Warren v. StateWarren v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Henderson
We have no statute expressly declaring an attempt to commit rape to be an offense. Penal Code, article 640, provides: “If it appear on the trial of an indictment for rape that the offense, though not committed, was attempted by the use of any of the means spoken of in articles 634, 635, and 636, but not such as to bring the offense within the definition of an assault with intent to commit rape, the jury may find the defendant guilty of an attempt to commit the offense and affix the punishment prescribed in article 608.” This statute specifically points out the manner, means, and method which must be intended by the accused in order to constitute the offense.
2. Same—Force.
No person, in this State, can be guilty of an attempt to commit rape unless the proof shows that an attempt was made by the use of force, and the force intended to be used is that defined in article 634; that is, the force intended to be used must be reasonably calculated to overcome resistance, taking into consideration the relative strength of the parties and other circumstances of the case. When the force used amounts to an assault, it ceases to be a mere attempt, and would be an assault to commit rape; for the two offenses have come together, the attempt has ceased, and the assault has taken its place. Where force is actually used, then it is no longer a mere attempt.
3. Same—Age of, and Consent by, Female.
In attempt to rape, the age of the female has nothing to do with the question, it being mainly a question as to the intended use of force. The law requires that the accused intended the use of the force defined in article 634, and though the female was under the age of 15 years, this did not dispense with the necessity of proving such force. And in this offense, the law presupposes that she was not consenting. She could not, at the same time, resist and consent. In this respect, the law of attempt to rape differs from the law of rape.
Henderson, Judge, while agreeing with the result reached, does not concur in some of the reasoning of the opinion.
The indictment contained two counts; the first alleging the rape of one Belle Beauchamp, a female under the age of 15 years; and the second, a rape of Belle Beauchamp by force, threats, and fraud, and without her consent.
The facts, substantially, as shown by the record, were: That on Friday, March 6, 1896, the defendant, a physician, resided with his wife in the town of Bullard, Smith County, in a four-room house, fronting east, with an open hall running through the middle of it, east and west, and
“He pushed me over in a sitting position on the side of the bed; then he sat down by me and talked to me. He told me that all girls did the like of that, and kept on talking to me; told me it was not wrong, and kinder felt of me. He kinder shoved me over on my back crosswise the bed. He was trying to get my consent to have carnal intercourse with me. He did not do anything then. He repeated the words over, and I told him if he was going to do anything like that to get up and put the curtains down. He got up and went to put the curtains down, and I ran to the door and he caught me and led me back to the bed. He pulled me down sitting on the bed again, and Sallie Tarrant opened the door and poked her head in and saw him and me. Dr. Warren got up and kept holding me by the arm; door was not locked; was locked at one time. After Sallie stepped back, he threw me kinder on the bed. Kept trying to get my consent. He was sitting on the bed; kept sitting on the bed. Before Sallie Tarrant opened the door he had gotten about half way on me. He tried to unfasten my clothes in front—my bosom—but did not. Do not know why, unless because I was moving about too much. He took hold of my clothing and tried to get my clothes up, but did not get them farther up than just above my knees; I was pushing his hands, trying to push him off. Do not think he ever got fully on top of me. I remember the most important part of it, but not all. Do not know whether his pants were unbuttoned or not; I did not see them unbut
Q. “Detail everything that occurred and that was said, from the time Marvin Cole came over to the schoolhouse after you, until he left the room and went down in town.”
A. “Well, Marvin came over there after me and said that Mrs. Warren said to come home, right home, she wanted to see me; and when I got there I went in her room, and when I came out, Dr. Warren was standing in the door of the opposite room. I asked him where she was. He said, she is here. I started back; he caught me by the arm and took me in the room. I could not tell all that was said, word by word. He said that anything of that kind was not any harm. I told him that it was, and he tried to persuade me and could not do that, and he tried to push me over on the bed, and I told him to quit, and if he would not, shut down the windows, and when he got up to do so I ran, and just as I caught the door knob he caught me, and just then Sallie came to the door and asked where Aunt Willie was; I don‘t know whether anyone answered her or not. He kept me in there some time and kept trying to persuade me, and finally got up and said he was going down in town and opened the door and went out. It was before Sallie poked her head in at the door that he put his hand on my person. All this occurred in Smith County, and the State of Texas, on the 6th day of March, 1896.”
The charge of the court (omitting formal matters) as given to the jury was as follows:
“Rape is defined by law, among other things, as ‘the carnal knowledge of a female under the age of fifteen years, other than the wife of the person, with or without her consent, and with or without the use of force, threats, or fraud.’
“The charge of rape included the offense of attempt to commit rape.
“If the jury believe, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Belle Beauchamp was, on the day alleged below, under 15 years of age, then you will not further consider whether or not she was willing and consenting to the carnal intercourse with defendant, or whether or not force, threats, or fraud was used by defendant; but in addition thereto, if you further find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant, Dr. R. B. Warren, in the county of Smith and State of Texas, on the 7th day of March, 1896, and prior to the filing of the indictment herein, did attempt to have carnal knowledge of said Belle Beauchamp, then you will find the defendant guilty of an attempt to commit a rape, and will assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any term of years not less that two.”
The refused special requested instructions for defendant are as follows:
1. “You are further charged, that if defendant did not intend to have carnal connection with the prosecutrix except by her consent, and that he used no force, but only fondled her and felt of her person, without any intent to have carnal intercourse by force or without her consent, then you will acquit the defendant.”
2. “You are charged that if you believe from the evidence that the defendant did not intend to have carnal connection with the prosecutrix, except by her consent, and that he did not use nor intend to use force to accomplish his purpose, and that he did not rape the prosecutrix, then you will not find him guilty of either assault to rape or an attempt to commit rape.”
3. “You are charged, that in order to find the prisoner guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner, when he laid hold of the prosecutrix, desired not only to gratify his passion upon her person, but that he intended to do so at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance on her part.”
4. “You are further charged, that before you can convict the defendant of an attempt to commit rape, you must believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he sought to have carnal connection with the prosecutrix by the use of force, but not such force as to bring the offense within the definition of an assault with intent to commit rape as defined in the main charge, and if you should not believe such force was used, then you will acquit the defendant, or find him guilty of aggra
5. “If you believe from the evidence that the defendant did assault the said Belle Beauchamp, but you do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he, under the circumstances, and at the time and place, intended to have carnal knowledge of her at all events, and notwithstanding resistance on her part, then you will acquit the defendant of the charge of the assault with intent to commit rape.”
The assigned errors, from 2 to 12 inclusive, will be considered together, and are as follows:
2. The court erred in charging the jury that the consent or want of consent of the prosecutrix should not be considered by them in determining the question of attempt to rape, if the prosecutrix was under 15 years of age at the time of the attempt.
3. The court erred in charging the jury that neither force, threats, nor fraud need be shown to establish the charge of attempt to rape, if the prosecutrix was under 15 years of age at the time of such attempt.
4. The court erred in its charge to the jury in failing to define the crime of attempt to commit rape, either in the terms of the statute or as used in ordinary language, and in authorizing the jury by the charge to find the defendant guilty of attempt to rape, if he simply asked or endeavored to persuade the prosecutrix to have intercourse with him.
5. The court erred in failing to define attempt to rape as defined in article 640 of the Penal Code. That is to say, in failing to charge that if the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that a rape, though not committed, was attempted by the use of force, but not such as to bring the offense within the definition of assault with intent to commit rape, then the jury might find the defendant guilty of an attempt to rape.
6. The court erred in failing to charge the jury upon assault with intent to rape, as the force necessary to constitute that offense is necessary to be defined to and be considered by the jury in determining as to whether the force actually used, if any, would come within the definition of the force necessary to be proven to establish an attempt to rape.
7. The court erred in charging the jury, in substance and effect, to find the defendant guilty of attempt to rape.
8. The court erred in its refusal to give defendant‘s requested charges from 1 to 5 inclusive.
The court erred in its charge to the jury in failing to define attempt, either in the language of the statute or as used in common language; thus authorizing the jury to convict of attempt to rape, if defendant had indicated by word or deed a desire to have carnal intercourse with the prosecutrix, or had made the slightest effort, by request or otherwise, to gain her consent thereto.
Defendant merely endeavored to persuade the prosecutrix to submit to him, or, as she expresses it: “He pushed me over into a sitting position on the side of the bed; then he sat down by me and talked to me; kept talking to me; told me it was not wrong, and kinder felt of me. He kept trying to persuade me that it was not wrong,” etc. Defendant did not expose his own person, or even unbutton his pants, and merely fondled and felt of the person of the prosecutrix; finally voluntarily desisted, left the room and house, saying to the prosecutrix he was going down in town. She remained at the house; went into the room across the hall, and was playing on the organ when he returned a half hour later. She then played an accompaniment to him while he sang, and altogether conducted herself that afternoon, that night, and the next day as though nothing extraordinary had happened, saying nothing to anyone in regard to the affair. McAdoo v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 603; Bozeman v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 503; Allen v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 381; Callison v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 211; Robertson v. State, 30 Texas Crim. App., 498; Marthall v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 22; Mitchell v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 575; 9 Texas Crim. App., 53, 137; 567; 12 Texas Crim. App., 194; 15 Texas Crim. App., 275; 17 Texas Crim. App., 565; 22 Texas Crim. App., 529; 24 Texas Crim. App., 366; 28 Texas Crim. App., 227; 30 Texas Crim. App., 662; 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 298; 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 26, 479; 34 S. W. Rep., 281; 10 Texas Crim. App., 552; 14 Texas Crim. App., 162; 16 Texas Crim. App., 535; 18 Texas Crim. App., 485; 23 Texas Crim. App., 73; 27 Texas Crim. App., 317, 330; 29 Texas Crim. App., 241; 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 371; 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 65, 385, 412; 29 S. W. Rep., 1078.
Force is not a necessary element of an attempt to rape a female under the age of 15 years. Carnal knowledge of such female is per se rape, whether with or without consent. This conclusion necessarily follows from the language of the statute defining the offense; that is, “The carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 15 years (other than the wife of the person) with or without her consent, and with or without the use of force, threats or fraud.”
It has been repeatedly held that “this offense has elements which do not constitute a technical assault.” Melton v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 286; Williams v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App., 90; Burney v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App., 565; Moore v. State, 20 Texas Crim. App., 275. Attempt to rape is a substantive offense for which indictment may be found
It is uniformly held that where the offense is against a female under the age of consent, it is not necessary to negative the consent or aver that force, threats, or fraud were used. 1 Whart. Prec. Indict., 189, et seq.; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 481.
Therefore sexual intercourse with a female under the age of consent constitutes rape, without reference to whether she consented or whether force, threats, or fraud were used to effect the purpose. Anschicks v. State, 6 Texas Crim. App., 525; Mayo v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 342; Callison v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 211.
The question is, “did the defendant at the time have the ulterior purpose of committing a rape, that is, of penetrating the female organ with his male member? If he had this purpose, the female being under the age of consent, it would be rape.” Allen v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 381. Did this defendant have the ulterior purpose of having carnal intercourse with Belle Beauchamp; if so, he is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense of rape. The definition of attempt to commit rape is perfect and complete. The court, after instructing that the jury must believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Belle Beauchamp was on the day alleged under the age of 15 years, further said, if he “did attempt to have carnal knowledge of said Belle Beauchamp, then you will find defendant guilty of an attempt to commit rape.” This sets forth the gist and constituent elements of the offense.
There was no evidence suggesting the special instructions in the line that if the appellant simply intended to fondle the female, he could not be guilty of assault to rape or attempt to rape. This also rendered it unnecessary to charge on aggravated or simple assault.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that the female was under the age of consent, and that appellant attempted to have carnal intercourse with her, that is, sought to have such intercourse. There is no evidence suggesting any other purpose. Therefore the argument of appellant on this line is without support in the evidence.
HURT, Presiding Judge.—Appellant was convicted of an attempt to commit a rape upon Belle Beauchamp, and his punishment assessed at seven years in the penitentiary; hence this appeal.
There are two counts in the indictment. The count which charges the rape alleges that Belle Beauchamp was under the age of 15 years. The second count is for assault with intent to rape Belle Beauchamp, it not being alleged that the assaulted party, Belle Beauchamp, was under the age of fifteen years. The assault is alleged to have been made with force, threats, and fraud, and without the consent of Belle Beauchamp. After the testimony was introduced, the court instructed the jury as follows: “Rape is defined by law, among other things, ‘as the carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 15 years, other than the wife
Appellant was convicted of an attempt to rape the prosecutrix. Counsel for appellant complains of the charge of the court given, and also insists that the requested instruction should have been given. We must test the charge of the court by the law of the case. At common law a party could be convicted for an attempt to commit a felony, the punishment being fixed either by common law or by act of parliament, graded by the character of the offense attempted.
Reversed and remanded.
DAVIDSON, Judge, concurs.
HENDERSON, Judge.—I am not prepared to agree with some of the reasoning of a majority of the court. However, I agree to the result. As I understand the evidence, this showed that appellant was not guilty of a mere attempt, but, if guilty of anything, it was an assault with intent to commit the offense charged; and I do not believe that the facts and circumstances in proof authorized the learned judge to submit an attempt to commit a rape at all. At any rate, if he undertook to submit an attempt to commit a rape on the person of the prosecutrix, he should have instructed the jury what constituted such attempt, and have further instructed them what constituted an assault with intent to rape, and in that connection should have informed the jury that, if the action of the defendant constituted an assault with intent to rape, they could not convict the defendant of an attempt to commit rape. For the failure to so instruct the jury, I believe the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and the cause remanded.