187 Mass. 290 | Mass. | 1905
These are petitions for a writ of certiorari
to quash the proceedings of the street commissioners of Boston in assessing betterments under the St. 1902, c. 527, for the laying out, extension and construction of Huntington Avenue. Our decision will depend upon the construction to be given to this statute. It was passed on June 27, 1902, and is a law giving general authority to the street commissioners of Boston to assess betterments for public improvements completed by the city within six years before its enactment, “ consisting of laying out, relocating, altering or widening, with or without construction or
Two questions arise under it: One is whether the Legislature constitutionally could authorize a re-assessment of betterments from the construction of Huntington Avenue, so as to include in the assessment a portion of the expenditures made in violation of the statute ; the other is whether the Legislature intended to authorize such a re-assessment. As to the first question, the-counsel for one of the petitioners concedes that the Legislature may authorize the re-assessment of a betterment tax if the original assessment failed because of informality or other defect. But we have before us an argument that the statute, if construed according to the contention of the respondents, is unconstitutional.
The assessment of betterments under statutes of this kind is simply a mode of special taxation to meet the expenses of gov
Under this statute the assessment cannot exceed one half of the cost of the improvements, and thus abutters are relieved from a part of the charge that might have been put upon them under the original act, which authorized a special assessment of the whole cost. This indicates liberality towards those upon whom invalid assessments had been or might be made under former statutes. Another statute, passed about the same time, indicates also the adoption of a more liberal policy towards abutters generally in the city of Boston. St. 1902, c. 521.
If it were true that the statute authorized assessments in cases in which prior valid assessments had been made, there might be force in this suggestion. If such valid previous assessments which had not been wholly paid might be revised and made to conform to the new assessment under the language of this statute, while such valid assessments as had been wholly paid were allowed to stand under the provision that no parcel for which assessment shall have been paid and not recovered back shall be subject to the payment of another assessment for that improvement, unequal and disproportional taxation would be likely to result; for the original assessments being valid, those who had paid without protest would be assessed at one rate which they would have no power to change, while those who had not paid would be entitled to revision, and presumably reduction, to conform to the new assessment at a different rate. But we are of opinion that the statute contemplates the making of but one valid assessment for any improvement, and that its reference to former assessments is to those that are invalid. In that view, this objection does not arise. Everybody who is affected at all by the proceedings under this statute will be entitled to be assessed in the same manner and at the same rate. The only peculiar provision is, that the estates of owners who have voluntarily paid former invalid assessments in full, so that there is no right to recover them back, shall not be subject to another assessment. Such owners cannot complain of the statute, for it does not affect their rights in any way, except as it diminishes for every taxpayer the amount to be paid by general taxation. The owners of other estates which are assessed under it cannot complain, because their estates are all assessed upon the same basis, and they do not suffer from leaving out those estates for which ample payments have already been made. If it appeared probable that
Petition dismissed.