stephan Rogers, Gump, B. magnum his gun, pistol, holster and a 41 on Feld, Soules, Hauer Luther H. & Soules & hip driving in case a deer saw while Wallace, Wallace, Antonio, San James P. way, back Lee’s. On vehicle’s Wallace, Austin, & Soules Gaston M. pulled to left rear tire went flat. Norrell Jr., Broyles, Redford, Wray Woolsey, road, vehicle, & the side of the exited the Christi, Corpus appellant. for down, removing kneeled started Kerr, lug jack. nuts. looked for Wolfe Huseman, Powers, Bryan Paul Van Dod- tire, intending in changing to assist son, White, Anthony Pletcher, Huseman, E. fully pistol removed loaded his his Powers, King, Hunt, Pletcher & Allan R. place in the vehicle. Kerr belt Hermansen, Barger, Corpus McKibben & dropped pistol, discharged, his and it shoot- Christi, Kilgarlin, William W. Austin for ing Norrell; Norrell’s the bullet entered appellees. temple through right left and exited NYE, C.J., Before and KENNEDY and seconds, eye. matter of Michael Within a BENAVIDES, JJ. McLain, officer, wildlife field Colorado transported

was on the scene. Norrell was OPINION and, by hospital ambulance to a on Novem- hospital, after died of ber a week KENNEDY, Justice. injuries. Warrilow, representa- a designated C.J. Kerr was of the National Rifle a member of certain insurance tive underwriters such, (“NRA”), and as cov- Association was (hereinafter Lloyd’s of London referred to insurance, policy ered under a master “Warrilow”), judgment appeals from a policy the “Peаcemaker” ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‍$10,963,066.53 awarded heirs by syndi- the C.J. underwritten Warrilow Norrell, damages appellees, for re- Carlton cate, February 2,1984, appellant. On War- sulting alleged from Warrilow’s breach of denying coverage sent rilow a letter insured, good dealing faith and fair to its separate being the first of three appeals Kerr. Warrilow further William denials. $8,080.48 attorney’s for from the award allegedly by appellee, incurred William

fees policy provided The “Peacemaker” cover- error, By twenty-five points ap- Kerr. age for: pellant complains Warrilow trial (a) bodily injury, or error, judgment. Having found court’s (b) damage caused an occur- judgment property trial court and reverse of the rising out use trial. rence and of the remand this cause for a new [sic] the Individual Insured preventing firing. Member of fire- an accidental Once arms, trapping bows and arrows or again, attorney King represented Allan equipment, only engaged in 17, 1986, Kerr, but while following Kerr. On June following activities: counsel, the advice of consented to the en-

(i) try against Hunting trapping public agreed judgment or or of an him and private $2,900,000. land. in favor of the Norrells On 30, 1986, King negotiated June Allan with excluded: Norrells, parties and the entered into (k) Bodily Injury Property Damage “Equitable Assignment and Covenant arising out ownership, mainte- (hereinafter Not to Execute” “assign- nance, operations, use, loading or un- *4 ment”), whereby agreed the Norrells that loading of: $2,900,000 judgment execution of the (ii) Any ... automobiles. taken, would not be in return for Kerr’s Warrilow, receiving report after from a against of claims and causes action both adjuster, licensed insurance Flem- James the NRA and The Norrells Warrilow. ob- ing, denied coverage on the that the basis prosecute right any to tained the causes of accident did not occur while Kerr en- was only jointly action in the name of or in Kerr gaged in hunting, alternatively, or that it the name of Kerr the Norrells. and was excluded it arose because out of the that assignment record reflects the recites loading maintenance or of an automobile. coverage up $1,000,000 to of under the 17, 1984, April brought On the Norrells “Peacemaker” From the doc- Sturm, against Ruger suit Company, & the us, to uments before there is evidence show pistol, claiming manufacturer of Kerr’s the that, place, time the assignment at the took designed company danger- and marketed a parties erroneously thought both the gun ously discharges flawed that when policy $700,- either “Peacemaker” limit was Sturm, dropped. Ruger thereafter made $1,000,000, reality, in the or while limit defendant, third-party seeking Kerr a con- $100,000.1 was from tribution him. Foremost Insurance appeal arises the Norrells’ Company, the This from sub- issuer of home- Kerr’s NRA, sequent Warrilow, policy, against suit the owner’s found under their policy jury, and and to to the King hired Allan Kerr.2 Prior submission Kerr. represent The suit was the Norrells settled. The NRA settled with the $50,000 Foremost limits of were ten- plaintiffs. jury that answered Sturm, Ruger dered to on behalf of Kerr as Kerr’s loss was covered and not excluded $1,500,000 contribution be- settlement policy, under the “Peacemaker” that Warri- Sturm, Ruger tween and the Norrells. duty good of intentionally low breached its reflects, part generally, record that of this faith dealing by denying and fair Kerr’s $50,000 paid was Allan in satisfac- claim, grossly negli- that Warrilow was his attorney’s tion of fees. $2,900,000 gent, and that the amount of in the agreed judgment was reasonable. The 15, 1985, November On Norrells filed jury in damages found actual to Kerr against directly. The suit Kerr evidence of $3,000,000 ($2,900,000in amount of finan- negligence part on Kerr’s was substantial. $100,000 in mental damages cial an- accident, knowingly Prior to the he failed guish $7,500,000 punitive in damages), program a free of- advantage to take of Sturm, for damages, attorney’s fees Allan by Ruger to correct fered the defect Moreover, King, counsel. The trial court ren- pistol. in the he failed use a Kerr’s safety practice against keeping empty judgment dered Warrilow favor basic hammer, respective pistol’s thus and Kerr in the chamber the Norrells reviewing possibility plaintiff. fact that "Cove- as a After 1. This raises the Kerr record, ground properly nant Not to is voidable on the Execute" clear entire it is that Kerr was trial, of mutual mistake. placed plaintiff during as a and this Court plaintiffs, as ac- will refer to Kerr one of the Although Kerr named was a defendant cordingly. suit, rеaligned parties, the trial treat- court solely to $8,080.48. (3) testimony will relate $10,963,066.53 If the amounts legal services Warrilow, value of appellant, appeals the nature and the sole lawyer case or rendered in the judgment. firm client. error, point By twenty-first its Warri- matter, if refusal would (4) any As to the trial court erred low contends hardship on the work substantial disqualify attorney, when failed to Kerr’s of the distinctive value client because King. agree. filed a Allan We Warrilow his firm as counsel in lawyer disqualify counsel which it motion particular ease. grounds separate disquali- two asserted (1) King: he a material fact Texas, fication Governing Rules Supreme Court case, desig- he was (Vernon Texas, X, witness Bar of Art. the State § plaintiffs nated witness 1988). grounds in the case. These were reassert- State Bar governing rules trial, during at which time Warrilow ed legal the same force Texas have The motion to dis- moved for a mistrial. they re upon the matters to which effect motion for mistrial were qualify the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure late as by the trial court. overruled *5 they to upon the matters which relate. have 5-102(A) provides: Disciplinary Rule Cochran, 635, v. S.W.2d Cochran If, undertaking employment in con- 1960, after (Tex.Civ.App. writ ref’d — Houston lawyer a templated pending litigation, or Furthermore, n.r.e.). Disciplinary lawyer a or is obvious that he or learns it Rules, considerations, ethical are unlike the ought in his firm to be called as a wit- mandatory in estab character because client, ness on his he shall lish the minimum level of conduct below of behalf of the trial withdraw from conduct lawyer fall. which no can United Pacific firm, any, his if and shall continue Zardenetta, 661 S.W.2d Insurance Co. trial, except representation in the that he 1983) (Tex.App. Antonio — San representation he may continue the (orig. proceeding). We must decide wheth lawyer testify his in the may or a in firm by er trial abused its discretion court in circumstances enumerated DR 5- (1) refusing disqualification to order 101(B)(1) (4) added).3 through (emphasis King brought to its attorney after was testify called to attention he would be 5-101(B)(l) (4) Disciplinary through Rule witness, (2)failing grant or to as material a provides: attorney King had testified a mistrial after (1) testimony solely If the tо will relate part as witness. an uncontested matter.

(2) testimony solely If relate to a will testimony as Attorney King’s formality there is no matter of material witness. fact reason that substantial evi- to believe King attorney was called to tes- opposition to Because

dence will be offered Kerr,4 client, on behalf of his with- testimony. tify (Kerr’s adversary) 5-102(B) con as behalf Warrilow DR states: 5-102(B). by templated See Gilbert McClure DR If, undertaking employment in contem- after Burnett, (Tex.App. Enterprises v. 735 S.W.2d 309 litigation, lawyer pending plated or learns 1987) (orig. proceeding); White v. Cul —Dallas lawyer in firm it is that he or a his or obvious 1985) ver, (Tex.App. Paso S.W.2d 763 — El may other on as witness than be called Wydick, (orig. proceeding); as Trial Counsel client, repre- may he continue the his behalf of Witness, (1982). 658-59 15 U.C.Davis L.Rev. apparent his it is testimo- sentation until (em- ny may prejudicial why client appears reasons to be least two There added). phasis testimony attorney King’s given on behalf of attorney King’s (1) "Equitable by determine whether We need not client: the terms of the his Assignment Execute,” client; prejudicial Warri- Kerr to his and Covenant Not to "fully plaintiffs’ cooperate complaint obligated call with coun- himself arises from low’s litigation testify prosecution King [this on in the of such attorney as a witness to sel ... suit],” potential (Kerr), for rescission of call not Warrilow’s his client behalf ing Assignment Not Ex- testify "Equitable Covenant attorney a witness mandatory drawal was lawyer unless the circum tinctive value of the as counsel ... stances which he testified fell within one case,” particular likewise has no exceptions contemplated by of the four DR application. exception generally This con- 5-101(B). exceptions The first three con templates attorney exper- who has some testimony, cern uncontested formalities specialized in a tise area of law such as fees, legal clearly having applica no patents, attorney and the burden is on the Attorney King regarding tion. testified seeking representation prove to continue issue, the contents of various documents at Processors, Supreme distinctiveness. Beef agreement such as: a nonwaiver executed Industries, Inc. v. American Consumer Warrilow; Kerr between the “Peace (N.D.Texas Inc., F.Supp. 1068-69 policy; correspondence maker” be 1977). relatively straightfor- This case is a regarding tween himself and Warrilow cov case; neither the ward civil contested is- erage under the “Peacemaker” At background partic- nor the factual sues are torney King also testified to conversations ularly complex, requiring the sort exper- regarding and actions taken Warrilow 5-101(B)(4). See, tise envisioned DR coverage. the denial of He further testi e.g., Groper v. 717 F.2d Taff surrounding fied to the circumstances (D.C.Cir.1983). Furthermore, i.e., underlying litigation, pol the Foremost King wholly any failed to assert “distinc- Sturm, icy coverage during Ruger law regarding representation tiveness” entry suit and the facts related to the change and we believe that a in coun- agreed judgment. the Norrell/Kerr Attor little, imposed any, sel if hard- would have ney King’s testimony was material and nec upon ship Kerr. essary plaintiffs’ assertion of a *6 good cause of action for faith breach find that the trial court We dealing by He and fair Warrilow. was by failing disquali to abused its discretion testify upon strategy called to about his fy attorney King, as mandated DR 5- transpired during the settlement what 102(A). However, in order to warrant re negotiations personally in the he conducted appeal, versal on rather than on manda underlying causes of action on behalf mus, complaining party asserting Kerr; testimony was crucial at trial to disqualified the trial court should have an prove part bad faith on the of Warrilow. attorney pursuant attorney-witness Zweig v. Insurance See Co. Safeco America, 205, 125 A.D.2d 509 N.Y.S.2d rule must show that the violation harmed 320, (N.Y.App.Div.1986). Attorney 321 improper judgment him an to or caused be King’s testimony part was not a Kehoe, rendered. Bullock v. 678 S.W.2d exceptions three to the Disci “black-letter” (Tex.App. 560 [14th Dist.] — Houston plinary Clajon Rules. Audish Gas n.r.e.). respect writ ref’d With to Cf. (Tex.App 673 attorney King’s testimony as a material . —Hous n.r.e.) writ ref’d ton Dist.] [14th witness, disapprove of this attor fact (where attorney testified that notice of continuing in his ney giving hearing given, and the issue was not was in this case.5 capacity аs an advocate contested). Nevertheless, we find that the trial court’s disqualify reasonably refusal was not exception, authorizing The fourth of an im calculated to cause the rendition attorney’s if an representation continued 81(b)(1)); proper judgment (Tex.R.App.P. work a substantial withdrawal “would error. hardship on the client because of the dis- we find no reversible ecute," case, attorney might regarding upon In a where an be based mutual mistake Stowers bearing offer and facts a witness to a settlement upon under the "Peacemaker" the amount settle, alleged negligent refusal to it is an King policy, gives attorney both and Kerr an accept employment him to unethical for suit, during success interest in Norrells’ Comm, Texas, Interpreta- State Bar of case. tion of the Canons of possibly avoiding attempt by an the Norrells to Ethics, (Nov. Op. $2,900,000 agreed judgment. execute the 1965). (4) conduct; rep- of ethical testimony as an standards Attorney King’s Sierra, expert party witness. of a to the suit. resentative great potential F.Supp. 1170. The King’s Attorney testifying on behalf coupled prejudice, with for confusion expert presents plaintiffs as an witness public about how the legitimate concern unprecedented in Texas. a fact situation situation, justified dis- perceive the clearly Disciplinary Rules antici- While Sierra, 5-102(A).6 under DR qualification attorney pated the situation where Furthermore, witness, at 1171. F.Supp. testify as a material fact might expert independent specifically address found that an the Rules do court Sierra, al- problems testimony. associated with provide could credible lowing designated as an ex- himself The court also noted F.Supp. at 1171. offering tes- pert subsequently witness not a situation where this was legal ultimate issues in the timony on the adversary’s attor- called the opposing party case. attempt rob the ney in an as witness representa- chosen 5-102(A) opposing counsel of its applicable

Clearly, DR be- Sierra, expert F.Supp. at 1172. designated as an tive.7 cause was testify called on behalf of witness and us in the case before The ultimate issues legal plaintiffs. Unable to locate Texas follow: issue, authority addressing this we turn (1) un- the accident was covered whether authority to a case from a United States i.e., policy, der the “Peacemaker” an attor- District Court Colorado where “hunting”: Kerr was whether witness, ney designated as an surprisingly ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‍under similar circumstances as (2) excluded the accident was whether Deposit the case at bar. Federal Insur- i.e., policy, the “Peacemaker” under Resources, Corporation ance v. Sierra the accident arose out of whether Inc., (D.Colo.1987),grant- F.Supp. loading of the automo- maintenance disqualify, a motion to the court held bile; jury and would that the would be confused Warrilow, by denying cover- whether weight attribute too much or too little intentionally age policy, *7 attorney’s important testimony. the Sier- duty good faith and its breached ra, likely F.Supp. jury at 1170. The insured, dealing to its William fair adequately distinguish would be unable to Kerr; roles, among attorney’s multiple the includ- (4) conduct consti- whether Warrilow’s (1) ing expert of: on the ultimate those disregard for the tuted a consciоus issues; (2) legal a critical fact witness insured, Wil- (3) rights and welfare of its good dealing; faith and fair the issue of Kerr; liam attorney responsible upholding for the of the Although at trial and the verdict enumerated sever both the record Texas courts have testifying disqualification "(1)” King’s applicable of a jury al reasons for the attorney, that reason following policy reasons have been the testimony. effective wit was not less exclusively applied where the attor to situations ness; opinion contrary, quite the we are of the (1) ney witness: the testifies as a material fact (2) (4) through reversal of reasons warrant that attorney may and, impeachable for interest more this case. therefore, witness; (2) a less effective handicap may attorney’s as an advocate role Discipli Clearly, rationale behind that is the credibility challenging opposing counsel in 5-102(B)’s requirement that the mov- nary Rule advocate; (3) may place testifying it of the testifying testimony showing that the of the ant make a unseemly and ineffec advocate in testifying attorney's may attorney prejudice arguing credibility; and position his own tive 5-102(B) is Disqualification under DR client. (4) and witness are incon the roles of advocate disqualification DR stringent than more sistent, is to because the function of an advocate 5-102(A) litigant may her call his or because a client’s cause and that of witness advance his tactic, seeking attorney opponent’s as a trial Wheeler’s, objectively. Inc. Bert is to state facts attorney case. Jones v. disqualify from the 510, (Tex.App.— Ruffino, S.W.2d (N.D. F.Supp. City Chicago, 360 n. 3 1983) (orig. proceeding). Houston [1st Dist.] considerations, Ill.1984). appears Applying these it (5) $2,900,000 agreed judg- whether the extremely It would have been difficult jury separate attorney

ment for the was reasonable under the circum- what stances; King said as an advocate from what he said as an To these witness. illustrate (6) money, any, what sum of if would be difficulties, only need turn to his own appropriate example to set an for the testifying jury, words when front good public and to deter the Honor, “My response, Your is that —it’s alleged wrongs commission of similar separate my response difficult to as a law of Warrilow. yer my here on behalf of Mr. testified, Attorney King upon based testimony, they’re because I think one and experience as a hunter and a in- former plaintiffs’ the same.” When counsel adjuster, surance claims as follows: passed witness, attorney King him as a (1) my opinion “It at the time the stated, stand, again “I from the witness occurred, incidents Mr. Kerr was in the any questions myself, don’t have Your * * * hunting. act of That there was Finally, during Honor.” cross-examination question without under the when defense counsel moved to admit a policy....” document, Peacemaker stated, attorney King from the stand, objection.” witness “I no have Com (2) my opinion “It is that the incident did pounding problem jury confusion is not arise out of the maintenance of the * * * attorney King the fact participated that Toyota my Landcruiser. It is actively throughout examining the trial: opinion that the accident did not arise witnesses, court, addressing argu out of the automobile at all.” Gill, ing jury. Callen v. 7 N.J. Cf. response following question to the (1951) (where 81 A.2d counsel, by plaintiffs’ “Let me you ask attorney participаte actively did not if you opinion have an whether or not proceedings and did not examine witnesses Lloyd’s intentionally re- [Warrilow] court). or address the fairly fused to deal with Mr. Kerr problem Another associated with good faith in the entire claims han- ” type attorney-witness is the [sic], dling of this matter? vouching credibility for his own when sum King responded, “There’s no doubt ming up jury; oppos it is unfair to they that did.” City counsel. Chicago, Jones v. (4) “I correspondence think the (N.D.Ill.1984). Moreover, F.Supp. agents went between the claims puts attorney-witness in the unseem Lloyd’s [Warrilow], compared to what ly arguing credibility. position of his own telling adjuster were their the Zardenetta, 661 S.W.2d at 247-48. Un field, telling adjuster to trans- questionably, principal ethical considera *8 they mit to Mr. indicates that underlying Disciplinary Rule tion is consciously were indifferent Mr. attorney-witness put in the is the un rights, they Kerr’s and that were— seemly position arguing of his own credibil gross negligence.” that constitutes ity jury. System, See Secon Service (5) $2,900,000 “That Joseph Inc. v. St. Bank & Trust [sic] [the

agreed judgment] (7th Cir.1988); a Groper, reasonable F.2d 418 n. 9 stated, Attorney amount.” 717 F.2d at 1418. during jury argument, why “That’s I testi organization’s the size of the “Given provided that the NRA should have fied monitary size of the or- [sic]—financial only notice. I wasn’t the one. Mr. Swant- ganization, only way get the its at- given ner testified NRA should have [sic] assessing penalty tention is some mail, through just notice the like sent dollars, against in them the form of I only out the wasn’t the one dollars, got high and that’s be * * * added).” (emphasis something In this case minimal. get the justifying it will take millions of dollars to An additional consideration fact, prohibition their attention.” occurs when the trier of (2d 568, 572 Cir. grants weight Corp., 513 F.2d especially jury, undue to Celanese 1975). concern attorney’s testimony; opponent is There exists broader the Jones, in administration of unfairly disadvantaged. public confidence appear King, justice “justice satisfy must F.Supp. Attorney at as an ex — Jones, F.Supp. at witness, good impression upon justice.” ance of pert made a adversary may harmed jury. be “[A]n your you if trial too role as counsel makes things perspective, in put To as a the trier of fact effective witness: presenta statement of facts shows that may by your performanсe dazzled be testimony plaintiffs’ sev tion of the give credence to advocate and thus undue approximately 1090 en witnesses covers Wy your from the witness stand.” words testimony alone pages. Attorney King’s dick, Witness, 15 U.C.D. Trial Counsel as nearly comprises approximately pages, (1982). L.Rev. testimony adduced in one third of all the opposing party prejudiced A when As presentation plaintiffs’ of the case. witness, counsel acts as both advocate and attorney pointed discussing we out when and this conduct becomes intolerable when fact wit King’s as a material attorney-witness that he fails to show ness, dis the failure of the trial court to attempted might has to contact others who qualify attorney King and the failure of them act as an witness and found grant Warrilow’s motion for trial court to lacking knowledge of the area relevant improper mistrial must have caused an Security of insurance. See General rendered, requiring us judgment to thus Life Court, Superior Insurance v. 718 P.2d 560) (Bullock, to reverse (Ariz.1986). Attorney King’s ex- for a trial.9 We have re remand new pert testimony wеnt to the merits of entire statement of facts and viewed the case and could have been substituted of attor improper find that the admission other sources.8 ney King’s testimony was calculated to probably cause and did cause the rendition disqualification The rule of involves judgment. holding, In so improper of an balancing public sus likelihood attorney King’s expressly disapprove of picion against retaining the interest voluntarily as trial failure to withdraw counsel of one’s choice. Cossette v. Coun counsel,10 court and we find that the trial Inc., Donuts, ty Style 647 F.2d by failing to order his abused its discretion (5th Cir.1981). right the client’s When failing grant Warri- withdrawal and counsel of his choice and the need to main for mistrial when the nature low’s motion professional tain ethical standards of re ap King’s testimony became clash, preservation sponsibility “[T]he parent. scrupulous adminis public trust both attorneys furnishing practice “The justice integrity and in the of the tration lips and on their own oaths from their own paramount ...” and client’s bar “[The testimony for their client is controlling recognizably important right to counsel however, by judicial condoned silence to consid one not to be yield, must choice] * * * corruption very nothing short of actual run to the erations of ethics which surely profession.” discredit the can more integrity judicial process.” Zarden *9 5, Minn. 265 N.W. 248, Taylor, v. 197 etta, quoting, Hull v. Ferraro 661 S.W.2d Indeed, possibility foresees the plaintiffs 10.When trial counsel called Mr. Richard trial, regard- testify expert testify as an witness behalf of his client at Swanter to that he will on making ing industry procedures, preserv any insurance doubt in favor of he should resolve testimony abundantly adequate clear that against integrity of his was available. participation counsel. Com as trial continued 906, Court, Superior 145 Cal. 20 Cal.3d den v. remedy for violation of the witness-advo 9. 971, (en banc), 9, Rptr. cert. P.2d 975 576 trial. remand for a new rule is reversal and cate 568, 981, denied, S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d 439 U.S. 99 Franke, generally 298 S.W.2d Cheatham v. See (1978). 652 1957), (Tex.Civ.App. on other rev’d 202 — Austin 397, (1957). grounds, 303 S.W.2d 355 157 Tex. meaning by application of the 829, (1936). twenty-first was created Warrilow’s case). point party of error is sustained.11 Neither has to the facts of the directly that presentеd a Texas case bears judgment must be When the trial court’s found none. question, and we have on the reversed, duty of this Court to it is the judgment, except when it proper render the plaintiffs contend that proceed- necessary to remand for further is from the “hunting” travel to and includes 81(c). Consequently, ings. Tex.R.App.P. fields, hunting contends while Warrilow points must Warrilow’s of error address pur “hunting” limited to the actual that reversing could result in our which ap- concluded that rendering judgment game. in this case. The suit of We have points inquiry reasonable, of error for our are propriate al parties have offered both legal- complain those that of the absence conflicting, interpretations of though jury findings. ly sufficient evidence on vital meaning “hunting” applied Booker, 420, 141 Tex. Yarbrough v. See case. The circumstances of this facts and (1943). 174 S.W.2d itself, ambiguous, in and of but term is not two, applied uncertainty the term is By points error one and Warrilow arises when legally in- evidence was Ramsay contends that the v. to the facts of the case. See the accident as a sufficient tо establish Insurance American General Maryland poli- under the “Peacemaker” covered loss (Tex.1976). Company, 533 S.W.2d that, i.e., as a mat- cy, contends Warrilow suscepti language policy of a When the law, engaged not hunt- ter of Kerr was one reasonable construc of more than ble Likewise, by points of error three ing. tion, ambiguous, and the patently it is four, the evidence asserts that Warrilow the construction which apply courts will that the legally insufficient to show recovery. permits favors the insured not excluded accident was National Insurance Under See Glover v. i.e., con- policy, Warrilow “Peacemaker” (Tex.1977). 755, writers, 545 S.W.2d law, that, Kerr was tends as a matter could argument Although a successful maintaining loading the Final- vehicle. “hunting” made that the term have been eight, claims ly, by point of error Warrilow by the trial court defined should have been plaintiffs failed to meet their bur- that the jury’s deter for the rather than submitted essentially arguing that the proof, den mination, not advanced argument was such necessary plaintiffs failed to fact obtain jury’s no error at trial. We see findings on the above issues. un was covered finding that the accident result would have policy; der the the same Coverage under assigned a if the trial court been reached “Peacemaker” “hunting,” as it would meaning to the term fact, jury trier of found As the term required to construe that have been was “en occurred while Kerr the accident liberally in strictly against the insurer policy does not hunting.” gaged Aet Barnett v. favor of insured. See “hunting.” Both a definition of contain 663, Co., 723 S.W.2d Insurance na Life “hunting” has the term parties argue that (Tex.1987). objective of an insur meaning, accepted plain generally insure; courts should ance is to opposite poles as to what they are at but the lan policies otherwise unless construe meaning is. Fire Insur Standard Cf. requires v. Em guage clearly it. Goswick (Tex.Civ. Griggs, 567 S.W.2d ance Co. Casualty ployers’ n.r.e.) writ ref’d App. — Amarillo error one (Tex.1969). points Warrilow’s (where meaning parties agreed uncertainty are overruled. two “jewelry,” and of the word 102(A), the same result Disciplinary have reached we would January new Texas *10 3.08(a) Disciplinary because Rule under the new become effective. Rules of Professional Conduct lawyer testifying for a today upon the standard of conduct Although is based an our decision materially has not been on behalf of his client Texas Code of Profes- application of the current by the new rule. Rule 5- altered Responsibility Disciplinary sional — coverage (Tex.1964), provision of the the Exclusion under the arising included accidents “Peacemaker” policy question unloading of the loading and out of the the accident was not jury The found that con injury occurred when vehicle. coverage the “Peace- excluded from being from a truck was unloaded crete policy maker” the accident did —that to a crane. bucket attached means of a loading of arise out of the maintenance or bucket, crane col moving a full the While asserts that the acci- the vehicle. Warrilow held killing three men. The Court lapsed, (chang- of the maintenance dent arose out collapse from the that the accident resulted tire) ing loading and the of the vehicle transporting con the crane which was of (Kerr’s place pistol intent his that, as a matter from the truck and crete hip). his removing after it from On vehicle law, out of the unload injury arose hand, plaintiffs claim that the the other line: in this ing the vehicle. bottom negligence12 accident arose out of Kerr’s Dorsey, case, construction of a as in entirely disconnected from the and was coverage section of policy an insurance was vehicle, loading essen- maintenance or of a exclu involved, interpretation an not the tially that the excluded conduct had no clause, sion and the Court found favor Thus, relationship casual to the accident. insurance against of the insured parties we have a situation where both company. at least claim the accident arose out of two activities, asserting different Warrilow apply urges us to Warrilow loading maintenance or of the vehicle at hand. of these cases to the facts law plaintiffs asserting negligence. Kerr’s imрortant recognize We cannot. It is governing for the different rules of construction Warrilow cites two Texas eases provisions interpretation policy proposition injuries which would not coverage opposed policy as occurred “but for” an excluded activi which extend have coverage. ty, activity. provisions which exclude When “arise out of” the excluded Co., Fidelity Casualty 52 a case involves an exception or limitation to Dorsey v. Union policy, a more (Tex.Civ.App. liability an insurer’s under a S.W.2d 775 writ — Waco stringent against the insurer by agr.), injured dism’d the insured was construction involving a companion, entering required than a case cover when his before Barnett, 666; age 723 S.W.2d at purpose prepar provision. and for the automobile Glover, car, If see also under 545 S.W.2d at 761. gun to be loaded into a therefrom, distinguish properly and in failed to Warrilow’s took to remove the shells involved cover so, doing gun accidentally dis cases on the basis and not exclusion provi age charged, shooting policy provisions the insured. sions, reаding the “Peacemak sustained against injuries we would be insured in provision in favor of the result of operating riding in a car. The er” exclusion insured, against company and removing court held that the of the shells surance legal principles. loading clearly against well-settled closely was so connected with the authority in part has cited ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‍no Texas into the car as to constitute a thereof. Warrilow Thus, loading volving multiple a claim of causation where negligence apart from the no shown; in favor provision an exclusion is construed car there was no claim was Moreover, to locate Texas the court of the insurer. Unable multiple causation. jurisdictions for authority, we turn to other interpreting section guidance. following the rule that policy, expressly policies against construed the insurance are involving leading case concurrent company. of an exclusion- causation and construction liability ary provision of a insurance Travelers Insurance Co.

Likewise, in Insurance Co. v. Farm Mutual Casualty State 610 is Employеrs safety practice knowingly to use a' basic undisputed and that he failed that Kerr failed 12. It is pistol’s keeping empty chamber under the advantage program free offered take Sturm, of a pistol Ruger hammer. to correct the defect in *11 526 maintenance, use, loading operation, Cal.Rptr. ership,

Partridge, 10 Cal.3d (1973). case, unloading any motor In that of vehicle. 514 P.2d 123 injury covered hunting by shooting reasoned that the was rabbits court insured was solely of a non- moving if arose out of his vehicle. the accident out of the window or from a non- trigger mecha- automobile related cause The insured had filed the related cause concurrent with magnum pistol, giving it a automobile nism of his .357 rabbit, arising from the use of an auto- trigger.” Upon spotting any cause “hair mobile, that, coverage noting by driving off the road. while insured chased it solely if arose chase, bump, afforded the accident During the the vehicle hit a not be use of an automobile. Glen discharged, passenger and a was out of the pistol Falls, Cal.Rptr. at 699. issue policies shot. One of the insurance injury exсluding bodily a clause contained Finally, Capital Insurance v. State maintenance, arising ownership, of the out Insurance, 318 N.C. Mutual Nationwide use, loading unloading of operation, (1986), removing a while 350 S.E.2d any motor vehicle. The California Su- vehicle, acciden- the insured rifle out of Court, preme declining predicate its deci- poli- tally passenger. The insured’s shot a exclusionary ambiguity sion on the arising the owner- cy injury out of excluded clause, injury joint that the had two held maintenance, use, loading or unload- ship, negligent op- arising from the causes: one any The Court sum- ing of motor vehicle. and the other eration of the automobile re-' principles involved with marized arising negligent tampering with this na- spect exclusionary provisions In the firing pistol. mechanism of the (1) standards ambiguous terms and ture: insurance, liability third-party context of provisions of causation in exclusion must policy did not ex- the Court held that the insurer, against the strictly construed shooting accident. coverage clude for the provided long so as a coverage multiple may causes have effectuat- “That sole or cause is either the nonexcluded single negate any ed the loss does not giving rise injury of the concurrent cause cause; multiple acts concurred in the Nationwide, 350 S.E.2d at liability. any injury nullify infliction of does principles to the Applying these Partridge, 109 single contributory act.” case, liability could be based present Kerr’s 818-19, P.2d at 130-31. Cal.Rptr. at negligent finding failure on a that both adopted this rationale Other courts have gun repaired and the have the defective accidents. finding coverage for similar empty keep an cham negligent failure to In Co. v. Aetna Cas- Travelers Insurance proximate were the under the hammer ber 491 S.W.2d ualty Surety Kerr’s Norrell’s death. causes Carlton (Tenn.1973), injury occurred when placing pistol vehicle choice of discharged while be- shotgun accidentally he could have eas happenstance; mere an automobile. Court ing placed inside places. any number ily set it down coverage exclude policy that for a held hold that the accident was decline to We unloading use, loading or because of because, as policy War- excluded under the automobile, use, loading or unload- loading urges, it arose out of rilow predominat- efficient and ing must be the respect to Warrilow’s With the vehicle. those terms. in the strict sense of ing cause the accident arose out assertion that Aetna, at 367-68. vehicle, reach the maintenance of reasons. the same conclusion for v. same Falls Insurance Co. Glen happen tire was mere changing of a Cal.Rptr. Rich, Cal.App.3d Queen Insurance Co. gun stance. (1975), placed a loaded the insured Cf. (Tex. 456 S.W.2d 538 Creacy, spotted he America car. When the seat of his writ) 1970, no car, Civ.App. Antonio un stopped the reached squirrel, he — San mainte fired, (where arose out an accident shotgun, and it der his seat for jiggle down to insured reached nance—the excluded passenger. injuring a lurched pedal, the car accelerator a stuck arising out of the own- injury

527 Co., Casualty the Farm Fire and pinned person vey a v. between State forward 298, 395, 292, Cal.Rptr. a 770 building). 257 automоbile 48 Cal.3d (citation omitted). 704, 710 P.2d third, eighth Warrilow’s fourth judg- The points of error are overruled. is Coverage policy in property REVERSED, and the trial court ment of is by causa provided reference to commonly trial. cause is REMANDED for a new tion, by “loss ...” certain such as caused OPINION ON MOTION FOR CahRptr. Garvey, forces. enumerated

REHEARING precisely P.2d at 710. It is at bring the physical forces that about these rehearing, appellant its motion for On Frequently, cited Texas as in the cases Warrilow contends that established loss. Id. Warrilow, permit adoption of the losses occur by property law does not our us Partridge. significant concurrent causation doctrine of one legally more than force; Texas disagree. cites three by We Warrilow poultry destroyed physical house of its These support argument.1 cases in in home rendered McKillip; and snow wind property coverage under cases involve loss uninhabitable an ex by contamination and policies first-party insurance and are distin- Auten, negligence in terminator’s guishable Partridge from both the facts of damagеd by in building rain and wind the and the facts of at bar. case Texas, force is if one Matchoolian. excluded, in one force is the covered and first-party Partridge did involve damage coverage; property sured must show property insurance involved force, liability coverage.2 third-party solely by insurance was caused the insured Partridge never in man- considered what separate damage caused he must might apply ner concurrent causation peril from caused the insured first-party property disputes, and insurance peril. McKillip, 469 at excluded S.W.2d holding its was not to that con- extended coverage property analysis 162. The text. the relation insurance context examines ship perils, those that are covered between Liability The Distinction Between policy and those that are exclud under the Property Insurance ed, limit focusing on the exclusions that fails to between Warrilow differentiate Cal.Rptr. coverage. Garvey, loss coverage first-party property loss under a P.2d at 710. policy, home- typically insurance an all-risk proper in Partridge rationale is not policy, liability coverage owner’s tort first-party property insurance context third-party policy, under a insurance because, cases, insured can in most policy present case. Peacemaker contribu- point arguably to some covered This distinction critical. California Garvey, Cal.Rptr. at ting factor. its Supreme recently Court elaborated on presence at 711. of such 770 P.2d rationale, “Liability and corre- Partridge minor, cause, give regardless of how would coverage in- sponding third-party under Partridge. Id. rise carefully must distin- surance expectations parties reasonable applied guished coverage analysis from the served efficient and not be when the property Proper- first-party in a contract. express- cause of loss is predominating insurance, insurance, unlike ty liability policy, ly by the terms of the negligence excluded establishing with unconcerned nevertheless, coverage assessing liability.” Gar- is extended. or otherwise tort coverage, first-party insured Indemnity McKillip, insurance v. 2. In 1. Travelers Co. (Tex.1971); Employers Na third-party in- S.W.2d 160 Auten for his own loss. In is covered (Tex.App. 722 S.W.2d 468 tional Insurance coverage, the for his insured is covered surance 1986), denied, writ —Dallas liability to another their loss. (Tex.1988); Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Matchoolian, (Tex.Civ.App.— 583 S.W.2d 692 n.r.e.). Dist.] Houston writ ref'd [14th Conversely, third-party lia on these issues. Before a court of two context, bility right appeals jury’s to cover can set aside a determination insurance *13 fact, by weigh tort con consider and all the age is established traditional it must cause, fault, duty. cepts proximate supporting contrary and and to the evidence 298, Garvey, Cal.Rptr. at 770 P.2d at jury’s City 257 determination. Sosa (Tex. insuring personal liability By Springs, for 72 Batch S.W.2d Estate, agreeing 1989); the insured for his own King’s to cover In re 150 Tex. agrees (1951). negligence, proper the insurer to cover the The 244 S.W.2d spectrum requires ap insured for a broader of risks. a court of standard of review Thus, consider, weigh compare the focus is on the insured’s all peals Id. legal obligation pay injury for or pertinent an the evidencе in the record occurrence, damage arising out of a certain and articulate issue under consideration coverage manifestly why original finding should extend to insured is un conscience, risk, clearly negligence, just, which constitutes a con shocks the or dem 72; Sosa, proximate injury. current ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‍cause of the Id. bias. 772 S.W.2d at onstrates resulting By finding coverage injury for an Pool v. Ford Motor S.W.2d (Tex.1986). words, negligence, the reason re from the insured’s other when expectations parties versing judgment to the in after con able a trial court’s cluding supporting are not frustrated. Our evidence is insuffi surance contract cient, expand appeals application Partridge does not the court of must detail liability, clearly why as potential insurer’s would be relevant evidence and state first-party property insur factually the case in the is insufficient. INA evidence (Tex. Briscoe, ance context. Texas v. 1989). appeals’ A conclusion that court of by The cases cited to us Warrilow involve might have additional or better evidence first-party propеrty insur- disputes over the issue under consider presented been on bar, the coverage. In the case at ance analysis for the ation is not a substitute liability dispute third-party over insur- is Sosa, 772 S.W.2d at 72. required Pool. coverage. We believe the distinction ance appel- Both necessary appropriate. RIFLE ASSOCIA- The “NATIONAL rehearing appellees’ motions for lant’s and INSURANCE POLICY” TION MASTER stated, in rele- providing are OVERRULED. Kerr’s part: vant NYE, C.J., concurs. will II. COVERAGE. underwriters Insured pay on behalf of the Individual NYE, Justice, concurring. Chief Individual all sums which the Member respectfully concur in the result I legally Member shall become Insured majority. agree I with reached pay damages, all as obligated to attorney Allen position that majority’s as included within hereinafter defined however, I reprehensible; King’s conduct is loss”, terms, “ultimate net excess1 and remand the case not reverse any other valid over and above would, however, I reverse that reason. insurance, because collectible appellant’s relying ease and remand this (a) injury, bodily i.e., error, the evidence point of second that Wil- factually insufficient to show under the claim was covered liam Kerr’s rising out by an occurrence and caused subject insurance Insured by the Individual of the use firearms, only but ... Member asked, Question No. Special Issue following activi- engaged in the while question a covered the accident “Was ties: poli- excluded under the loss and not public or (i) Hunting trapping on affirma- jury answered cy?” The private land. upheld jury’s find- majority tive. original. Emphasis in Kerr evidentiary scene minutes of incident. show that Carlton within facts

Norrell, details of the incident. William Kerr and A.T. Wolfe went told McLain the indica- hunting. They a vehicle from that there no deer rented McLain testified they Lee which used to drive to McLain filled out hunting. Richard tion of also hunting report from the fields. On the last whether report. accident asked hunting day, hunting. decided to leave the (Norrell) was Officer the victim hunting Ac- fields return vehicle. that he was not. McLain McLain indicated keep him to cording to Norrell told with on his discussions based answer *14 gun hip they and in case his holster on his He also based his answer Kerr Wolfe. way way deer on the On the saw a back. a incident on on the fact that the occurred back, they had a flat tire. Norrell started by private property. paved road surrounded Kerr, intending changing the tire. to as- they that have McLain testified would Norrell, pistol his from his sist removed adjoining permission needed to hunt on the place in order to it inside the vehicle. belt private property. dropped pistol. discharged, the It Kerr pertinent language in indi- the killing Norrell. “only enjoyed coverage cates that Kerr Holland, designated repre- Michael the hunting. Legisla- engaged in” Our while syndicate, the C.J. Warrilow sentative take, “hunt” ture has that “includes said in intent opinion, that is a testified take, kill, pursue, trap, attempt and the to determining major consideration in whether Ann. kill, & trap.” Tex.Parks Wild.Code person hunting. a is He also said that the 1976). 61.005(1)(Vernon In the instant § alleged hunting to in person is the best case, that all of circumstances indicate the say position to or not he was actu- whether incident, prior during to the actual hunting. ally hunting the now ceased and men were had i.e., mission, returning the on а different incident, (the day of On the the Kerr Having Mr. Lee. exam- rented vehicle to gave dropped pistol) person who evidence, I ined all of the would conclude stated, Kerr statement Officer Chaffin. greater weight and preponderance that the being just decided that this the last “[W]e evidence that William of all credible is season, give up go day of this we’d in engaged hunting at Kerr was not home_just quit year_ the ... on for grant I a new time of the incident. would got Jeep into and started home.” [W]e on trial this issue. trial, During Kerr that their hunt testified have until their arrival at would continued point error sustained majority however, Lee’s; he also said that while that court twenty-one and held the trial fields, got leaving hunting they aon “by failing its to order abused discretion a gate. drove four or five miles to road and King’s] [attorney withdrawal passed through gate, this Once mis- failing to motion for grant Warrilow’s place, permission continued Lee’s King’s trial when the nature required. would be Kerr did not have hunt testimony became witness] [as area and permission hunt in this question apparent.” There is no it. anything shot without not hаve provisions Discipli- violated the ethical of the men had incident occurred after all nary exceptions Rule stat- 5-102[A] through gate. Kerr admitted passed in Rule Disciplinary ed 5-101[B][l]-[4]. incident, he that at the time was II, Ann. Tex.Gov’t Code Title Subtitle See shoot; rather, looking something he (Vernon 1988).2 These enact- G rules were concentrating pistol placing his in- protect attorneys clients of ed to changing the the vehicle and tire. side public general from the intentional McLain, attorneys. wrongdoing and/or mistakes of field officer with the Michael Inc., Quintero Homes, Wildlife, v. Walter Division arrived at Jim Colorado II, 1990). Ann. Title Subtitle also Tex.Gov't Code 2. See (Vernon G, Supp. Rules 1.15 and Rule 3.08 allegiance to his light of his (Tex.App. Corpus Christi

S.W.2d — n.r.e.). position. of these client’s writ ref 'd Breaches attorney receiving pri rules result in the Furthermore, testifying advocate reprimand, suspension, or public vate or easily impeachable because of more uniquely are disbarment. These remedies may have as an advocate interest he they prevent the client appropriate because outcome of his client’s case. Wilson suffering any further mistreatment (1911), Wilson, 132 N.W. Neb. ethical misconduct. due to counsel’s attorney, the defendant wife’s who was however, believe, King’s I do not action, ap- divorce principal witness of the trial conduct warrants reversal The Ne- peared as her divorce counsel. F. judgment. court’s Professor John Sut- the attor- Supreme criticized braska Court ton, Jr., Testifying Advo- in his article The conduct, role as ney’s saying that his dual stated, cate, (1963), 41 Texas L.Rev. 477 against the ethics witness-advocate “is discussion, that: relevant to this unseemly, and no legal profession, *15 by interest —occasioned The advocate’s (Em- case. weakens the defendant’s doubt parti- merely by an advocate’s his fee or added.) Wilson, 132 N.W. at phasis prevail seeing instinct—in his client san case, may facts any given In the trier of lessens, strengthens, credibility not his giving weight little to a justified in testimony. weight and the of his When- testimony. Many witness-advocate’s given lawyer’s testimony a is un- ever weight of a witness’ tes- factors affect the by particular jury or weight usual however, question and the timony, his judge, lawyer’s demeanor and usually left to weight is best of evidence community similar standing in the Seaboalt, of facts. the trier responsible. The cir- likely are factors does present appeal, In the the record that he is both advocate and cumstance reflect, argue, appellants fail not itself enhance his stand- witness does not or King’s testimony was untruthful that advocacy a witness or make his as certainly credibility. Appellants in lacking appealing. appearance more any opportunity expose weak- had the lawyer as either a witness or particular thorough testimony in a King’s nesses may be influential with an advocate case, present In the cross-examination. reputation jury, by reason of judge such, not, as cause King’s dual role did difficult personal magnetism, but is or improper judgment. he simultaneous- rendition of to see how the fact that record to his not refer to the ly appears majority as both could increase does fact, cross-examining King on the trier of how influence show where or [footnote I note that handicapped defense counsel. omitted] occurs, King a retrial will still be when King, that Apparently, majority fears and, attorney perhaps, an expert witness advocate, acting witness and by as both may serve though may he or not even standing as a wit enhanced his somehow counsel. Retrial will again as Kerr’s trial judgment ness, reversing the by opportunity to defense counsel’s not make they obviously assume that point, this testimony any easier. impeach King’s intelligence to consider and jury lacked punish- now stands majority’s opinion as it King’s interest weigh effect of attorney. the sins of the es the client for witness’ An interested case. however, rules, disciplinary were jury can prohibited, because need not be rather, litigant; designated penalize of the interest. weigh the effect and will duties an is to delineate the purpose their Vandaveer, 231 S.W.2d Seaboalt judicial proceeding owes in a advocate writ (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland weight denying proper By his client. case, n.r.e.). King’s present ref’d testimony, majority imputes King’s keenly intеrest is so evident partisan would, King’s professional indiscretions unsophisticated jury the most even could, client. in this case did consider practice acting King’s

I condemn his client. witness advocate for

both

Ample justification preventing becoming found

practice prevalent from respect to maintain for the

in the need due legal

integrity profession, which to suffer such conduct.3

bound punish- sanctioned

should be whatever Supreme

ment the Texas or our dis- Court grievance appropri-

trict committee finds conclude,

ate. I after careful consideration attorney thinking, reflective

King’s prejudice oppos- conduct did not

ing party to such an it caused extent that im- probably caused rendition of an Tex.R.App.P.

proper Compare verdict. error).

81(b)(1)(judicial

I not hold that the trial court failing its discretion to order

abused King’s by not withdrawal and/or mistrial

granting Warrilow’s motion for *16 attorney King’s nature of testi-

when the apparent.

mony became judg-

I reverse the trial court’s remand the trial

ment and case for a new premises. out in its

as set KING

John and Veronica

King, Appellants,

v. EVANS, al., Appellees. D.

Earl et

No. 04-88-00348-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court

San Antonio.

March

Rehearing Denied June judgment Supreme presented in Court of Criminal lack of ethical other 3. Our and Court ble recently adopted Lawyer's Appeals as this one that this creed "The Texas cases as well indicates auspicious appears ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‍re most See Mill Mandate for at a time. Creed—A Professionalism" Wiesenthal, (Tex.1989); growing practice sponse abuse of the v. S.W.2d 626 to the house Grimes, (Tex.1989). profession Cosgrove legal system. urge 774 S.W.2d 662 These courts our justice nor our man is served practice itself to the of law "so we Neither fellow to rededicate public profession, principles become stated in this creed can restore faithfully confidence in our until clients, through lawyers all our re moral fabric that wear serve our and fulfill professional legal system." personal sponsibility considera lives. out their

Case Details

Case Name: Warrilow v. Norrell
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Apr 12, 1990
Citation: 791 S.W.2d 515
Docket Number: 13-88-437-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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