3 Park. Cr. 544 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1857
The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the law under which the conviction was had is unconstitutional: First. Because it denies the right of trial by jury, in a case in which it has been heretofore used. Second. Because it establishes a new court, which
Previous to examining the act of 1855, it will be proper to notice the Revised Statutes, “ Of disorderly persons,” in which it is declared, among other things, “ that all keepers of bawdy-houses, or houses for the resort of prostitutes, drunkards, tipplers, gamesters or other disorderly persons,” &c., “ shall be deemed disorderly persons.” (1 R. S., 638, § 1.) Upon a complaint on oath to a justice of the peace against any person, as being disorderly, the justice is required to issue his warrant, and to cause such person to be brought before him for examination. If it appear that; such person is a disorderly person, the justice may require of him sufficient sureties for his good behavior for one year; and in default of such sureties, the justice is to make up, sign and file, in the county clerk’s office, a record of the conviction of such offender, as a disorderly person, specifying generally the nature and circumstances of the offence, and by warrant, commit such offender to the common jail, there to remain until such. sureties be found, or such offender be discharged according to law.
Two justices may discharge the prisoner from jail upon his giving the sureties required. If not discharged, the Court of General Sessions is to inquire into the circumstances, and may discharge such person from confinement, &c., or may, in its discretion, order such person to be kept in the common jail, for any time not exceeding six months, at hard labor, &c. The provisions of the Revised Statutes are taken mainly from an act passed February 9, 1788. (1 R. L., 114, § 1.) By that act the justice was authorized to commit such disorderly persons to the bridewell or house of correction, for any time not exceeding sixty days, or until ■ the next General Sessions of the peace. The General Ses
It is sure, that neither by the Revised Laws nor the Revised Statutes, was any trial by jury given in proceedings against disorderly persons. The whole power was, in the first instance, confided to a justice of the peace, and until the Revised Statutes, he was not authorized to take sureties, except as to persons who, for the most part, supported themselves by gaming. (1 R. L., 154, § 9.)
It is proper to remark that I do not find “ keepers of bawdy-houses” mentioned in the statutes relating to disorderly persons, prior to the Revised Statutes. It is clear that the trial by jury was not used prior to the constitution of 1821, or 1846, in cases relating to disorderly persons, as defined by the statute, and reserving the case of the “ keepers of bawdy-houses,” there can be no question that the legislature has the power to provide for the examination and trial of disorderly persons, without a jury.
Keeping a bawdy-house was, and is, an indictable o Hence at common law (l Russ. on Cr., 322), and the person, when indicted for this offence, has a right to be tried by a jury. May the legislature in revising the laws from time to time, or by new-statutes, declare that persons doing certain acts, which acts by the common law or by statute are crimes, indictable and punishable as such, disorderly persons, and thus subject them to the summary proceedings and punishment before and by a justice of the peace, or any court, without a jury?
By the statute under which the justice acted, it is provided that, in addition to those persons described in section one, title five, chapter twenty, of the Revised Statutes, all riotous persons, or persons found quarreling or fighting in any alley, street or lane, or in any public place, street, lane or alley in said village, and any person who shall make any indecent exposure of his person in public view, and specifying many other acts, it is declared shall be deemed disbr
It will be noticed that the act does not mention “ keepers of bawdy-houses, or houses for the resort of prostitutes, drunkards, tipplers and gamesters, or other disorderly persons.” This is the language of the Revised Statutes. The act of 1855 introduces its specification with the language : “ In addition to those persons described in section one, &c., of the Revised Statutes, all riotous persons, &c., shall be deemed disorderly persons,-and maybe proceeded against and punished according to the provisions of this act.” Quere. Had the justice any power under the act to proceed against and punish any persons except such as are charged with the acts specified in this statute ? Could he apply the provisions of this act, touching trial and punishment, to the cases specified only in the Revised Statutes? The act says, “ When any person charged or complained against as a disorderly person under the provisions of this act shall be arrested ” the justice may try. Are we to incorporate in the act all the cases specified in the Revised Statutes? I certainly have great doubt whether the language in this statute is sufficient to bring into the statute all the cases specified in the Revised Statutes as constituting disorderly persons, and thus subject them to a summary trial and punishment by the justice. If not, then the proceeding was under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, as to the charge of keeping a bawdy-house, or house for the resort of prostitutes, &c., and the justice had no right to try and punish the accused under the act of 1855, but he should have
In Wood v. City of Brooklyn (14 Barb., 432), Justice Strong says : “ This provision relates to classes, and of course includes the individual cases which they comprise. In no other way can constitutional enactments preserve that continued efficacy which is so essential for the public good. Whenever, therefore, a new case is added to a class it becomes subject to its rules.” He applied these rules to a newly enacted penalty. He adds: “ To allow the legislature to except from the operation of a constitutional provision by direct enactment, a matter clearly falling within its meaning, would sanction a fraud upon its organic law, and might, in the end, destroy its obligation.” (The People v. Berberrick and Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. R., 336; The People v. Kennedy, 2 Park. Cr. R., 312.) In the latter case Justice Parker says : “ If the accused, in a trial of this grade, had the right to a trial by jury, in the constitutional sense of the word, when the constitution took effect, his right cannot be taken away by a subsequent act of the legislature. It is no answer to say that this offence did not exist at the time the constitution took effect, but has since been enacted by statute. If the offence be such that it could have been entitled to a trial by a jury, if enacted before the constitution was adopted, it cannot be deprived of the same right when enacted afterwards.” These remarks were in cases where the crime was enacted since the constitution. They furnish the rule in such cases, viz., that where the legislature vote a new offence it is placed on the same footing as other previous offences of the same grade or class, and is equally governed by the constitution;
The legislature has, as we have seen, from time to time revised the statutes in relation to disorderly persons, and added new cases; and the legislature may, I have no doubt, continue to do so; and if the acts which shall be specified as constituting a disorderly person are of a similar charac